安全理事会

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安全理事会主席的说明

安全理事会第 2569(2021)号决议第 2 段请第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组向安理会提交附有结论和建议的中期报告。安理会主席谨因此而分发收自专家小组的报告(见附件)。

附件

2021 年 9 月 3 日第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组给安全理事会主席的信

安全理事会第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组谨根据安理会第 2569(2021)号决议第 2 段转递关于专家小组工作的中期报告。

已于 2021 年 8 月 3 日将报告提交安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会，委员会于 2021 年 8 月 26 日审议了该报告。

请提醒安全理事会成员注意本信及报告并将它们作为安理会文件分发为荷。

安全理事会第 1874(2009)号决议
所设专家小组

附文

2021 年 8 月 3 日第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组给安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会主席的信

安全理事会第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组谨根据安理会第 2569(2021)号决议第 2 段转递关于专家小组工作的中期报告。

请提醒安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会成员注意本信及报告为荷。

安全理事会第 1874(2009)号决议
所设专家小组

摘要

在本报告所述期间，尽管朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的重点是着力应对日益恶化的经济困境，但该国继续维持和发展核计划和弹道导弹计划。没有关于洲际弹道导弹试射或核试验的报道。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国试验了一种结合了弹道和制导技术的新型短程弹道导弹，并以其他方式维持和改进其弹道导弹和核基础设施。它继续寻求从海外获得这些计划所需的材料和技术。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国为应对 2019 冠状病毒病(COVID-19)大流行而实施的封锁继续对该国境内和进出该国的合法和非法的人员和货物流动产生根本性影响。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国煤炭和其他受制裁商品的海运出口仍在继续，但出口数量大大减少。向专家小组报告的石油产品进口量在 2021 年上半年大幅下降。海事和金融调查显示，为了逃避制裁，船只以及支持船只的管理和所有权结构采用了日益复杂的技策。继续存在滥用自动识别系统的情况；朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的船队继续购置船只；该国继续出售其水域的捕鱼权。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续使用国际金融机构，依然存在该国海外工人赚取收入用于国家计划的现象。海外官员继续感受到创收的压力。进入朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的奢侈品进口几乎停止。

专家小组继续调查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国参与全球网络活动以及其学者和大学与国外科研机构合作的情况，这些合作的重点是研发可能用于大规模毁灭性武器计划的各种应用。专家小组认为，网络盗窃资金和专门知识以及通过学术手段进行技术无形转让都是重要问题。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的声明显示，该国的人道主义危机正在加深，尽管为应对 COVID-19 疫情实施的封锁意味着制裁对人道主义局势的相对影响可能已降低。专家小组再次对以前活跃在该国的人道主义组织进行调查。由于贸易活动因封锁而几乎停止，加上 2020 年的收成受到洪水的严重影响，目前来看，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国广大民众的前景黯淡。

专家小组感谢那些建设性地支持其工作的会员国。然而，会员国与专家小组的互动情况仍然参差不齐。专家小组提出的索要信息的请求有一半以上未获答复。专家小组将与有关各方讨论关于改进对专家小组调查工作的回应情况的想法。本报告提出的专家小组建议载于每一节的末尾，建议汇总载于附件 66。

目录

* 附件仅以来件所用语文分发，未经正式编辑。

一. 导言

1. 安全理事会第 2569(2021)号决议第 2 段请第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组向安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会提交一份载有专家小组调查结果和建议的中期报告。[1] 本报告所述期间为 2021 年 2 月 6 日至 8 月 3 日。在整个期间，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续实施边境管制，以应对持续的 2019 冠状病毒病(COVID-19)大流行(见附件 1)。

二. 近期与核计划和弹道导弹计划有关的活动

核

2. 专家小组继续监测朝鲜民主主义人民共和国正在进行的核计划。虽然在本报告所述期间没有核试验的报道，但在与该计划有关的地点仍有活动存在。

宁边地点

3. 据一个会员国称，轻水反应堆的外部建造似乎已经完成。该会员国评估认为，机器安装可能正在进行中。另一个会员国使用红外和其他图像手段探测到 2020 年 12 月至 2021 年 2 月期间该设施内有活动迹象，这表明已经进行了一些测试。2021 年 5 月，一个会员国观察到涡轮发电机东侧变压器周围有热活动(见附件 2)。卫星图像显示轻水反应堆以南地区有建筑活动，包括出现一个圆形结构(直径 3.5 米)，一个会员国评估认为该结构可能是个竖井(见附件 3)。

4. 自 2018 年以来，宁边实验核电站 5 兆瓦(电)反应堆一直没有运行的迹象。观察到反应堆附近有车辆，一个会员国评估认为，车辆在那里可能是为了维修目的(见附件 4)。

5. 专家小组观察到放射化学实验室的活动。自 2021 年 2 月以来，一个会员国探测到在燃煤热电厂和后处理区之间的旁路上有热信号，也发现了烟囱冒烟的迹象。会员国评估认为，这表明该设施在一定程度上恢复了运行(见附件 5)。专家小组注意到国际原子能机构总干事 2021 年 6 月 7 日的声明，总干事在声明中表示，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国可能开展了新的后处理活动(见附件 6)。专家小组通过自己的卫星图像分析，观察到热电厂冒出的烟雾。

6. 专家小组观察到宁边离心厂持续存在活动。专家小组注意到，2021 年 4 月，离心厂附近可能有一辆液氮储罐拖车(见附件 7)。专家小组证实了一个智库[2] 的观察，即在该工厂可能有一辆液氮储罐拖车，这可能表明工厂正在运行。一个会员国报告说，观察到在工厂的冷却装置一侧有一个金属结构，但该结构的用途尚不清楚。

[1] 为发表此中期报告，六名专家认为，列入第三方主要原始资料中使用的地理标志或符号并不意味着专家小组本身对任何国家、领土或地区或其当局的法律地位发表任何意见(专家小组的两名专家对列入这一条款持保留意见)。

[2] 38 North；见 www.38north.org/2019/06/yongbyon060519/。

平山铀矿和浓缩厂

7. 一个会员国报告说，浓缩厂仍在运行，并通过卫星图像分析观察到活动。专家小组发现，位于主厂区以南的尾矿池中固体废物堆积量可能增大(见附件 8)，这表明工厂正在运行。专家小组还观察到工厂内可能有轨道车活动(见附件 9)。

丰溪里核试验场

8. 据一个会员国称，卫星图像显示试验场有活动迹象，可能与维护场址安全有关。

其他场址

9. 专家小组继续监测降仙[3] 附近的活动，据说那里是秘密铀浓缩设施。专家小组观察到那里持续有车辆活动(见附件 10)，但无法确认该场地的建筑是否具有与铀浓缩设施相一致的功能。

10. 根据开源信息，[4] 据信 Yongdoktong 参与了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的核武器研制计划，包括作为核武器储存设施参与其中。[5] 一个会员国无法确认 Yongdoktong 是否被用作核弹头储存地，但注意到在 Yongdoktong 有一些翻修活动，并发现在该场址的储存区有一个新建成的建筑物(见附件 11)。该会员国评估认为，这个新建筑是用来掩盖用于进行可能的设备转移的两条隧道的入口。在两个山谷还发现了两处新的挖掘(见图一)。专家小组也证实了会员国对该建筑和挖掘地的观察。

[3] S/2021/211，第 8 段。国际原子能机构在其报告中也提到了该地点。


[4] 见美国有线电视新闻网，www.cnn.com/2021/03/02/politics/north-korea-satellite-images-yongdoktong-nuclear-site/index.html。

[5] 据信该地点也用于进行核装置内爆技术试验中的高能炸药爆炸(见 Arms Control Wonk，www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1211166/new-construction-at-yondoktong/)。

图一

在 Yongdoktong 的疑似核武器储存设施

分别在主储存区(北纬 40°01′51″，东经 125°18′27″)以西 3 公里(北纬 40°01′44″，东经 125°16′27″)和以南 3 公里(北纬 40°00′01″，东经 125°18′01″)的两个山谷中发现了两处新的挖掘。



资料来源：Planet Labs，2021 年 5 月 22 日，协调世界时 2 时 04 分；2021 年 7 月 16 日，协调世界时 5 时 26 分。谷歌，2017 年 3 月 13 日；2019 年 1 月 30 日；2019 年 12 月 4 日。专家小组提供了该地点的坐标。

技术无形转让和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国相关大学的活动

11. 根据安全理事会第 2321(2016)号决议第 11 段(见附件 12)并参考各科研机构编写的报告，专家小组一直在调查涉及朝鲜民主主义人民共和国科学家在特定活动领域的技术无形转让问题。专家小组感到关切的是，复合材料结构和振动分析(两者都有工业应用，但在核设备和弹道导弹计划的设计中都是必不可少的)方面的高级学术研究可能为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的科学家提供一个机会，使他们从与其他科学家和学术机构的联合工作中获益。专家小组找到了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国研究机构和中国的几所大学于 2019 年联合发表的 11 篇科学论文，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的具体科学家参与了这些论文的写作(见附件 13)。专家小组致函中国，请求澄清这些联合研究的性质。中国答复称："中国的大学与朝鲜之间不存在被禁止的学术交流、科学合作或联合研究"(见附件 14)。对其他几篇联合科学论文的调查仍在继续。[6]

12. 专家小组继续调查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国与海外大学[7] 之间的学术交流以及朝鲜民主主义人民共和国科学家参与的科学技术伙伴关系。专家小组收到了针对其先前就金日成综合大学与古巴、印度尼西亚、阿拉伯叙利亚共和国和越南的四所大学之间学术交流一事所提问询提供的补充资料，这四所大学在金日成综合大学网站上被称为"姊妹大学"，它们声称在 2012 年至 2016 年期间与金日成综合大学签署了合作协议。这四所大学解释说，其交流方案的范围仅限于法律、语言、旅游和教育，没有发现违反制裁的情况(见附件 15)。专家小组等待其余机构的进一步答复。

13. 专家小组还要求被金策工业综合大学(见附件 16)确定为"国际友谊"大学并且目前或以前与之进行过交流的 11 所大学提供资料。俄罗斯联邦答复说，太平洋国立大学(俄罗斯联邦)与金策工业综合大学之间没有正式学术交流或合作，也没有发现与专家小组的调查有关的违规行为。的里亚斯特大学(意大利)也答复说，它与金策工业综合大学没有正式关系(见附件 17)。专家小组收到了中国就与金日成综合大学和金策工业综合大学进行大学交流的答复，称"安全理事会决议并不禁止与朝鲜的大学建立友谊。中朝两国大学之间的'姊妹大学'式友好关系不仅是出于传统友谊，也符合两国人民开展文化教育交流与合作的需要"(见附件 14)。调查仍在继续。

弹道导弹

14. 过去几年，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的弹道导弹计划发展迅速，该国实现了主要的威慑和打击能力目标；相比之下，该计划在 2021 年上半年失去了势头。然而，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的弹道导弹计划仍然保持连贯和动态活跃，具体表现在：根据专家小组对会员国提供的信息所作分析，3 月 25 日试射了一种结合

[6] S/2021/211，第 13 段。

[7] 同上，第 14 段。

了弹道和制导技术的新型固体推进剂导弹系统；[8] 在最近两次阅兵式上出现了两种新型潜射弹道导弹和一种新的超大型洲际弹道导弹(S/2021/211，第 17-20 段)。此外，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续调整其工业生产基础设施和弹道导弹基地。尽管会员国的制裁和不扩散方面的努力大大降低了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国核扩散的可能性，但该国继续寻求获得其大规模毁灭性武器计划所需的两用部件和技术。

15. 与前几年相比(2020 年进行了 4 次弹道试验，2019 年 13 次试验，2017 年 15 次试验)，2021 年前 7 个月(一次试射两枚短程弹道导弹)报告的弹道导弹试射速度明显放缓。但是，据几个会员国称，弹道导弹计划使朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有能力运载现已小型化、可以安装弹道导弹弹头的核武器。

16. 据会员国称，2021 年 3 月 25 日，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国用新的五轴轮式运输竖起发射装置进行了两枚经过技术改造的新型固体推进剂短程弹道导弹[9] 的移动试射。两枚导弹先后从咸镜南道的一个军事设施[10] 向东发射(见图二)。据几个会员国称，短程弹道导弹在完成艰难的拉升动作后落入海中(见表 1 和附件 18-1 和 18-2)。

图二

2021 年 3 月 25 日短程弹道导弹发射



资料来源：劳动新闻和朝鲜中央电视台。

[8] 两名专家表示，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国 2021 年 3 月 25 日发射的射弹的性质和技术尚不清楚。

[9] S/2021/211，附件 12。

[10] 据一个会员国说，第一枚导弹是在 7 时 04 分左右发射的，第二枚是 7 时 23 分左右在咸镜南道宣德周围地区发射的。

表 1

2021 年朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运用弹道导弹技术和固体燃料推进剂发射和试验的导弹或系统

2021 年试验次数	2019 年至本次发射期间的试验次数	日期和时间(当地)	据报类型	数量	据报发射地点	据报发射距离(公里)	据报远地点(公里)	备注	朝鲜中央通讯社分类
第 1 次	第 18 次	2021年3月25日 7 时 06 分和7时25分 或 7 时 04 分和 7 时 23 分	短程弹道导弹；似乎是在 2021 年 1 月 14 日阅兵式上展示的新型短程弹道导弹和运输竖起发射装置，[a] 被确认为可能是对之前展示和测试的KN-23 短程弹道导弹 [b] 的改装和扩充	2	咸镜南道咸州地区，可能是在西南部由宣德军用机场划定的区域和在东北部由Yonpo 军用机场划定的区域 [c]	600	60，可能是 100	–自 2019 年以来第 37 次弹道导弹发射 –新型五轴轮式运输竖起发射装置 –发射间隔时间：19 分钟 –因拉升轨道而下压	新型战术制导导弹 或 新型战术制导射弹

资料来源：会员国提供的资料和专家小组的分析。

[a] 如果朝鲜中央通讯社 2021 年 3 月 26 日的照片属实；曾有证明显示朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在以前的发射场合修改或伪造照片图像，可能是为了宣传目的。

[b] S/2021/211，第 18 段，图 5 和附件 11 和 12；S/2020/151，第 194 段，表 3 和附件 58.1 和 59。

[c] 如专家小组在 S/2020/840 和 S/2020/840/Corr.1 表 1 和 S/2020/151 表 3 中所报告的，这一区域曾多次被用来进行短程弹道导弹发射试验。宣德军用机场位于北纬 39°44′17″，东经 127°28′07″，Yonpo 军用机场位于北纬 39°48′00″，东经 127°32′21″。

17. 关于 2020 年 10 月 10 日阅兵式上出现的新型洲际弹道导弹，[11] 一个会员国评估认为，带有万向节喷嘴的发动机可以提供 170 吨的推力，隔热罩可以装下三到四个多弹头分导再入飞行器(见附件 18-2)。[12] 另一个会员国评估认为，这枚洲际弹道导弹是一种“非作战型号”，尽管专家小组评估认为，其 11 轴运输竖起发射装置与以前在任何国家看到的任何运输竖起发射装置都不匹配，如果运载非作战有效载荷，将是一项重大工程成就。

18. 关于 2020 年 10 月 10 日和 2021 年 1 月 14 日阅兵式上展示的新型“北极星-4”和“北极星-5”型潜射弹道导弹，[13] 一个会员国评估认为，“北极星-5”是一个非作战模拟型，一个空的灯丝基导弹外壳。据另一个会员国称，它的直径非常大，

[11] S/2021/211，附件 10。

[12] 这种新的超大型洲际弹道导弹(朝鲜民主主义人民共和国媒体迄今尚未命名)被观察家暂称为“火星-16”。

[13] S/2021/211，附件 11。

约为 2 米，由于发动机部分[14] 比以前的北极星型号更大，因此可以提供更大的推力(见附件 18-2)。

19. 据一个会员国称，与弹道导弹计划相关的工厂(见附件 19-25)[15] 和基地(见附件 26)[16] 内的活动和基础设施建设仍在继续，尽管因为要应对 COVID-19 疫情，其速度较慢。在基地不断更新欺骗措施，采用地下走廊、掩体、半掩埋的免下车通道(用于维护和为远程液体推进剂弹道导弹加油)和其他隐藏和伪装手段。

20. 尽管实施了针对 COVID-19 疫情的封锁和管制，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续非法地努力从海外采购具体部件，并寻找机会将其产品转交给合作伙伴(见下文第 21-23 段和 S/2020/211 第 26 段)。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在海外的代表面临着为满足国家需求赚钱的压力。该国继续发展与国外大学的科技合作(见上文第 11-13 段)。

采购非法商品和与大规模毁灭性武器有关的商品

21. 据会员国称，疫情期间滞留海外的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国贸易公司和国防科学院[17] (包括朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司[18] 和 Saengpil Associated Corporation[19])的驻外代表继续从事弹药材料的进出口业务以赚取外汇和协助发展武器。特别是，会员国评估认为，这些代表正与中东国家(如阿拉伯叙利亚共和国和伊朗伊斯兰共和国)[20] 在导弹相关项目上进行合作，[21] 弹药代理商正试图在非洲和东南亚出售武器。据称，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国正在寻求各种手段，包括重组其贸易相关机构(名称、组织等)和进行基于船对船移交的交易，来应对国际社会的严格监督并克服本国的疫情封锁。专家小组尚未证实这些评估。

[14] 然而，北极星-5 型不适合新浦南方造船厂的静能试验台，因为新型导弹的尺寸很大(见附件 24)。

[15] 与弹道导弹计划有关的工业活动(见以下附件)：附件 19：Nampo naval shipyard，2020 年 11 月至 2021 年 6 月；同上：Sinpo south shipyard，2021 年 2 月至 6 月；附件 20："Pyongsong March 16 factory automotive plant"，2020 年 11 月至 2021 年 6 月；附件 21："Kusong tank factory"("No. 95 Factory")；同上："No. 112 Factory"；附件 22：Sanum Dong scientific and ballistic missile research complex，2021 年 2 月至 3 月；附件 23：Sinpo south shipyard, resumption of the construction of the pier/water break；附件 24：Sinpo south shipyard, buildings under construction at the static test stand area；附件 25："January 18th Factory", activity at a possible engine test stand。

[16] 2021 年 4 月至 6 月与弹道导弹计划有关的基地活动(见附件 26)："Hoejung-ri missile base"、"Kumchon-ri missile operating base"、"Sangnam-ri missile operating base"和"Sunchon airbase"。

[17] 国防科学院被列名为 KPe.021，它控制着一个负责收集科学信息的海外幌子公司网络。

[18] KPe.001，又名 Changkwang Trading Corporation and External Economic General Bureau (S/2019/691，附件 32，第 6 段)。

[19] 又名青松联合会社。

[20] 据一个会员国称，第 221 总局和朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司驻伊朗伊斯兰共和国的两名代表之一 Kim Hak Chol (又名 Jong Chol Jin，1965 年出生，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻德黑兰大使馆一等秘书，护照编号 10821043)于 2020 年 1 月 20 日持编号为 108210148 的护照从俄罗斯联邦出发。驻伊朗伊斯兰共和国的另一名代表 Ha Won Mo 使用的护照编号为 108210147。

[21] 例如见 S/2020/151，第 106-107 段；S/2019/171 和 S/2019/171/Corr.1，第 72 段。

22. 专家小组正在调查一个可能与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国核计划和弹道导弹计划有关的“隘口”物项采购网络。据一个会员国称，由 Kim Jong Dok 任代表的 Korea Machinery General Trading 定期向设在第三国的公司发出采购敏感工业材料的订单。自 2021 年 1 月以来，Korea Machinery General Trading 至少向这些公司下了四份订单，订购的物项包括(除其他外)1Cr18Ni9Ti 不锈钢(见附件 27)。这种类型的不锈钢可用于航空用途，也可用于制造液体推进弹道导弹发动机或核武器外壳。据了解，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国寻购这种钢材是专门为了用于其弹道导弹计划。订单中的其他物项包括阀门、泵和滚珠轴承。对这一采购网络的调查仍在继续。

其他大规模毁灭性武器计划

23. 专家小组正在分析从一个会员国收到的关于其对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国疑似拥有其他大规模毁灭性武器所做评估的信息。

三. 部门制裁和海上制裁

24. 为应对 COVID-19 疫情，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续关闭边境，这似乎严重影响了其进口精炼石油和违禁出口煤炭和其他商品的海上贸易。专家小组继续调查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国和可疑船只用来逃避制裁的一系列复杂和欺骗性航运做法，以及个人和实体为使这些运输得以继续而采用的故意混淆商业和登记的做法。本报告关于财务的单独一节将介绍后一种做法的一些实例。

25. 向委员会报告的精炼石油进口官方数据极低，到 2021 年 7 月中旬，官方报告的进口数量仅为 500 000 桶年度许可上限[22] 的 4.75%。一个会员国评估认为，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国 2021 年上半年的石油进口量大大低于历史平均水平，同时也评估说，非法进口的增加意味着朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在 2021 年的进口量仍有可能超过上限。

26. 在本报告所述期间，向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国非法进口石油产品的活动仍在继续，尽管专家小组几乎没有收到有关这一问题的报告。虽然在南浦建成了一个新的石油码头，但在本报告所述期间，没有向专家小组报告外国油轮直接在那里交货的情况；尽管石油产品的船对船移交活动仍在继续，特别是在夜间进行，但数量似乎有所减少。

27. 专家小组先前报告中点名的直接向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送石油产品或与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国较小的船只进行石油产品船对船移交的许多油轮仍然逍遥法外，它们在区域领水停泊和使用当地船坞设施时，继续掩饰自己的身份以混淆视听。最近从会员国收到的未加评估的信息表明，自 2021 年 5 月以来，船对船移交活动一直在增加。

[22] 安全理事会第 2397(2017)号决议，第 5 段。

欺骗性航运做法

28. 进行了应受制裁活动的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只和其他可疑船只继续操纵或不发送自动识别系统信号，以掩饰其活动并逃避侦查。具体做法包括发送可探测到的伪造识别信息和使用涉及船舶身份互换的复杂混淆技术。

船舶身份洗白和互换

29. 专家小组继续调查船舶身份洗白案件，[23] 这种技术涉及对船只(A 船)进行实体改动，目的是获得一个新的国际海事组织(海事组织)编号，随后 A 船可以假借该编号以在另一个船旗下注册的另一艘船(B 船)的身份航行。A 船的原始自动识别系统档案在海事数据库中被空置，这样其他可疑船只可以使用它。参与向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送未报告石油的几艘船使用了这一复杂耗时的逃避技策。专家小组认为，这种船只身份洗白做法是一种逃避制裁的技策，直接使可疑船只能够继续向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国非法运送精炼石油。

“Subblic”号伪装为“Hai Zhou 168”号

30. 2020 年 11 月，高分辨率卫星图像显示，悬挂未知旗帜的“Subblic”号(海事组织编号 8126082)在中国三沙湾以“Hai Zhou 168”号的身份发送信号(见图三)。截至 2021 年 3 月，“Subblic”号继续不时地以“Hai Zhou 168”号的身份发送信号。专家小组以前曾建议对“Subblic”号予以指认。专家小组请求中国提供资料，说明该船在中国水域的存在以及“Subblic”号欺诈性地传输信号的情况，并提供关于任何检查结果的信息。中国答复称，“关于‘Subblic’号以‘Hai Zhou 168’号的身份传输信号一事，根据中国的调查，这两艘船自 2020 年以来都没有进入过中国港口。”

[23] S/2021/211，第 31-36 段。

图三

悬挂未知旗帜的“Subblic”号以“Hai Zhou 168”号的身份传输信号，2020 年 11 月 26 日，中国三沙湾



资料来源：图像：Planet Labs；自动识别系统坐标：Windward。[24]

31. 2019 年 1 月，当时悬挂塞拉利昂国旗的“Hai Zhou 168”号(又名“Smooth Sea 28”号)(海事组织编号 8514045)的身份被洗白，使其空缺的自动识别系统档案被用来为向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国非法转移精炼石油提供便利。专家小组的调查显示，这次洗白身份的准备工作可能早在 2016 年就开始了，当时这艘船在泰国的一家造船厂进行了大量改装。为了完成身份洗白，“Hai Zhou 168”号在离开据称其下水地中国宁德一家造船厂时，冒充一艘新建的船——“Cheng Xin 1”号(又名“Smooth Sea 22”号)。[25] 这艘船返回了其最初离开的泰国同一港口，以虚假借口获得了船舶牌照，并以悬挂泰国国旗的“Smooth Sea 22”号(海事组织编号 9870991)在国内航线上航行。由于“Hai Zhou 168”号本身的外观和名称已经改变，其原始自动识别系统档案被空置，供“Subblic”号等已知逃避制裁的船只使用(更多细节见附件 28a)。

32. 专家小组请求泰国协助调查“Smooth Sea 22”号涉嫌身份欺诈事件。[26] 专家小组正在等待泰国的答复。

33. 专家小组还追踪了拥有或运营该船的实体和个人。在 2019 年 1 月的过渡期间，“Hai Zhou 168”号和“Smooth Sea 22”号均由在中国香港注册的 Cheng Xin Shipping Co. Ltd.拥有和管理。专家小组已经调查的若干船只也出现在宁德同一家造船厂，其中包括“Mouson 328”号(海事组织编号 9021198)，专家小组报告该船也参与了一次船舶身份互换。这些实体提供的信息和答复载于附件 28a。

[24] 除非另有说明，海事人工智能平台 Windward 上的所有日期和时间均以东部标准时间记录；卫星图像和其他海事跟踪平台上的所有日期和时间均以协调世界时记录。

[25] IHS Markit。

[26] 在商业海事平台上使用自动识别系统跟踪。

34. 专家小组上一次对“Mouson 328”号船在身份洗白后以“Smooth Sea 29”号的身份航行一事[27] 进行的调查涉及到类似的实体和造船厂。泰国答复说，关于涉嫌欺诈(S/2021/211，第 31-36 段)，泰国当局没有足够证据证实“Mouson 328”号与它航行时使用的假冒身份之间存在联系。当局正在重新审查被疑为冒牌货的“Smooth Sea 29”号的注册信息。该船自 2019 年 11 月抵达泰国以来没有用于任何运输活动(另见附件 28b)。

“Billions No.18”号(又名“Kingsway”号)伪装为“Apex”号(又名“Shun Fa”号)

35. 2021 年 5 月，一个会员国扣押了以悬挂蒙古国旗的“Apex”号(又名“Shun Fa”号)(海事组织编号 8528864)的身份航行的被指认船只“Billions No.18”号(又名“Kingsway”号)(海事组织编号 9191773)，此前已确认该船在 2021 年 5 月 5 日进入该会员国港口时伪装了身份。在扣押这艘船时，该会员国叫停了“Billions No.18”号的进一步作业。[28] 海事数据库中的自动识别系统传输信息显示，该船一直在以悬挂蒙古国旗的“Shun Fa”号的身份传输信号。然而，“Shun Fa”号的海事组织注册编号又属于悬挂蒙古国旗的“Apex”号，[29] 后者被列为 2021 年 6 月从蒙古船舶注册处注销。

36. 会员国在扣押这艘船后进行的调查显示，“Shun Fa”号的发动机细节，包括发动机型号，与“Billions No.18”号船的发动机细节相匹配。其他证实该船真实身份的支持性细节包括在船上发现的实际操纵海事组织编号的痕迹以及船上携带的其他手册和设备。

37. 专家小组 2017 年报告了“Billions No.18”号(又名“Kingsway”号)向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送精炼石油的情况。[30] 在该船被指认后，船的身份被故意洗白，以将(当时的)“Kingsway”号伪装成另一艘有不同海事组织编号的船，从而有效地规避了该船被指认。通过这种反复使用的欺骗做法，这艘船甚至在被指认后继续运营了近三年而未被发现，并在此过程中获得了诸如船旗注册和财务支付等被禁止的服务(详情见附件 29a)。[31]

38. 专家小组在调查船只身份冒用时追踪了“Apex”号的航行和所有权历史。官方记录显示，从 2016 年开始，“Apex”号一直以悬挂中国国旗的“Zhe Sheng 26”号的身份航行，直到 2018 年悬挂蒙古国旗。然而，从公开来源获得的两艘船的照片比对显示，两者的外观明显不同，可以确定这两艘船是不同的船只，“Apex”号声称自己是“Zhe Sheng 26”号属欺诈行为(见图四)。

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[27] S/2021/211，第 31-36 段。

[28] 在 2017 年 10 月与悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的“Rye Song Gang”号(海事组织编号 7389704)进行船对船移交后，于 2017 年 12 月 28 日对其实施了港口禁令。

[29] 根据海事组织网站上的官方记录，这艘船的名称注册为“Apex”，而不是“Shun Fa”。

[30] S/2018/171 和 S/2018/171/Corr.1。

[31] 2019 年 3 月美利坚合众国外国资产管制处的航运通知将“Kingsway”号列入据信与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮进行船对船移交活动的油轮名单。

图四

“Apex”号与“Zhe Sheng 26”号的比较



资料来源：FleetMon、VesselFinder 和会员国。

39. 进一步调查表明，“Apex”号和“Billions No.18”号(当时以“Kingsway”号的身份航行)通过同处一地的一个地址而存在联系。“Kingsway”号的合规控股公司 United Ships Maritime Corp[32] 的文件列出的办公地址与陈昭荣[33] 的地址位于高

[32] IHS Markit。

[33] Chen Chao-Jung。

雄市的同一座大楼。陈先生被列为在伯利兹注册的 Better Smart Ltd.的董事和唯一股东，该公司自 2018 年 7 月以来一直是“Apex”号的船东和管理人。

40. 专家小组致函 Taizhou Zhesheng Shipping Co. Ltd.(被列为“Zhe Sheng 26”号船东的中国实体)、设在马来西亚的公司 Yong An Shipping Sdn Bhd(该公司为作为“Apex”号船东的 Better Smart Ltd.提交了注册文件)以及陈先生本人。专家小组尚未收到答复(更多详情见附件 29a)。

41. 蒙古回复提供了有关“Shun Fa”号(又名“Apex”号)的信息，其中显示，该船已数次变更所有权，这些变更并未在海事数据库中更新。[34] 航运文件列明 New East Investment Inc.是“Apex”号的前船东(见附件 29b)。另一家香港注册公司 Joy Wealthy Trading Limited 于 2019 年 10 月购买了“Shun Fa”号。Joy Wealthy 的所有人王先生在给蒙古海事局的一封信中声称，他没有做过任何非法业务，并且“在购买前已于 2019 年对该船进行了检查，当时蒙古船舶注册处没有提出任何问题”。王先生说：“……如果该船被证明是受制裁船只，我也是受害者。”[35] 蒙古于 2021 年 6 月 2 日取消了“Shun Fa”号的注册(见附件 29c)。

欺诈性地传输信号以逃避侦查

42. 专家小组以前认定违禁向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国转移精炼石油的几艘悬挂外国国旗的油轮的船旗注册已被取消，但它们通过在自动识别系统上传输欺诈性的识别信息继续运营。这些欺诈技策可使船只能够靠港进行补给、更换船员或接受维修服务。

43. 专家小组认为，船只为隐瞒身份而采取的各种混淆方法构成逃避制裁活动。在没有对这些船只采取行动的情况下，这些“直运”船只[36] 虽然已被摘旗，但仍继续运营。专家小组指出，在没有船旗注册的情况下航行的船只被视为无国籍船只，因此受其所在领水所属国家的海事法以及安全理事会第 2397(2017)号决议第 9 段的约束。[37]

“Diamond 8”号

44. 2021 年 5 月的海上跟踪数据和卫星图像显示，“Diamond 8”号(海事组织编号 9132612)在中国宁德锚泊区域以悬挂蒙古国旗的“Chang Shun 8”号(海上移动业务标识码 457222000)的假冒身份进行广播(见图五)。专家小组此前曾报告，塞拉利昂已于 2020 年 8 月取消了“Diamond 8”号的注册，原因是该船参与了违反制裁的活动。专家小组请求蒙古提供关于该船欺诈性传输信号的资料。

[34] 海事组织没有记录更新的所有权变更。

[35] 这封信由蒙古当局提供，并由专家小组存档。

[36] 非法向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送精炼石油的悬挂非朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只。

[37] 该段规定，若会员国有合理理由认为任何船只参与违反安全理事会各项决议的活动，则会员国应在其港口内扣押、检查和查封该船只，并可在其领水内扣押、检查和查封该船只。

45. 蒙古证实，它于 2020 年 9 月将先前悬挂洪都拉斯国旗的“Bonvoy 6”号(海事组织编号 8682969)注册为“Chang Shun 8”号，海上移动业务标识码 457222000 保持不变，后因该船与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有联系而于 2020 年 9 月 24 日取消了注册(见附件 30a 和 b)。“Bonvoy 6”号最后一次在其自动识别系统档案上传输信号是在 2019 年 9 月，地点是中国罗源湾。香港注册实体 Sure Metro Ltd.历史上曾经管理过“Bonvoy 6”号。开源信息表明，据称为“Diamond 8”号采购精炼石油货物的个人与 Sure Metro Ltd.之间存在联系。专家小组正在从贸易融资角度调查与“Diamond 8”号有关的其他相关网络联系(见下文第 165-170 段)。[38]

46. 专家小组请求中国提供有关该船身份的信息，包括说明以上述与蒙古相关的海上移动业务标识码传输信息的船只的实际身份和合法性，以及根据安全理事会有关决议对该船采取的任何行动。中国答复说，“这两艘船属于不同类型，因此它们很难互换身份传输信息。自 2020 年以来，这两艘船都没有进入过中国港口”。中国在海事问题上的完整答复载于各个海事问题附件。

47. 专家小组注意到，本报告附件 34 显示，已知有船只发送与其长度、类型或船旗不符的欺诈性识别信息，通过观察可以发现蓄意操纵船只自动识别系统档案中所述船型或船只长度的行为。

图五

“Diamond 8”号以“Chang Shun 8”号的身份传输信息，2021 年 5 月 2 日，中国三沙湾



资料来源：Planet Labs 和会员国。

[38] 另见 c4ads.org/black-gold。

"Bonvoy 3"号(又名"Fu Shun 3"号)

48. 专家小组报告曾在 2019 年和 2020 年向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送精炼石油的船只"Bonvoy 3"号(海事组织编号 8714085)也曾由 Sure Metro Ltd.管理，直至 2018 年 5 月。后来这艘船由在英属维尔京群岛注册的 Faith Trade Group Ltd.拥有，并更名为"Fu Shun 3"号。专家小组 2020 年 8 月的报告(S/2020/840 和 S/2020/840/Corr.1)发布后，该船换了新主人，由鹭昌船务(香港)有限公司[39] 拥有(见附件 31)。这种所有权变更的总体操作方式与专家小组以前报告的方式一致，即参与违反制裁活动的船只通过未在海事数据库中更新的所有权和(或)管理权变更而循环运营，即使船只已经暴露也仍然运营。专家小组的调查进一步表明，"Bonvoy 3"号牵涉到的不同实体都跟与"Diamond 8"号有关联的个人有联系，[40] 例如，鹭昌船务也被列为"Chang Shun 8"号的船东和运营方(见前一案件)。专家小组尚未收到鹭昌船务的答复。

"Xing Ming Yang 888"号

49. 2021 年 5 月，"Xing Ming Yang 888"号(海事组织编号 8410847)[41] 冒用悬挂洪都拉斯国旗的"Vi Fin"号(海事移动业务标识码 334191000)的身份，同时还广播呼号 9LU2843，该呼号以前与直运船只"Vifine"号(海事组织编号 9045962)[42] 相联，这艘船于 2020 年 8 月易旗悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗，[43] 以"Un Hung"号的身份航行。"Vi Fin"这个名字似乎没有在海事组织注册(见附件 32)。专家小组已建议对这三艘船予以指认，因其多次向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送精炼石油。

直接交货船经常光顾的地点

50. 会员国提供的海事数据库、高清卫星图像和信息显示，专家小组此前提议指认的许多直接交货船经常通过或返回中国的宁德港区、东引岛和三都岛附近海域，要么没有传输自动识别系统信号，要么进行了欺诈性的传输。2021 年 3、4 月间，"Bonvoy 3"号、"Diamond 8"号和"Rich United(又名 Xin Hai)"号(海事组织编号 9129213)在东引岛附近锚泊，"New Konk"号(海事组织编号 9036387)和被指认的"Yuk Tung"号(海事组织编号 9030591)则分别在福安和西洋岛附近锚泊(见附件 33a)。专家小组在以往报告中已查明上述水域内这些直接交货船的身份，近期看到这些船只并非孤立事件。

51. 有一个会员国提供了另一份船只清单，列有位于中国领水的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只、此前与悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只进行对接移交的船只和其他有关船只(见附件 33b)。专家小组注意到，悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只、与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有关联的船只和疑似参与逃避制裁的

[39] Lu Chang Shipping (HK) Co. Ltd。

[40] 调查正在进行中。

[41] S/2021/211。

[42] S/2020/151。

[43] 国际海事组织 2021 年更新的船旗信息。

船只反复且经常出现在这些水域。专家小组向中国提供了这份船只清单，其中包括上文提到的船只和附件 33a 和 b 所列船只，并要求说明这些船只的活动、这些船只传输的识别信息和这些识别信息的有效性，以及这些船只在中国领水的日期、始发港、目的港和既定目的。

52. 中国的答复是，“据中方核实……疑似向朝鲜运送精炼石油产品的船只……自 2020 年以来并未进入过中国港口”。

悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的货船冒用自动识别系统档案

53. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只使用类似混淆技术掩盖其存在和交易地点。虽然大多数朝鲜民主主义人民共和国货船已被观察到没有传输自动识别系统信号，但那些进行传输的货船主要也都在传输欺诈性的识别信息，特别是在这些船只集结转运煤炭的中国宁波-舟山水域。这些欺诈性的自动识别系统档案虽然隐藏了船只的真实身份，但在商业海事数据库中仍然可以识别。


54. 数据不一致情况包括：传输的信息没包含船只的尺寸；船只数据不完整或不一致；在短时间内对传输的海事移动业务标识或海事组织编号进行多次更改；传输未注册的海事组织编号；或者不太可能的船只类型信息。[44] 举一个例子，悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的“Zai Zhou 1”号(海事组织编号 8664149)于 2021 年 3 月抵达宁波-舟山水域，在通过不同的海事移动业务标识和名称进行传输时，没有隐藏其船旗状态(见图六)。该船在宁波-舟山水域时更改了身份，以悬挂中国国旗的船只身份进行传输，但又保留了同样的船名“Harvest 1”号。“Zai Zhou 1”号于 2021 年 5 月 3 日被卫星图像捕捉到与其他悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的运煤船同行(见图七)。专家小组提供了其他朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只进行欺诈性传输的更多例子(另见附件 34)，请中国说明朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只的活动、这些船只传输的识别信息和这些信息的有效性，以及这些船只在中国领水的日期、始发港、目的港和既定目的。

55. 中国的答复是，“据中方核实……大部分被指称运送煤炭到中国的船只……自 2020 年以来并未进入过中国港口”。

[44] 例如，货船以渔船或冒充石油钻井平台的船只身份进行传输。

图六


朝鲜民主主义人民共和国“Zai Zhou 1”号船以朝鲜民主主义人民共和国另一艘船的身份传输其他船只的识别信息，2021 年 3 月和 4 月



资料来源：Windward，由专家小组附加说明；地图和卫星图像：会员国。

图七

“Zai Zhou 1”号运煤船与其他朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只同行，宁波-舟山，2021 年 5 月



资料来源：会员国。


56. 这些船只固然能利用物理规避策略，例如涂刷船名或使用虚假的海事移动业务标识或海事组织编号，但在自动识别系统档案中蓄意篡改既定的船型或长度以混淆视听，是可以通过观察被发现的。

船对船非法移交区

57. 有一个会员国提供了以下与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国 2019 年和 2020 年期间受制裁活动有关联的船只进行非法船对船移交活动的最新评估地图(见图八)。最集中的活动区域仍然与专家小组过去所报告的一致(中间画圈区域)，2020 年观察到两个新的活动区域(顶部和底部画圈区域)。

图八

与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有关联的船对船移交地点，2019 年 2 月至 2020 年 8 月



资料来源：会员国；圆圈内的附加说明：专家小组。

与逃避制裁有关的其他惯用手法


“Gold Star”号

58. 专家小组正在调查以前悬挂喀麦隆国旗的“Gold Star”号船(海事组织编号 9146247)，该船据指在 2019 年和 2020 年多次与悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只以及与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有关联的船只进行船对船移交精炼石油产品(更多详情见附件 35(a))。

59. 据一个会员国称，2019 年 11 月中旬和 12 月初，“Gold Star”号从中国海南岛洋浦港的一个石油码头装上精炼石油，然后移交给悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的“Kum Jin Gang 3”号船(海事组织编号 8791667)。2020 年 8 月底，海事数据库显示该船再次来到洋浦，在那里停留直至 2020 年 11 月离开前往中国宁德的一个港口。港口清关文件显示，“Gold Star”号欺诈性地使用悬挂蒙古国旗的“Ocean Star”号的识别信息，以伪装身份(见附件 35(b))进入宁德。没有记录到该船的任何自动识别系统信号，直至其于 2021 年 5 月抵达帝力海岸(见图九)。

图九

“Gold Star”号的最后一次自动识别系统信息传输，帝力，2021 年 5 月[45]



资料来源：Windward、Google Earth，由专家小组附加说明；船只卫星图像：空客防务和空间部。

60. 蒙古确认“Ocean Star”号于 2020 年 9 月 30 日至 2021 年 1 月 11 日用海事组织编号 8351584 临时注册，当时该船已不在该国船舶注册簿中。在注册之前，该船作为悬挂中国国旗的“Zhe You 8”号航行。[46] 达码贸易有限公司向“Ocean Star”号的注册船东提供了公司注册服务。达码贸易有限公司使用的香港地址[47] 与为捷程海运有限公司[48] (下称“捷程海运”)进行注册的另一家公司服务提供商以及为专家小组此前调查的其他直接交货船进行注册的其他提供商相同。

61. 捷程海运是该船在疑似从事逃避制裁活动时的船东和运营方。会员国进一步评估认为，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的一个实体“Mulgil 贸易总公司”也参与雇用该船从事未经报告进口精炼石油产品进入朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的活动。专家小组于 2020 年 9 月致函中国，通知当局在海南岛洋浦港的中国水域有该可疑

[45] 截至 2021 年 6 月。

[46] 该船似乎没有商业追踪记录，目前(2021 年 6 月)在海事数据库中是列在按最初悬挂中国国旗注册的船只之下。

[47] 地址：Room 19C, Lockhart Centre, 301-307 Lockhart Road, Wan Chai, Hong Kong, China。

[48] J&C Shipping Co., Ltd。

船只，要求提供关于该船地点、身份详情、船对船移交活动和所载货物的信息，并询问关于 Cheng Yuantai 先生的情况，根据香港公司注册记录，他在 2019 年和 2020 年被列为捷程海运的创始董事和股东。[49] 中国的答复见图十。

图十

中国关于“Silver Star 1/Gold Star”号和捷程海运注册东主信息的答复

> **(4) OC.233**
>
> The Chinese side did not find the vessel “Golden Star” staying in waters off Yangpu port of Hainan. With regard to the Chinese national Cheng Yuantai who was mentioned in the Panel’s letter as relevant to this case, in fact, Cheng is a nearly 80-year-old farmer. He does farming at home place all year long. There is no company under his name. He does not have any certificate for exiting and entering Chinese borders, and has no relation with any companies in Hong Kong SAR or DPRK vessels. China hopes that the Panel does not readily believe information which is against facts.

资料来源：会员国。

注：“Golden Star”的汉语译法与“Gold Star”相同。专家小组索要关于“Gold Star”号(海事组织编号 9146247)的信息，目前正对该船进行调查。

62. 为了躲开侦测，捷程海运所运营的船只使用了夜间在中国领水非法移交、在持续 4 到 6 小时的船对船操作中卸载少量燃料、不顾船员健康和安全将船停在港口外以及伪造船只识别信息、包括使用虚假船名和海事组织编号进入中国港口等惯用手法。

63. 会员国随后提供的信息表明，捷程海运的 Cheng Bin 先生指导了调查所涉期间的这些活动。Cheng 先生通过通讯应用程序“微信”进行沟通，并在每次船对船操作中使用不同的电话号码。

64. 专家小组的调查显示，捷程海运的活动与拥有和/或管理此前被专家小组调查的船只的其他实体的惯用手法相一致，包括不留网上足迹、设立只有一名董事且明面上不与该船打交道的幌子公司(见上文图九)以及使用公司注册服务提供商进一步混淆视听等，所有这些都是为了隐藏受益东主的真实身份以逃避制裁。

65. 专家小组请中国提供以下信息：从洋浦港一个码头移交石油的情况，据报与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国相关联船只进行非法船对船移交的情况，相关当局就“Gold Star”号入港时提供的识别信息的有效性、捷程海运提供的公司注册东主信息的有效性以及在涉及“Gold Star”号的调查和/或扣留中采取的任何其他步骤进行尽职调查的情况。

[49] 香港公司注册记录显示，Cheng Yuantai 先生的董事身份已于 2020 年 4 月转给俄罗斯人 Yuri Chernilovskiy 先生，地址在俄罗斯联邦滨海边疆区的纳霍德卡。

66. 中国答复称，“Gold Star”号于 2019 年 11 月底离开洋浦，此后没有进入过中国港口。没有关于该船据指移交精炼石油产品的相关信息。中国表示，2020 年 11 月“Ocean Star”号没有向中国港口提出过“入港请求”，港口清关文件“是假的”。中国还表示：“‘Ocean Star’号没有进入中国港口，‘Gold Star’号也没有冒充‘Ocean Star’号进入中国港口。”关于捷程海运，中国表示：

> 专家小组来信中提到的“Gold Star”号运营方香港特别行政区捷程海运公司已于 2021 年 3 月被注销。没有关于该公司从事进出口贸易或参加涉朝走私活动的记录。中国希望专家小组不要轻信违背事实的信息。


67. 专家小组还向喀麦隆、蒙古、帕劳、俄罗斯联邦、塞拉利昂和东帝汶等多个当事方以及现在或以前拥有和/或管理这些船只的相关实体、包括 Cheng Bin 先生索要信息。详细答复情况见附件 35(a)。

“Ji Yuan”号(也称为“Chang Long”号)

68. 据一个会员国报告，以前悬挂塞拉利昂国旗的“Ji Yuan”号(也称为“Chang Long”号)[50] (海事组织编号 9044140)曾从香港向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送多批货物，包括 2019 年 9、10 月间的一辆 S 级奔驰车(见图十一)和同年 11 月两个集装箱未具体指明的电子商品。该豪华车的装运据报得到了一家在香港注册的公司“义发汽车(香港)有限公司”的协助(另见第 73 和 146 段)。

图十一

“Ji Yuan”号驶往朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的运输航程，2019 年 9 月和 10 月




资料来源：会员国。

[50] 从 2020 年 8 月到 2021 年 6 月注销之前，该船一直是以悬挂蒙古国旗的“Chang Long”号之名航行。

69. 专家小组对“Ji Yuan”号 2019 年 10 月和 11 月航行情况的调查显示，该船还传输另一个海事移动业务标识，即 300800121，[51] 例如在 2019 年 9 月的航行中，这一传输就将该船冒用的自动识别系统信号置于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国水域。这与会员国 2019 年 9 月 28 日就“Ji Yuan”号位于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国水域提供的日期相符(见图十二)。自动识别系统信号跳起，即显示同一个海事移动业务标识同一时间出现在两个不同地点，表明“Ji Yuan”号正冒用在中国水域开展当地作业的船只(见附件 36(a))。

图十二

“Ji Yuan”号冒用的海事移动业务标识传输将其置于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国水域，2019 年 9 月



资料来源：Windward，由专家小组附加说明。

70. 公司注册记录将地址在中国福建的 Zhuang Jixiang 先生列为在大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国注册的吉源船务有限公司[52] 的董事。吉源船务的公司秘书是云马天隆国际顾问有限公司，[53] 后者也为 Always Smooth 有限公司和 Good Siblings 有限公司提供秘书服务，这两家公司则是专家小组报告违反制裁的船只的注册船东。[54]

[51] 这个海事移动业务标识据报属于一艘 20 米长的货船，该船航行时交替使用“Ataizhouxinluo”和“Guanyunyu60230”两个名称。

[52] 该公司于 2021 年 3 月 23 日被列为已解散。

[53] 该公司的地址是 United G25, Waterfront Studios, 1 Dock Road, London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland，这一地址似乎注册了多家提供公司秘书服务的公司。

[54] 分别是当时悬挂多哥国旗的“Lucky Star”号船(海事组织编号 9015278)和当时悬挂多哥国旗的“Asia Bridge”号船(海事组织编号 9010022)。

71. 专家小组寻求中国、蒙古、塞拉利昂、联合王国和有关实体的协助。关于此案的更多详情和答复情况，见附件 36(a)至(c)。

72. 中国确认了专家小组提供的关于注册船东实体是在联合王国注册的信息，并提供了一些关于该船所载货物的信息(见第 146 段)。

73. 蒙古提供了关于该船的信息和文件，显示“Ji Yuan”号于 2019 年 7 月 26 日由在大韩民国注册的 Korea Marine Transport 有限公司出售给在香港注册的 Good Job 贸易有限公司(下称“Good Job”)，售价为 110 万美元(见附件 36(d))。该船的股份则于 2019 年 8 月 15 日以 1 美元的价格从 Good Job 转给吉源船务有限公司(见附件 36(e))，就在随后一个月据报“Ji Yuan”号向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送一辆豪华车之前(另见第 68 和 146 段)。蒙古于 2021 年 6 月 14 日注销了这艘悬挂蒙古国旗、以“Chang Long”号之名航行的船只以及相关的船务证书(见附件 36(f))。蒙古的海事通告见附件 36(g)。

74. 塞拉利昂按要求提供了船务文件，并确认“Ji Yuan”号因参加安全理事会决议所禁止的活动，已于 2020 年 4 月 3 日从该国船舶注册簿中删除。

75. 联合王国答复称，正按要求跟踪相关公司信息，将适时提供更多详情。

船只购置情况

76. 自 2019 以来，[55] 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国通过添加以前悬挂外国国旗的油轮和货轮扩大了船只队伍，违反了联合国禁止向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国直接或间接供应、销售或转让新旧船只的相关决议。有些船多年来的航行没有悬挂任何旗帜，在被朝鲜民主主义人民共和国注册之后继续航行和贸易，向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送非法的精炼石油，并出口来自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的煤炭。在许多情况下，船只由相同的实体管理，在出售前沿用非常相似的所有权模式。一个会员国评估认为，有几艘船在悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗之前就已被朝鲜民主主义人民共和国控制。

77. 有几艘船在专家小组报告之后才迟迟地更新为悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗，包括出售给未披露的买家。有些船是在船舶拍卖网站上出售，有些则是通过第三方经纪人采购。以下是 2020 年在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船舶注册簿上改挂旗帜的船只。

“Sin Phyong 5”号(以前称为“Woo Jeong”号)

78. 以前悬挂大韩民国国旗的“Woo Jeong”号船，也称为“Sin Phyong 5”号(海事组织编号 8865121)，[56] 从 2020 年 10 月起悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗。与专家小组以前报告改由朝鲜民主主义人民共和国控制的其他船只一样(例如“Enterprise”号(海事组织编号 9153331)，[57] 见下文第 81 段)，“Woo Jeong”号最

[55] 根据海事数据库的记录，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国 2019 年和 2020 年添置了 10 几艘油轮和货轮。

[56] 海事组织 2021 年更新的信息。

[57] 见 S/2021/211，第 71-72 段。

后的自动识别系统传输是 2019 年 7 月 27 日前后在中国的石岛水域被记录到。在该船的所有权归属朝鲜民主主义人民共和国之前，Young Sung Global 有限公司(下称“Young Sung Global”)被列为最后的注册船东、运营方和管理方。[58] 大韩民国确认已于 2019 年 9 月 10 日注销该船的旗帜，原因是出口。

79. 据 Young Sung Global 称，该船通过经纪人出售，买方是一家中国实体。确定买方的船舶经纪公司与中国的经纪人完成了所有销售手续。该船于 2019 年 7 月卖给了列为买方的 Deepika 船务贸易有限公司(下称“Deepika 船务”)的代表 Zhang Rusheng 先生。专家小组注意到，Deepika 船务也被列为“Sen Lin 01”号船(海事组织编号 8910378)的注册船东和运营方，[59] 这艘直接交货船此后悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗，作为“Kwang Chon 2”号船航行。[60] 此外，Korea Myongryu 贸易公司是“Sin Phyong 5”号的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船东，同时也拥有“Sin Phyong 2”号(海事组织编号 8817007)，[61] 专家小组以前曾报告，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国于 2019 年购得这艘油轮，该船此前作为“Tianyou”号船航行，曾向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送精炼石油。调查仍在继续。更多详情见附件 38(a)至(c)。

80. 其他改挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只包括后来改名为“Wol Bong San”号的“Xin Hai”号船(海事组织编号 7636638)(见附件 37(a)和(b))，以及后来改名为“Tae Phyong 2”号的“Ming Zhou 6”号船(海事组织编号 8829878)(见附件 39)。

供应链网络

81. 专家小组继续调查与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有关联的“Enterprise”号船(海事组织编号 9153331)，该船 2021 年一直在出口来自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的煤炭。专家小组拿到的更新文件显示，“Enterprise”号船的运营方“大连太源国际船舶代理有限公司”向海事数据库提供了不同于船务记录的地址。[62] 船务文件上的运营方地址是与被指认的“Jie Shun”号船(海事组织编号 8518780)前船东“Vast Win 贸易有限公司”相关联的一个共用大楼地址。该船此前的唯一董事和股东 Gu Min 女士，也与专家小组对“Jie Shun”号船的调查有关联(见附件 40)。调查仍在继续。

[58] 被海事组织列为该船 2012 年 6 月至 2019 年 10 月期间的船东、管理方和运营方。

[59] 见 S/2020/151。

[60] 见 S/2020/840。

[61] 同上。

[62] 海事组织网站上的最新记录。

捕鱼权转让

82. 一个会员国向专家小组提供的信息显示，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续向第三国实体出售捕鱼权，允许他们在领水内作业。2020 年从第三国捕鱼船队手中拿到了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国家保险公司(KPe.048)发布的几份官方文件，包括捕鱼权证书和保险单。还从这些船队手中拿到了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国当局发布的特许捕鱼区地图[63] 和捕鱼船队准则(见附件 41)。据一个会员国称，已用大约 20 万人民币(30 867 美元)至 30 万人民币(46 301 美元)购得在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国水域为期四到五个月的捕鱼权。

83. 专家小组继续收到关于可能启程港、船只海事移动业务标识信号和参与捕鱼权转让活动的相关私营实体等方面的信息。调查仍在继续。

84. 在本报告所述期间，专家小组再次致函据信参与出售朝鲜民主主义人民共和国捕鱼权的旅华朝鲜人总联合会主席 Choe Un Bok，[64] 以及参与策划与一家朝鲜民主主义人民共和国实体成立捕鱼合资企业的威海半岛船舶燃料有限公司。[65] 中国回复称(见附件 42)，据调查，没有找到关于旅华朝鲜人总联合会和威海半岛船舶燃料有限公司据指参与的实质性证据。调查仍在继续。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的海事报告

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只出口煤炭情况

85. 一个会员国评估认为，从 2021 年 2 月到 5 月，至少有 36.4 万吨来自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的煤炭被悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国控制的船只至少分 41 船次出口到宁波-舟山区域。[66] 专家小组指出，四个月期间出口煤炭的这一估计数量平均值大大低于同一会员国提供的 2020 年装运数量，据该会员国估计，在 12 个月期间总共至少有 480 万吨煤炭和其他受制裁矿物分 636 船次出口到中国(见附件 43)。[67]

86. 然而，该会员国还评估认为，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国已准备大规模恢复煤炭出口。2021 年 4 月 4 日的卫星图像捕捉到朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的大安港有 32 艘悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只，其中只有三艘未装载煤炭(见附件 47)。专家小组将继续监测这一状况。

87. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的煤炭出口一直沿用以前识别的模式：悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国控制的船只位于宁波-舟山水域的同一区域，与悬挂中国国旗的大型货轮进行船对船移交，有的传输欺诈性识别信息，有的则根本不传输任何自动识别系统信号。

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[63] 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国当局按字面命名为“처벌작업구역”，这是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国水域允许第三国船只在严密监视下捕鱼的一幅简化地图。

[64] 见 S/2021/211，第 54 段和附件 32(a)。

[65] 同上，第 55 段和附件 32(b)。

[66] 截至 2021 年 5 月的信息。

[67] 两位专家认为，这一段里的信息需要核实。


88. 这与以前观察到的从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进口煤炭的外国沿海驳船的活动[68] 有着明显的不同，2021 年专家小组没有收到任何关于此类驳船进入朝鲜民主主义人民共和国水域的报告。

89. 专家小组继续就多艘朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国相关联船只出现在宁波-舟山水域(见图十三)一事寻求中国协助，这些船只继续集结以船对船移交的方式出口煤炭[69] (另见附件 44)。

90. 专家小组在以前的报告中已提到其中有些船只在同一区域非法出口煤炭。有几艘朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只继续在同一区域停留了一段时间(见图十四)。[70] 这些区域由相关港口和收集船只活动信息的其他主管海事当局管辖。

图十三

图解悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国相关联船只，中国宁波-舟山，2021 年 4 月 5 日



资料来源：会员国。

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
[68] 见 S/2020/151，第 67-68 段，以及 S/2021/211。

[69] 见 S/2021/211。

[70] 包括“Myong Sa Sim Ni”号、“Enterprise”号、“Kwang Myong”号、“Puk Dae Bong”号和“Su Ri Bong”号。

图十四

中国马迹山船舶交通服务区附近不同地点的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只，2021 年 3 月和 4 月



资料来源：会员国。

91. 专家小组请中国提供以下信息：中国领水内每一艘朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只的情况、这些船只传输的识别信息、所载货物、在中国水域进行的任何船对船移交及卸载货物的类型和数量、收货船的身份及拥有和运营这些收货船的实体和个人以及煤炭卸载后的最终目的地。

92. 中国答复如下：

> ……有海事组织编号的 10 艘船在 2021 年 4 月 5 日前后并没有进入中国港口。在这 10 艘船中，“Kum Jing Gang”号和“Un Bong 2”号分别向大连和烟台提出了进港请求，但实际上并未进港。至于没有海事组织编号的其他 16 艘船，中国无法核实相关信息，因为中国不是这些船的船旗国。

93. 专家小组拿到了一个会员国提供的图像，显示中国海洋执法巡逻队多次在紧靠多艘朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只的地点作业。这些朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只据报都向悬挂中国国旗的船只卸载了煤炭。专家小组请中国提供中国巡逻船可能掌握的关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只识别和活动情况、接收移交煤炭的船只以及所采取的任何相关联行动的信息。[71]

94. 中国答复如下：

> 中国重视打击和监管非法海洋活动。中国海警的巡逻和执法有助于维护中国管辖水域的航行秩序，而且也忠实履行安全理事会相关决议规定的义务。宁波-舟山水域是各类船只进出非常频繁的海区。中国海警船在那里巡逻是完全正常的。一国执法力量的活动事关国家安全。中国请专家小组尊重会员国

[71] 有一个专家反对将有关执法的信息列入第 93-95 段。

> 的合法权利和利益，不要将涉及中国海警船的未经核实的信息列入报告，这将损害海警船的安全。

95. 专家小组注意到中国对其海警安全的关切，将把重点继续放在上文已识别的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只上。机密附件 45 载有会员国提供的图像。

接收来自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的煤炭的货轮

96. 专家小组继续调查悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只使用悬挂中国国旗的大型散装货轮在中国领水内以船对船移交的方式接收煤炭的情况。[72] 专家小组正在调查一个会员国报告的 2021 年 2 月至 4 月期间悬挂中国国旗的船只在宁波-舟山水域以船对船移交的方式从悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只接收装载煤炭并运往中国港口的两起事件。两艘船都传输与中国有关联的海事移动业务标识，其中一艘有注册的海事组织编号。专家小组收到的卫星图像详细记录了这些船只的行程，包括夜间船对船移交、装载煤炭的中国船只出现在中国港口和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只移交煤炭的情况，以及这些船只活动的详细日期和时间。专家小组对悬挂中国国旗的船只的航线、报告的吃水变化、船只传输自动识别系统信号时所处地点与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只的邻近距离以及中国船只停靠的港口进行的分析与会员国提供的信息相一致。这一信息已与中国分享，并请中国提供进一步信息。

97. 中国答复如下：

> 中国相关当局正在调查和核实，目前没有信息可以分享。由于调查正在进行，中国请专家小组不要将有关这些船只的信息列入报告，避免干扰中国的调查和执法。

98. 鉴于中国正在对这些指名船只进行调查，专家小组已保留船只的识别信息、数据和图像以及对拥有和管理这些船只的列名实体的研究。专家小组将适时更新中国进行的调查情况。


在往返一趟行程中出口来自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的煤炭并进口人道主义货物

99. 专家小组和会员国观察指出，截至 2021 年 5 月 11 日，有超过 20 艘朝鲜民主主义人民共和国货船锚泊在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的南浦船闸口外围，该区域已成为船只的长期隔离检疫地点(见图十五)。

[72] 例如，见 S/2021/211，第 58 和 65-66 段。

图十五

从中国港口和港区返回、锚泊在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国南浦船闸口外围的悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国相关联船只，截至 2021 年 5 月 11 日的情况




资料来源：会员国。

100. 根据会员国提供的信息，这些朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只都是从中国港口返回。其中有些船只，例如被专家小组追踪的悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的“Ko San”号(海事组织编号 9110236)，据报在宁波-舟山水域卸载来自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的煤炭之后又驶往中国大连港，据会员国称，该船于 7 月 1 日在那里“装载人道主义援助物资”[73] 进口到朝鲜民主主义人民共和国(见图十六)。更多详情见附件 46。

[73] 港口分析表明，“Ko San”号是停靠在中国大连的北良粮食码头。

图十六

“Ko San”号在往返一趟行程中出口煤炭并进口可能的人道主义货物，2020 年 5 月至 7 月



资料来源：Sea-web、IHS Markit，由专家小组附加说明；内嵌图像：Windward；卫星图像：会员国。

101. 专家小组指出，安全理事会第 2397(2017)号决议第 9 段规定，会员国如果有合理理由认为任何船只参与决议禁止的活动或物项运输，就应扣押、检查和查封在其港口内的该船只，而且也可对其领水内受其管辖的任何船只这样做，但只要不参与逃避制裁的活动，船只都允许向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送人道主义货物。[74]

[74] 另见 S/2021/211，第 58 和 63-64 段。

102. 附件 46 提供了一个会员国报告的其他含有卫星图像的例子，以及专家小组对同样通过往返一趟行程在中国领水卸载来自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的煤炭并在中国港口装载人道主义援助货物的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国“Thae Song 8”号船(海事组织编号 9003653)、“Min Hae”号船(海事组织编号 8672897)和“Tae Phyong 2”号船(以前称为“Ming Zhou 6”号)(海事组织编号 8602763)的调查情况。

103. 专家小组就图十五所列 26 艘朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只中每一艘船的活动情况寻求中国协助，包括哪些船 2021 年以船对船移交的方式在中国领水卸载了来自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的煤炭或其他受制裁的商品，哪些船参与运输了来自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的煤炭又从中国港口装载了人道主义货物，在受制裁的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国煤炭出口中有哪些易货贸易换取了中国的粮食或其他进口货物。

104. 中国答复如下：

> “Thae Song 8”号、“Min Hae”号和“Tae Phyong 2”号是空载进入龙口港，在装载肥料和农药后驶往南浦港。“Ko San”号是空载进入大连北良港，在装载大米后驶离。中国没有发现这些船只在中国领水内走私煤炭，也没有理由禁止这些船只空载进港装载人道主义货物。

建议

关于船只身份洗白和互换

105. 会员国和船舶注册处应发布关于已查明的冒用自动识别系统档案隐藏身份事件的最新通告，以防范与此类船只进行贸易。

106. 根据第 2397(2017)号决议第 9 段，如果对船只识别信息的有效性存有怀疑，港口和其他相关海事当局应对此类船只进入其港口管辖水域的历史进行必要核查。

107. 船旗注册处应要求所有寻求注册的申请人在展示船只识别信息之处提供船只外部(船头、船尾甲板)和内部的最新照片。

108. 拥有为悬挂外国国旗的船只提供服务的船坞的会员国应进一步认识船只为从事受制裁活动而寻求实体改造或其他修改从而混淆身份的风险。

关于信息共享

109. 船旗注册处应定期在其网站上以及面向更广泛航运界的海事通告中公布被注销的船只名单。

110. 滥用海事移动业务标识是一种趋势，对各类船旗注册处都有影响。为了协助和确保船旗注册处的海事移动业务标识不被欺诈性使用，专家小组鼓励注册处和会员国调查在其水域传输欺诈性识别信息的船只，并分享调查结果，包括与专家小组分享调查结果，在涉及疑似逃避制裁活动的情况下尤其如此。

关于操纵自动识别系统

111. 会员国应监测和调查传输可疑识别信息的船只，特别是在已知有朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国相关联船只作业的水域。

112. 船旗注册处应确保有专职人员监测注册处船队的自动识别系统状态，作为其尽职调查工作的一部分，包括与传输不同于注册档案中所载的自动识别系统信息的船舶进行联系。

113. 作为定期安全检查的一部分，船级社应证明每艘船上都存在单一的、功能性的、A 型自动识别系统。检查时应寻找存在多个自动识别系统的证据。

关于实益所有权信息

114. 专家小组重申其建议，即会员国应要求其相关主管当局披露所有寻求在其船舶注册处注册船舶的法律实体的实益所有权信息。开放注册的会员国应努力收集拥有或控制每艘船舶所属外国实体的每个人的身份和联系信息，无论是作为控股股东、企业融资人，还是高级管理人员或决策者。应向执法等相关实体和专家小组提供此类信息，以促进制裁的执行工作。

贸易统计和海关问题

115. 由于采取了应对 COVID-19 的措施，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国记录的对外贸易从 2020 年初开始暴跌。2020 年记录的出口总额达到约 1.569 亿美元，约为 2019 年数字的 33%。进口总额为 5.581 亿美元，约为 2019 年进口额的 20%(见表 2)。一个会员国表示，制裁给合法贸易带来了相当大的额外成本(包括必须在出口价格上提供大幅折扣、提高进口价格、增加保险费、增加金融业务的成本，以及通关方面的复杂情况)。[75]

表 2
2018-2020 年记录的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国贸易

(千美元)

	2018	2019	2020
出口	352 611	473 550	156 867
进口	2 327 431	2 726 196	558 071
贸易差额	**(1 974 820)**	**(2 252 646)**	**(401 204)**

资料来源：国际贸易中心贸易图(2021 年 7 月 6 日查阅)。

[75] 2020 年朝鲜民主主义人民共和国按商品(协调制度编码)分列的贸易统计数据，见附件 48。

116. 在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国当局为进口商品建造消毒设施[76] 并作为一些例外重新开放边境后，一些贸易活动于 2021 年 3 月重新开始。然而，很快又恢复采取了边境限制措施(见附件 1)。

117. 公开提供的统计数据，包括朝鲜民主主义人民共和国贸易伙伴汇编的统计数据，仅代表该国对外贸易的一部分，有时还列有错误数据。国家代码的错误使用，即朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的国家代码(KP)被当作实际贸易伙伴大韩民国的国家代码(KR)而被错误地输入，经常被列举为一个问题。[77] 专家小组已就此事致函国际标准化组织，但没有收到答复。

118. 根据国际贸易中心关于国家贸易数据的记录，其中一些贸易物品似乎属于制裁类别，专家小组要求 69 个会员国提供与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国交易的资料，以及任何拒绝清关或扣押出口到朝鲜民主主义人民共和国或从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进口的货物的详细情况。

119. 专家小组还请会员国海关当局提供资料，说明其实际履行制裁义务的情况，例如要求检查往来朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的所有货物，并在发现违禁品时予以扣押和处置(专家小组的调查模板见附件 49)。

120. 许多会员国表示，2020 年和 2021 年与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国之间没有录得任何贸易活动，而其他会员国则表示，交易符合联合国制裁规定。几个会员国向专家小组通报了对可能不遵守制裁案件的调查结果。参见附件 50，其中载有比较数据，在许多情况下，这些数据表明国际贸易统计数据与国家数据之间存在差异。

121. 专家小组发现，会员国海关当局遵守了对禁令的执行，尽管在一些情况下，会员国面临着确定某些物品是否被禁止进出朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的挑战。关于专家小组用来监测部门禁令执行情况的受限制的协调制度编码商品清单，见附件 51。

122. 针对专家小组的询问，中国答复如下：

> 国际贸易中心(国贸中心)的数据与中国官方数据不同的主要原因是，国贸中心将在中国生产并出口到第三方，后被移交给朝鲜的商品视为中国对朝鲜的出口，国贸中心对贸易进行了相应的调整。这与事实不符，国贸中心没有及时更新和更正其数据。

中国还强调，在有关朝鲜民主主义人民共和国方面没有录得涉及违禁品的交易。

[76] “朝鲜将机场变成 COVID-19 消毒中心以促进贸易”，NK PRO 网站(朝鲜新闻)，2021 年 4 月 16 日。可查阅 https://www.nknews.org/pro/north-korea-turns-airport-into-covid-19-disinfection-center-to-boost-trade/。

[77] 见 S/2021/211，附件 41。

123. 应专家小组的要求，泰国提供了关于将朝鲜民主主义人民共和国列为目的地的 12 个出口条目的资料，后来这些条目被撤回，并退回了货物。见附件 52。试图出口的产品包括几批属于被禁止的协调制度编码 85 一组的电子产品(变压器、二极管)，但也包括香水产品，这些香水产品是否属于制裁范围有时难以确定。

124. 保加利亚向专家小组通报了营养添加剂的出口情况(见附件 53)。

125. 新加坡再次确认了关于查获转运葡萄酒和果汁并由海关根据法院命令予以处置的信息(见附件 54)。[78]

126. 在给乌拉圭的函件中，专家小组解释说，正如乌拉圭早些时候所设想的那样，部门转让禁令不仅涉及“第 2270(2016)号决议中所列的化学、核或生物材料”，而且还包括附件 51 所列的其他商品。专家小组准备逐案提供咨询意见，以协助乌拉圭海关当局就涉及朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的计划中的进出口作出自己的决定。专家小组强调，最后决定是各会员国的特权，但再次建议会员国使用受限制的协调制度编码商品完整清单作为指导(见附件 51)。

127. 危地马拉告知专家小组，2020 年 12 月，该国海关总署表示，其规则部对中美洲单一海关报关单平台进行了改进，禁止确认含有 KP(朝鲜民主主义人民共和国)编码的中美洲单一海关报关单和申报。此外，通过新闻摘要和现代海关(Aduana Moderna)公告在内部和外部传播信息，表明不应在进口报关单中使用 KP 编码(见附件 55)。[79]

128. 圭亚那告知专家小组，圭亚那税务局正在联合国贸易和发展会议(贸发会议)赞助的海关数据录入、控制和管理自动化系统(海关数据自动化系统)世界系统中引入一个风险简介系统，以便对交易进行示警(见附件 56)。

129. 专家小组打算继续对开放源码统计数据和会员国提供的数据进行比较分析，以警惕任何可能的差异并调查其原因。

130. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国非法出口的主要商品包括煤炭、矿物、铁、沙和纺织品。根据一个会员国的数据，2020 年出口了数百万吨煤炭，可能还有其他受制裁的矿物。截至 2021 年 5 月底，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国至少出口了 36.4 万吨煤炭(见第 85 段)。

131. 专家小组审查了涉及非法出口煤炭、沙子和锌的几个中国诉讼程序。2019 年 10 月 30 日至 11 月 3 日，5 名中国公民合谋将原产于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的煤炭走私到中国。向 Fuzhou Tenghuang Trade Co.Ltd.付了款，煤炭被移交到属于 Nanjing Feixiong Ocean Shipping Company 的船只上。中国一家法院[80] 认定，这几名被告犯有走私罪，每人都被判处有期徒刑和罚款。

[78] 同上，第 117 段。

[79] 专家小组正在寻求澄清。

[80] 见 https://wenshu.court.gov.cn/。

132. 另一起法庭判例涉及“Hao Fan 2”号船，[81] 该船非法走私原产于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的煤炭，途经俄罗斯联邦，然后进入中国。据称，这些煤炭是由总部位于香港的 Champion Global Trading Limited 出售给 Chifeng Shenhua Material Trade Co.Ltd 的。中国法庭记录显示，相同的同谋中的几人还在 2019 年 6 月为源自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的锌粉的船对船移交提供了便利，此事涉及 Unphung 合资公司(总部位于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的 Unphasan Trading Corporation 和总部位于中国的 Liaoning Wellhope Agri-Tech Joint Stock Corporation 的合资企业)。

建议

133. 专家小组建议国际标准化组织研究可能采取的措施，防止错误使用朝鲜民主主义人民共和国和大韩民国的国家编码(分别为 KP 和 KR)。

134. 专家小组建议会员国精简其进出口管制清单，使用专家小组的非正式违禁商品清单作为辅助材料(见附件 51)。

135. 专家小组注意到，会员国可以研究使用贸发会议开发的海关数据自动化系统(一种计算机化海关管理系统，目前在 80 多个国家使用；见 https://asycuda.org/en/)，以监控与受制裁管辖区的交易。

136. 专家小组建议会员国海关当局利用上述资源为其管辖范围内的贸易代理人提供信息并供其使用，以进行尽职调查，特别是在处理与受制裁管辖区贸易有关的违禁商品时。

四. 禁运、被指认的实体和个人以及海外工人

禁运

与纪录片《鼹鼠：在朝鲜卧底》有关的案件

137. 专家小组继续调查纪录片《鼹鼠：在朝鲜卧底》所描述的一些活动。[82] 乌干达答复说，有关政府机构的调查仍在进行中；柬埔寨最初答复了专家小组的询问，但没有答复后续问题。中国答复如下：

> 信中提到的纪录片涉嫌以不正当手段制作，损害了有关信息的真实性和公信力，不得作为专家组调查朝鲜涉嫌违反安全理事会决议活动的可靠信息来源。专家小组应以公平、客观和公正的态度开展工作。

[81] 沈忠国际海运有限公司(KPe.073)于 2018 年 3 月 30 日被指定为“Hao Fan 2”号的船舶和商务管理人。

[82] 见 S/2021/211，第 90 段和附件 88。

缅甸

138. 专家小组重申先前提出的要求，即向其提供有关缅甸与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国军事合作的资料，包括自 2006 年 10 月以来的弹道导弹合作，并提供缅甸和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国技术人员返回各自国家的证据。[83]

139. 缅甸答复如下：

> 缅甸武装部队继续致力于不扩散，并正在积极履行其在核裁军和不扩散大规模毁灭性武器以及裁减国际人道法禁止的武器方面的国际法律义务。缅甸武装部队支持彻底消除大规模毁灭性武器，并正在履行缅甸加入的国际和区域法律文书规定的关于不扩散的国际义务。

阿拉伯联合酋长国

140. 专家小组对与朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司(KOMID)有关的个人的调查仍在继续。Ri Hyong Thae 先生继续为一些国家和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国之间的与武器有关的活动合作进行国际旅行，并在安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会指认的其他人员陪同下旅行。专家小组要求阿拉伯联合酋长国提供有关 Ri 先生的进一步资料。专家小组尚未得到答复。

滥用使馆财产

141. 专家小组继续对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻索非亚大使馆财产的调查，并要求保加利亚提供资料，说明有报道称保加利亚公司仍在为“Terra 官邸”出租打广告事宜，该住宅似乎是朝鲜大使以前的官邸(位于 No. 6, Andrei Sakharov Street, Mladost Quarter 1, Sofia, 1784)。[84] 保加利亚答复说，2017 年 2 月，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国大使馆被告知禁止将该国大使馆拥有的财产用于外交和领事活动以外的任何目的，并敦促该大使馆立即停止任何此类活动。当地公司“Terra Group”和“Technologica”是以上述地址注册的，也被强烈建议终止租赁协议并遵守制裁制度。据保加利亚当局称，自那以后，这些公司没有向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国大使馆支付过任何租金(见附件 57)。

奢侈品禁令执行情况

142. 由于边境关闭，包括奢侈品(被第 1718(2006)号决议第 8(a)㈢段禁止进口)在内的消费品进口实际上已经停止。跨越边境的私人商业交流几乎不复存在。

143. 然而，媒体报道称，一些供精英阶层使用的进口货物和奢侈品(包括“汽车轮胎和零件、建筑和室内设计材料、金正恩家庭别墅的用品、奢侈品和其他物品”)

[83] 见 S/2019/171 第 78 段和 S/2020/151 第 110 段。

[84] 见 S/2021/211，附件 110。

由船只从边境的一个铁路仓库(在那里被存放在列车上)非法运往诸如南浦等朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的港口。[85]

豪华汽车

144. 专家小组继续调查 2018 年从意大利向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国供应两辆 S 级奔驰豪华轿车背后的网络。European Cars & More S.R.L 公司在 2018 年的汽车中转销售中扮演了不为人知的角色。该公司还告知专家小组，它此前还在 2017 年和 2018 年向 LS Logistica & Spedizioni S.R.L.C.公司(后者也是在 2018 年运输 S 级车辆中发挥作用的公司)出售了另外三辆奔驰豪华车——一辆奔驰 S600 Guard、一辆 S650 Maybach 和一辆 S600 Pullman，车辆识别号为 WDD2221761A356488、WDD2229801A351655 和 WDD2229761A333357。专家小组尚未收到该公司的答复。

145. 专家小组已就后三辆车与戴姆勒公司接洽。戴姆勒公司已证实，这些车是应一名意大利客户的要求，由德国辛德尔芬根的戴姆勒股份公司(Daimler AG)生产的。根据意大利注册局的说法，这些车在 2020 年之前一直在意大利注册，然后被转售到“欧洲内外”；车辆的位置尚待确定。专家小组继续进行调查，包括向意大利海关当局了解情况。[86]

146. 专家小组收到一个会员国提供的信息，即总部设在香港的义发汽车(香港)有限公司[87] 为“Ji Yuan”号(海事组织编号 9044140，又称“Chang Long”号)向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送一辆豪华汽车提供了便利(另见第 68 和 73 段)。该会员国还报告说，2019 年 11 月，“Chang Long”号(以“Ji Yuan”号的名字运营)向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送了两个装满未指明的电子产品的集装箱。专家小组致函有关方面。中国答复说：“初步调查发现，该香港特别行政区公司即‘义发’与朝鲜之间没有任何贸易往来。关于“Ji Yuan”号船所载离境货物，中国正在进行深入调查和核实。”中国进一步表示：“部分货物的目的地是大韩民国，该船船东是联合王国的一家公司。”义发公司尚未回复。调查仍在继续。

147. 专家小组继续调查向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国转运丰田雷克萨斯汽车事宜。据一个会员国称，Jiangsu Overseas Group Foreign Economic and Technical Cooperation, Ltd(江苏海外集团对外经济技术合作有限公司)[88] 参与了一起企图向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送价值超过 100 万美元的豪华汽车的事件，其中包括新的 2020 款雷克萨斯 LX570 运动多功能车(SUV)。据报道，一批此类车辆于 2020 年 9 月下旬抵达宁波(据称来自阿拉伯联合酋长国)，准备继续运送到朝鲜民主主义人民共和国。据报道，这些交易是由朝鲜民主主义人民共和国朝鲜联合开发银

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[85] “丹东站货运列车上的货物通过船运往朝鲜”，《朝鲜日报》，2021 年 5 月 31 日。可查阅 www.dailynk.com/english/cargo-freight-train-dandong-station-transported-north-korea-boat/。

[86] 见 S/2021/211，第 113-114 段。

[87] Yee Fat Motor Trading (H.K.) Ltd，地址：28 Kam Tin Road, Yuen Long District, Yuen Long District, New Territories, Hong Kong, China。

[88] 位于中国江苏省南京市鼓楼区中山路 55 号。

行(KPe.033)、信贷开发银行和 Korea Kyongeun Trading Corporation 公司在中国的代表促成的。专家小组要求提供资料，但没有收到任何答复。

其他奢侈品

148. 专家小组估计，自 2020 年初以来，几乎没有向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国发运过酒精饮料，而且由于与 COVID-19 有关的限制，该国国内市场上也无法买到这类饮料。

149. 根据专家小组从公开来源获得的信息，[89] 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国家事务委员会乐队最近开始公开使用媒体来源认为是一架高端的三角钢琴，并由朝鲜民主主义人民共和国官方电视台进行电视转播。鉴于安理会第 1718(2006)号决议第 8(a)㈢段禁止直接或间接向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国供应、销售或转运奢侈品，向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国转运此类奢侈品乐器违反了会员国执行安全理事会相关决议的义务(见附件 58)。专家小组要求推定的制造商提供产品信息。

建议

150. 专家小组再次建议会员国精简其出口管制清单，以符合第 1718(2006)、1874(2009)、2094(2013)、2270(2016)和 2321(2016)号决议目标的方式反映被禁奢侈品清单，避免不必要地扩大其范围，以便不限制向平民供应未受禁止的货物，也不会在贸易重新开始后产生负面的人道主义影响。

151. 专家小组再次建议，会员国应鼓励本国出口奢侈品的商业实体和国民在合同中列入防止转售给朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的合同条款。

152. 专家小组再次建议，会员国和相关组织应鼓励船务和运输公司在考虑到转运风险的情况下，建立全面的检查收货人制度。

侦察总局(KPe.031)

153. 专家小组继续调查与被联合国指认的侦察总局有关联的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络威胁行为体实施的网络攻击。[90] 根据多家媒体报道和网络安全公司的说法，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的网络行为体对全球各地的国防工业发动了攻击。

154. 在本报告所述期间，媒体报道称，与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国侦察总局有关联的网络威胁行为体 Lazarus Group 对两家德国国防公司进行了网络攻击，其做法是以虚假的工作机会接近这些公司的雇员。[91] 其他媒体报道称，Lazarus Group 和另一个与侦察总局密切相关的网络威胁行为体 Kimsuky Group 在 2020

[89] “金正恩的新宠乐队在新音乐视频中过着奢华的生活”，朝鲜新闻，2021 年 6 月 24 日。可查阅 www.nknews.org/2021/06/kim-jong-uns-new-favorite-band-lives-life-of-luxury-in-new-music-videos/。

[90] 关于侦察总局和其他组织在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行动中的作用，见 S/2020/840，附件 48。

[91] 见 www.br.de/nachrichten/deutschland-welt/cyberspionage-gegen-deutsche-ruestungskonzerne,SJSDtK2 (德文)。

年对俄罗斯国防、能源和信息技术部门进行了网络攻击——这是一场名为“ThreatNeedle(威胁针)”的网络运动。[92, 93] 专家小组已就这些事件进行查询。[94]

155. 专家小组还继续调查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国通过网络手段逃避制裁的情况，该国的做法是通过盗窃知识产权非法获取经济资产。根据网络安全公司的报告和媒体报道，已知与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有关联的长期威胁行为体对开发 COVID-19 疫苗的制药公司发动了网络攻击。[95] 专家小组向会员国证实了这些活动，并注意到攻击的战术、技术和程序与此前报告的诸如 Lazarus 等朝鲜民主主义人民共和国行为体实施的网络攻击相吻合。一家制药公司告知专家小组，威胁的潜在影响很大，但没有发现任何证据表明威胁行为体成功了。该公司为保护其信息技术系统实施了额外的安全措施。

海外工人

156. 专家小组继续调查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国海外工人事宜。一个会员国向专家小组报告说，2020 年和 2021 年，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民仍然留在几个国家，并继续在信息技术、建筑、电子和农业等领域赚取收入，这直接违反了第 2397(2017)号决议第 8 段。专家小组继续进行调查。

157. 专家小组还从另一个会员国获得信息，在几个东南亚国家，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的餐厅在 2019 年 12 月遣返截止日期之后一直在营业。专家小组正在进行调查。

158. 专家小组曾报告说，[96] 来自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的三名医务人员和三名翻译在厄瓜多尔皮钦查省工作。他们的合同本应在 2020 年 5 月结束(见附件 60)。厄瓜多尔告知专家小组，已采取适用措施终止这些工人的合同并遣返朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民。专家小组继续监测此案。

五. 财务

159. 根据其自身的调查、会员国提供的信息和开放源码报告，专家小组评估说，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国使用全球金融机构的机会没有明显减少。专家小组还注意到，该国的非法金融活动继续集中在东亚和东南亚，那里不透明的公司登记程序破坏了金融机构的合规和了解客户程序。结果，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续

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[92] 见 www.kommersant.ru/doc/4538451(俄文)；另见 www.kommersant.ru/doc/4426131(俄文)。

[93] 卡巴斯基报告的相关摘录见附件 59。

[94] 一个受影响的会员国向专家小组通报说，正在进行调查。

[95] “与朝鲜有关的黑客以强生和诺瓦克斯为目标，寻找 COVID 研究成果”，路透社，2020 年 12 月 2 日。可查阅 www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-north-korea-cyber/north-korea-linked-hackers-targeted-jj-novavax-in-hunt-for-covid-research-idUSKBN28C1UE。

[96] 见 S/2020/840，第 129 段。

维持和利用空壳公司网络，为与海上制裁、贸易交易、奢侈品进口、非法劳工和虚拟资产洗钱有关的逃避制裁活动提供便利。

160. 专家小组正在对与逃避海上制裁活动有关的贸易融资进行的审查表明，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续盯着透明度低的司法管辖区，以便进行公司登记服务。机构服务提供商的不合规做法，特别是在身份管理方面的不合规做法，大大有助于该国发起和隐藏非法活动的能力。在若干案件中，专家小组的调查发现，几家空壳公司的实益所有人实际上是代理权所有人。在大多数情况下，简单的身份核实检查显示，名义实益所有人与航运业没有任何联系，在某些情况下，他们并不知道自己的身份被用来注册一个空壳公司。

据称在中国的合资企业

161. 根据开源信息和一个会员国提供的信息，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续与中国公司组建合资企业。

162. 2021 年 1 月，专家小组开始对 Yongxiang International Trading Company Limited 进行调查，据称该公司与朝鲜计算机中心[97] 签署了一份合同，其中提及与朝鲜计算机中心进行“战略合作”，供应用于促进数字零售支付处理的销售点连线系统(见附件 61)。中国答复说：“任何禁止向朝鲜出口的物品，中国海关都不会放行，即使签署了相关合同也不放行。”(专家小组对中国的询问和中国答复见附件 62)根据 Yongxiang International Trading Company Limited 的网站，该公司自 2017 年以来一直与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国中央银行保持着联系。调查还在继续。

163. 根据专家小组获得的记录，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的一家公司——朝鲜新兴信息技术贸易会社[98] 拥有一家中国公司 60%的股份(见附件 63)。根据一个会员国提供的信息，朝鲜新兴信息技术贸易会社被怀疑与军需工业部(KPe.028)有联系。调查还在继续。[99]

海外银行代表

164. 专家小组继续调查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国海外银行代表。作为对专家小组正在进行的调查[100] 的回应，一个会员国转告专家小组说，“2020 年有数十名朝鲜银行代表继续在世界各地开展业务”，并提供了一份不详尽的名单，其中声称朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有 6 名银行代表在俄罗斯联邦开展业务，有 22 名在中国，[101] 1 名在印度尼西亚，1 名在新加坡。[102] 该会员国还指出，在若干情况下，

[97] 根据一个会员国以前向专家小组提供的资料，朝鲜计算机中心隶属于军需工业部(指认编号为 KPe.028)。专家小组关于朝鲜计算机中心的最新报告，见 S/2020/151，第 123-125 段。

[98] Choseon Xinxing Information Technology Trade Association。

[99] 一位专家对这一段持有异议，因为其内容需要进一步的佐证。

[100] 见 S/2021/211，第 140-141 段和附件 72。

[101] 两位专家对使用未经核实的信息持异议。

[102] Li Hyun 先生于 2020 年 6 月被定罪并判刑。

一名个人可能同时代表多家朝鲜民主主义人民共和国银行开展金融业务，没有任何信息表明这些银行已被关闭。专家小组继续调查有关海外银行代表的这些说法。

贸易融资和逃避海上制裁

165. 根据最近的一份报告[103] 和随后的媒体文章，Winson Group 总部设在新加坡，拥有广泛的全球业务，主要从事国际石油批发贸易和公海装燃料，是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国非法燃料采购活动的关键节点。根据上述报告和先前的调查，专家小组开始调查当时悬挂瑙鲁国旗的“Super Star”号(海事组织编号 9085388)[104] 和悬挂不明旗帜的“Diamond 8”号(海事组织编号 9132612)[105] 在 2020 年 5 月 1 日(协调世界时)左右和再次于 2020 年 6 月 14 日(协调世界时)左右进行的与销售汽油以及随后的船对船移交有关的交易，这显然违反了第 2397(2017)号决议和第 2375(2017)号决议第 18 段。

166. 2021 年 4 月，专家小组要求提供 Winson Group 除其他外与“Super Star”号和“Diamond 8”号有关活动的财务记录和贸易文件。专家小组还要求澄清 Winson Group 为减轻逃避制裁风险而进行的尽职调查进程和程序。[106] 在给专家小组的答复中，Winson Group 指出它对遵守制裁的承诺，并提供了该公司于 2018 年实施的尽职调查程序摘要。[107]

167. 在解释“Super Star”号和“Diamond 8”号之间的船对船移交时，[108] Winson Group 表示，其批发客户 Sino Global Trade Co. Ltd 公司(原 Super Gold Holdings Inc.公司，以下简称“Sino Global”)从 Winson 的一个实体 Golden Shelter Limited 公司定时包租了“Super Star”号。Sino Global 随后提议“Super Star”号以船上交货的方式从 Winson Oil(Wholesale)Pte Ltd 接收汽油。[109] Sino Global 随后将部分汽油出售给一家名为“Zfullboto Co. Ltd”的公司，该公司向 Sino Global 推荐“Diamond 8”号，让其通过与“Super Star”号的船对船移交方式提货。

[103] 见“黑金——暴露朝鲜石油采购网络”，皇家联合研究所(Royal United Services Institute)，2021 年 3 月 22 日；可查阅 www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/project-sandstone-special-report-black-gold-exposing-north-koreas-oil-procurement-networks。另见“调查向朝鲜秘密输送石油的 5 件事”，《纽约时报》，2021 年 3 月 22 日；可查阅 www.nytimes.com/2021/03/22/world/winson-north-korea-oil-tankers.html。

[104] 这艘船目前已被拆散。

[105] 专家小组此前曾建议指认“Diamond 8”号，并进一步指出，该船是非法向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国供应石油的最大油轮。专家小组关于“Diamond 8”号的先前报告，见 S/2020/151 第 21 段、S/2020/840 第 25-39 段和 S/2021/211 第 49 段。

[106] 专家小组曾于 2018 年 5 月致函 Winson Group，强调朝鲜民主主义人民共和国利用全球石油供应链、串通外国人、离岸公司登记和国际银行系统逃避联合国制裁所构成的风险。这封信还提供了尽职调查指导和装运港船上交货最佳做法。

[107] 作为制裁合规政策的一部分，Winson Group 特别指出，它对潜在交易对手进行尽职调查，在合同中包括制裁条款，并在签订任何合同之前进行适当的风险管理。

[108] Winson Group 承认了这一船对船的移交。

[109] Winson Oil (Wholesale) Pte Ltd 是位于新加坡的 Winson Group 公司的一部分。

168. Winson 的代表也向专家小组报告，该集团已对 Sino Global 进行尽职审查，发现其唯一股东兼董事为 Chien Chih-wei(简志玮)先生，而且该公司没有被列入任何指认实体名单。[110]Winson 与 Sino Global 签订的汽油合同特别注明：“本合同的产品不会出售给朝鲜或任何朝鲜实体或任何其他受制裁的国家。”据 Winson Group 的一位高级公司官员称，“Winson 没有参与 Sino Global 向 Zfullboto 出售货物的交易和(或)Zfullboto 向 Sino Global 提议‘Diamond 8’号的交易”，一位名叫“Ivy”的人是 Zfullboto 的运营商。[111]

169. 然而，专家小组获得的资料显示，简志玮先生使用中国台湾省高雄市凤山区诚爱路 150 号注册 Sino Global(见附件 64)。[112] 这也是 Winson Group 的一名高级员工在国际海事组织为“An Ping”号(国际海事组织编号 7903366)船只提交申请时使用的地址，[113] 该申请将船东列为 Spring Gain International Limited 公司。[114] 同一员工还在申请中使用了 Winson Group 的电子邮件，以及一个与 Winson Shipping (Taiwan) Co., Ltd.有关的电话和传真号码。[115, 116]

170. 对社交媒体记录(见附件 64)的审查表明，上述雇员和简先生关系密切。此外，专家小组获得的社交媒体记录显示，简先生与几名在 Winson Shipping (Taiwan) Co., Ltd.、Jiu Li Shuen Trading 和 Taishun Trading 公司担任高级职位的个人保持着密切的关系。鉴于这些实质性联系，专家小组正在继续调查 Winson Group 及其子公司以及 Zfullboto 的所有者和经营者。

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[110] 专家小组无法查明任何网上资料、联系信息或其他信息，表明该公司参与了石油行业。这些是专家小组先前报告的空壳公司的示警红旗指标。

[111] Zfullboto Co. Ltd (中盛博通有限公司) 于 2019 年 1 月注册成立，没有网上足迹，公司下所列的是名叫 Chen Jieyue (陈节约)的中国国民，居住地址在中国福建省石狮市。

[112] 中国台湾省的法庭记录显示，简志玮曾经居住在这个地址。同一法庭记录还显示，简先生使用过别名 Chien Ko-yeh (简科晔)。公司记录显示，专家小组认为是简先生的一名个人也在这个地址经营一家名为 Fengxin Enterprise(锋馨企业社)的公司。此外，简先生于 2018 年 9 月 3 日至 2019 年 2 月 11 日被列为 Taishun Trading (一家位于 Winson Shipping (Taiwan) Co., Ltd 和 Jiu Li Shuen Trading (Winson 旗下的一个机构)的下面一层楼的石油销售公司)的监事。

[113] 2020 年，“An Ping”号曾两次向南浦运送石油。


[114] 专家小组关于“An Ping”号的先前报告，见 S/2021/211，第 46(a)段和附件 25。Spring Gain International 继续在商业数据库中列出 Winson Shipping (Taiwan) Co., Ltd 的电话和传真号码，作为其联系方式。

[115] 现称 Zheng Yu Shipping Co., Ltd (正毓船舶股份有限公司)。

[116] 一位专家认为，需要在公司名称后面加上“位于中国台湾省”。

图十七

“Super Star”号和“Diamond 8”号之间船对船移交背后的网络



资料来源：专家小组。

虚拟资产和虚拟资产服务提供商

171. 根据会员国提供的信息以及开源信息，专家小组评估认为，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续开展针对加密货币行业的鱼叉式网络钓鱼活动。这些网络钓鱼活动大量使用社交媒体平台来识别潜在目标，并进行初步联系。一个会员国向专家小组转告说，网络行为体通常使用定向方法，包括使用电子邮件大众营销平台发送和跟踪“网络钓鱼”信息；使用相关的新闻文章或附件链接(非恶意的)来启动联系；通过流行的基于云的文件共用平台共享恶意文件；并向加密货币交易所的支持人员进行争揽贷款业务。

建议

172. 专家小组注意到，金融行动特别工作组于 2020 年 10 月修订了建议 1 及其解释性说明(R.1 和 INR.1)，要求各国和私营部门实体“查明、评估、了解和减轻”其与“可能违反、不执行或逃避定向金融制裁有关的扩散融资风险”。根据这一要求，专家小组建议所有会员国和私营部门实体审查最近公布的金融行动特别工作组“关于扩散融资风险评估和缓解的指导意见”。[117]

[117] 可查阅 https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Guidance-Proliferation-Financing-Risk-Assessment-Mitigation.pdf。

六. 制裁的意外影响

173. 安全理事会第 2397(2017)号决议第 25 段重申，联合国制裁无意对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国平民造成不利的人道主义影响，也无意对安理会各项决议未予禁止的经济活动与合作、粮食援助和人道主义援助等活动产生不利影响或作出限制，并强调指出该国须充分满足本国人民的生活需要，对此负有首要责任。

174. 联合国机构、会员国和非政府组织继续将朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的人道主义局势描述为不断恶化。2021 年 4 月，金正恩强调了朝鲜经济形势的严重性，指出“由于农业部门因去年台风的破坏而未能完成粮食生产计划，人民的粮食状况现在变得紧张起来”，[118] 这一情况被官方描述为“粮食危机”，[119] 官方数据支持这种说法。[120] 这一承认恰逢许多消费品价格异常波动、食品短缺、获得商品和服务的机会减少、恐慌性购买以及医疗用品和服务的可获得性进一步减少。专家小组认为，下列因素导致朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的人道主义局势恶化：

(a) 与防范 COVID-19 相关的措施，包括自 2020 年 1 月起关闭边境，几乎停止消费品进口，出口收入下降，严格限制购买食品和其他必需品的能力；

(b) 与联合国制裁有关的持续限制：专家小组在其以前的报告中评估认为，这些限制，例如对燃料、机械和零部件进口的限制，对能源安全、民用运输、农业、医疗保健、环卫和个人卫生产生了意外影响。虽然专家小组无法对这一影响进行量化评估，并进一步注意到，由于该国的边境关闭、旅行限制和进口限制，其相对影响可能有所减少，但专家小组确实评估认为，在本报告所述期间，制裁可能产生了一些意外影响，并在边境开放后将继续产生负面的人道主义后果；[121]

(c) 试图加强对经济的集中控制和对市场活动的进一步限制(例如，限制食品以外的消费品的国内销售)，导致失去对个人经济活动的刺激。

175. 专家小组继续评估 COVID-19 大流行和制裁对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国境内人道主义行动的影响。2021 年 5 月，专家小组调查了直接或间接向安全理事会

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[118] 金正恩在 6 月份的劳动党中央委员会全会上发表的讲话，这是传统上粮食库存最低的时期。见“金正恩在党的全会活动开始之际承认存在粮食安全问题”，朝鲜新闻，2021 年 8 月 19 日，可查阅 www.nknews.org/2021/06/party-plenum-event-kicks-off-kim-jong-un-admits-food-security-issues。

[119] “朝鲜承认‘粮食危机’，称将向民众分发粮食”，朝鲜新闻，2021 年 6 月 20 日。可查阅 www.nknews.org/2021/06/north-korea-admits-food-crisis-says-grain-to-be-distributed-to-population/。

[120] 根据朝鲜民主主义人民共和国官方提供的资料，“2018 年的产量约为 495 万吨，是过去 10 年来的最低水平”。专家估计，2021 年粮食短缺约为 130 万吨。另见“朝鲜称 2018 年粮食产量降至 10 年低点”，《韩国先驱报》，2021 年 7 月 14 日。可查阅 http://www01.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20210714000330。

[121] 两位专家认为，毫无疑问，联合国制裁对人道主义局势产生了意想不到的影响。另一位专家指出，没有证据支持这一评估，即制裁对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国人道主义局势产生了影响。

第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会申请豁免的 38 个联合国组织和非政府组织[122] (答复摘要见附件 65(1)至 65(3))。

176. 回复的组织指出，自 2020 年 1 月边境关闭以来，它们开展人道主义援助行动的能力鲜有或根本没有改善。[123] 大多数组织不再设有驻该国人员，也缺乏获取信息的渠道，因此无法进行独立监测。对剩下的少数人员行动的持续限制削弱了与地方官员的关系。透明度的降低使得寻求新资金变得越来越困难。在没有进行中的项目的情况下，各组织正在吃力地维持管理费用。

177. 关于制裁对人道主义援助的影响，各组织关切的主要领域是在获得豁免方面的延迟；缺乏稳定的银行业务渠道，最终增加了行政费用和风险；清关延误；外国供应商的意愿下降；与人道主义有关的物品和业务费用增加；金融机构降低风险措施；对行动的资金投入减少。一个组织指出："了解制裁机制所涉及的信息所需的法律专业知识，以及驻地国际非政府组织缺乏与安理会制裁委员会沟通的直接渠道，这些在某些情况下业已证明不利于其他任务和责任。"尽管进口产品获得了适当的豁免，但复杂的海关手续造成了严重的延误。援助团体的供应商已经停止提交报价，特别指出了在海关当局方面的挑战。[124] 据另一个组织称，"二次抵制"措施阻止了为购买人道主义物资付款的银行交易和船只进入朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的港口，结果，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的对口单位放弃了对该国的人道主义项目。运输和后勤延误也被归咎于遵守制裁规定和海关执法。

178. 专家小组认识到在该国从大流行病中恢复的过程中提供人道主义援助的重要性，并强调会员国需要确保按照有关决议不受阻碍地向该国提供人道主义援助。自大流行病开始以来，豁免程序已经有了相当大的改善，应该进一步精简，使其更加透明和容易理解。

建议

179. **专家小组指出联合国有关机构一年两次就制裁的意外影响进行通报是有益之举，建议委员会继续这一做法。**

180. **专家小组重申需要采取紧急措施重新建立银行业务渠道。**

181. **专家小组建议，安全理事会应继续处理各种问题和进程，以减轻制裁对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国平民和人道主义援助行动可能产生的意外不利影响，从而使该国的弱势民众受益，并克服 COVID-19 大流行的后果。**

[122] 以往调查答复摘要，见 S/2021/211，第 173-174 段和附件 99(a)。

[123] 据一个组织称，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国实施的措施导致国内生产短缺，最终影响到平民人口。

[124] 自 2018 年以来，人道主义项目的商品价格上涨，有时涨幅高达 25%，最终给援助组织的运营预算带来压力。

七. 国家执行情况报告

会员国报告相关决议执行情况的现况

182. 截至 2021 年 7 月 31 日，有 66 个会员国提交了关于第 2397(2017)号决议执行情况的报告；81 个会员国提交了关于第 2375(2017)号决议执行情况的报告；95 个会员国提交了关于第 2371(2017)号决议执行情况的报告；90 个会员国提交了关于第 2321(2016)号决议执行情况的报告；107 个会员国提交了关于第 2270(2016)号决议执行情况的报告。尽管报告总数有所增加，但专家小组注意到，仍有很多国家(127 个，其中一个在 2019 年担任安全理事会非常任理事国)未就第 2397(2017)号决议提交报告。

183. 另外，会员国对专家小组有关其调查的询问的总体回复率不到 50%，实体和个人的回复率甚至更低。专家小组指出，会员国、实体和个人应遵守安全理事会有关决议，并及时答复专家小组的询问。

八. 建议

184. 建议综合清单见附件 66。

Annex 1: COVID-19, Democratic People's Republic of Korea border measures

DPRK maintained its COVID-19 blockade imposed in January 2020. Cross-border movement of people and trade remains generally forbidden. Flights and passenger rail services into and out of Pyongyang have been suspended, although there have been media reports of limited border crossing in the reporting period. The diplomatic presence in Pyongyang has continued to shrink as the few remaining missions have repatriated staff; international staff of UN agencies and non-governmental organizations have left the country. DPRK continues to declare to the WHO that the country remains free of the COVID-19 virus.

In the reporting period, DPRK made a number of preparations, in the form of "disinfection centres" built near the border, to resume a measure of cross-border trade in March-April 2021, and there was a small rise in trade figuresat the time. The respite from a total blockade was brief, however, due to resumed fears of COVID-19 variants beyond DPRK's borders and, according to media reports, [1] a "grave incident" relating to COVID-19 protection measures in the country.

Maritime exports of sanctioned commodities continued, at relatively low rates. Similarly, undeclared oil products were imported by sea, but at very low levels compared to previous years.


The DPRK government has held emergency meetings and, unusually, has publicly admitted to an increasing economic crisis and associated food shortages in the country.

DPRK's COVID-19 blockade, which prevents repatriated DPRK nationals from entering their own country, causes practical difficulties for Member States in implementing paragraph 8 of resolution 2397 (2017), even long after the deadline for that action has passed. However, DPRK's blockade also provides an opportunity for DPRK workers overseas to remain there, and to continue to earn wages which are likely to contribute to governmental programmes. The Panel continues to watch closely how Member States have addressed this issue.

Source: The Panel

1. https://www.nknews.org/2021/06/grave-covid-19-incident-in-north-korea-prompts-politburo-meeting-state-media/?t=1634861200262


Annex 2: Light Water Reactor (LWR) - Electrical transformers on the eastern side of the turbine generator



Source: Planet Labs Inc. 23 June 2021

Annex 3: Construction activities in the area south of the LWR





Source: Planet Labs Inc. 23 June 2021

Annex 4: Vehicle activities in the vicinity of 5MW(e)




Source: Planet Labs Inc. 18 April 2021



Source: Planet Labs Inc. 23 June 2021

Annex 5: Radiochemical Laboratory and Coal-fired thermal plant, and signs of chimney smoke





Source: Planet Labs Inc.

Annex 6: Excerpt of IAEA Director General's Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors

The Agency continues to monitor the nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Since my report to the Board of 3rd of September 2020, some nuclear facilities in the DPRK have continued to operate while others have remained shut down. There are indications consistent with internal construction activities at the experimental light water reactor (LWR). There are no indications of operation at the 5MW(e) nuclear reactor or of the production of enriched uranium at the reported centrifuge enrichment facility at Yongbyon. There are ongoing indications of activity at the Kangson location.

The steam plant that serves the Radiochemical Laboratory has continued to operate since my last Statement to the Board in March. The duration of this operation is consistent with the time required for a reprocessing campaign at the Radiochemical Laboratory. It is not, however, possible to confirm that reprocessing is taking place.


The DPRK’s nuclear activities remain a cause for serious concern. The continuation of the DPRK’s nuclear programme is a clear violation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions and is deeply regrettable.

I call upon the DPRK to comply fully with its obligations under Security Council resolutions, to cooperate promptly with the Agency in the full and effective implementation of its NPT Safeguards Agreement and to resolve all outstanding issues, especially those that have arisen during the absence of Agency inspectors from the country.


The Agency is intensifying its readiness to play its essential role in verifying the DPRK’s nuclear programme.

Source: IAEA, IAEA Director General's Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors (7 June 2021), https://www.iaea.org/iaea-director-generals-introductory-statement-to-the-board-of-governors-7-june-2021. (Accessed on 11 July 2021)

Annex 7: Yongbyon Centrifuge Plant




Source: Planet Labs Inc. 18 April 2021



Source: Planet Labs Inc. 23 June 2021

Annex 8: Pyongsan Uranium Mine and Concentration Plant



Source: Planet Labs Inc. 13 June, 2021



Source: Planet Labs Inc. March 10, 2021 *Source*: Planet Labs Inc. June 13, 2021

Annex 9: Pyongsan Uranium Mine and Concentration Plant



Source: Planet Labs Inc. 5 April, 2021



Source: Planet Labs Inc./ From top to bottom, 20 April 2021, 19 May 2021, 17 July 2021

Annex 10: Suspected uranium enrichment facility in Kangson



Source: Planet Labs Inc. 5 April, 2021

Annex 11: Suspected nuclear weapons storage facility in Yongdoktong



Source: Google Earth: January 2021



Source: Google Earth: January 2019

Annex 12: Panel's enquiry to the universities listed on Kim Chaek University of Technology website

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL PANEL OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1874 (2009)

REFERENCE: [redacted]
YOUR REFERENCE

3 June 2021

Dear Sir/Madam,

I am writing to you with regard to ongoing efforts of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016) and 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), in particular incidents of non-compliance.

The Panel would like to request information on academic exchanges between [redacted] and the DPRK's Kim Chaek University of Technology (KCUT),. The KCUT website, as of 28 May 2021, lists [redacted] as thaving "international friendship cooperation" status with KCUT (Annex 1).

The Panel is making enquiries concerning scientific and technical partnerships with DPRK scientists in academic fields covered by the relevant provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (below). The Panel seeks information to assess whether these partnerships have involved joint studies which may have contributed, or continue to contribute, to the development by the DPRK of technologies related to its WMD programme.

Paragraph 17 of resolution 2270 (2016), reinforcing paragraph 28 of resolution 1874 (2009) which called for Member State vigilance, states that "all Member States shall prevent specialized teaching or training of DPRK nationals within their territories or by their nationals of disciplines which could contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including teaching or training in advanced physics, advanced computer simulation and related computer sciences, geospatial navigation, nuclear engineering, aerospace engineering, aeronautical engineering and related disciplines". Furthermore, paragraph 10 of resolution 2321 (2016) clarifies that for the purposes of implementing paragraph 17 of

[redacted]

CC: Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations

resolution 2270 (2016) specialized teaching and training which could contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems includes, but is not limited to, advanced materials science, advanced chemical engineering, advanced mechanical engineering, advanced electrical engineering and advanced industrial engineering.

Moreover, in paragraph 11 of resolution 2321 (2016) the Security Council decided that all Member States shall suspend scientific and technical cooperation involving persons or groups officially sponsored by or representing the DPRK except for medical exchanges unless in specified cases exempted by the 1718 Committee or in all other cases notified in advance to the Committee.

Furthermore, the Panel has concerns that if DPRK scholars have access to the internet, libraries, and exchanges with other scholars, they may use this access to collect proliferation sensitive information which could contribute to the DPRK's WMD and ballistic missile development or the enhancement of its military operational capability. The Panel also has concerns that networks developed during overseas exchange programs may be used to facilitate the transfer of intangible technology applicable to the DPRK's WMD programme.

In addition, paragraph 8 of resolution 2397 (2017) requires all Member States to repatriate to the DPRK all DPRK nationals earning income in their jurisdiction and all DPRK government safety oversight attachés within 24 months from 22 December 2017 and to submit midterm and final reports on repatriation. The Panel notes that paragraph 8 of resolution 2397 (2017) covers all DPRK citizens who are earning income, regardless of work authorization, visa category, and how the payment is labelled.

In connection with the above, and in its effort to gather reliable and verifiable information, the Panel would be grateful for your assistance in providing the following:

1. Information on the current status of [redacted] academic exchange with Kim Chaek University of Technology.

2. The total number of DPRK students who have studied at [redacted] since 2017, as well as the number of current DPRK students. Please specify their degree programs (whether Masters, PhD, post-doctorate researchers, etc.), fields of study and subject of their scientific collaborations, if applicable. Please provide information on any scholarships or sponsorship they have received / are receiving.

3. Confirmation if any DPRK scholars have been affiliated with [redacted] since 2017. If so, please provide the Panel with the following information:

   3-1) A list of the DPRK scholars (name, affiliation, area of research, period of affiliation) as well as copies of documents showing their source(s) of income while in China including sponsorships (if applicable);
   3-2) Information on whether any financial support, such as scholarships, for the DPRK scholars are provided by [redacted]; and

2

3-3) Information regarding any non-financial resources provided by [redacted] including the use of facilities and access to databases and IT.

Paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 2569 (2021) urges all Member States and other interested parties to cooperate fully with the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal. The Panel would welcome any other information that you might consider relevant to this issue.

Given the importance the Panel attaches to this investigation, we would be grateful for any information to be supplied within six weeks of the date of this letter. As the Panel intends to report on these matters in its next report to the Security Council, we would be grateful to receive a timely response to ensure that your reply can be taken into consideration. Please send the reply to the Panel at dppa-poe1874@un.org.

Should you or your designated representative wish to discuss this request or any follow-up matters, please contact the Panel through Mr [redacted] and Mr. [redacted]

Yours Faithfully,

[redacted]

Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Annex 1: Website of Kim Chaek University of Technology

3

Source : The Panel

Annex 13: Table summarizing specific scientific collaboration projects between institutes in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Universities in China

DPRK Institutes	Chinese Universities	Year	Journal or Subject	Title and web reference	Authors
Pyongyang University of Mechanical Engineering	[redacted]	2019	Composites Part B: Engineering Volume 159, 15 February 2019, Pages 418-436	Three-dimensional exact solution for the free vibration of thick functionally graded annular sector plates with arbitrary boundary conditions https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1359836818329238	[redacted]; **Choe, Kwangnam** - Pyongyang Univ Mech Eng, Dept Light Ind Machinery Engn, Pyongyang 999093, DPRK; [redacted]
Institute of Information Technology, University of Sciences, Pyongyang	[redacted]	2019	Composite Structures Volume 209, 1 February 2019, Pages 277-299	A general vibration analysis of functionally graded porous structure elements of revolution with general elastic restraints https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0263822318326035	[redacted] **Sok, Kyongjin** - Univ Sci, Inst Informat Technol, Pyongyang, DPRK; [redacted]

DPRK Institutes	Chinese Universities	Year	Journal or Subject	Title and web reference	Authors
Pyongyang University of Mechanical Engineering; Chongjin Mine & Met Univ	[redacted]	2019	Composite Structures Volume 208, 15 January 2019, Pages 127-140	A modeling method for vibration analysis of cracked laminated composite beam of uniform rectangular cross-section with arbitrary boundary condition https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0263822318325017	Kim, Kwanghun - Pyongyang Univ Mech Eng, Dept Eng Machine, Pyongyang 999093, DPRK; Choe, Kwangnam - Pyongyang Univ Mech Eng, Dept Light Ind Machinery Eng, Pyongyang 999093, DPRK; Kim, Sok - Chongjin Mine & Met Univ, Dept Informat Eng, Chongjin 999091, DPRK; [redacted]
Pyongyang University of Mechanical Engineering	[redacted]	2019	Composite Structures Volume 225, 1 October 2019, 111155	Dynamic analysis of composite laminated doubly-curved revolution shell based on higher order shear deformation theory https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0263822319306919	Choe, Kwangnam - Pyongyang Univ Mech Eng, Dept Light Ind Machinery Eng, Pyongyang 999093, DPRK; Kim, Kwanghun B. - Pyongyang Univ Mech Eng, Dept Eng Machine, Pyongyang 999093, DPRK; [redacted]
Kim Chaek University of Technology	[redacted]	2019	Composite Structures Volume 224, 15 September 2019, 111040	The effects of coupling mechanisms on the dynamic analysis of composite shaft https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0263822318331763	Ri, Kwangchol; Choe, Kwangnam - Pyongyang Univ Mech Eng, Dept Light Ind Machinery Eng, Pyongyang 999093, DPRK; Han, Poknam - Kim Chaek Univ Technol, Coll Ship & Ocean Technol, Pyongyang 999093, DPRK;

DPRK Institutes	Chinese Universities	Year	Journal or Subject	Title and web reference	Authors
					[redacted]
Pyongyang University of Mechanical Engineering	[redacted]	2019	Composites Part B: Engineering Volume 158, 1 February 2019, Pages 55-66	Free vibration analysis of laminated composite elliptic cylinders with general boundary conditions https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1359836818325332	[redacted] **Choe, Kwangnam -** Pyongyang Univ Mech Eng, Dept Light Ind Machinery Eng, Pyongyang 999093, DPRK. [redacted]
Kim Il Sung University	[redacted]	2019	Chemical Engineering Science Volume 207, 2 November 2019, Pages 1017-1029	Optimization of thermo-mechanical properties of shape memory polymer composites based on a network model https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0009250919305846	[redacted] **Yun, Kumchol -** Kim II Sung Univ, Fac Mech, Pyongyang, DPRK

DPRK Institutes	Chinese Universities	Year	Journal or Subject	Title and web reference	Authors
Kim Il Sung University	[redacted]	2019	Materials & Design Volume 181, 5 November 2019, 107926	Investigation of thermodynamic and shape memory properties of alumina nanoparticle-loaded graphene oxide (GO) reinforced nanocomposites https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264127519303648	[redacted] **Yun, Kumchol**; [redacted] **Yun, Kumchol** - Kim II Sung Univ, Fac Mech, Pyongyang 950003, DPRK
Pyongyang University of Mechanical Engineering	[redacted]	2019	Composites Part B: Engineering Volume 159, 15 February 2019, Pages 447-460	A closed form solution for free vibration of orthotropic circular cylindrical shells with general boundary conditions https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S135983681832924X	[redacted] **Choe, Kwangnam,** Pyongyang Univ Mech Eng, Dept Light Ind Machinery Eng, Pyongyang 999093, DPRK; [redacted]

Source : The Panel

Annex 14: Reply from China to the Panel

8. University exchange (OC.162, OC.167-174)

The establishment of friendship with the universities in the DPRK is not prohibited by the Security Council resolutions. The friendly relationship like "sister college" between Chinese and the DPRK universities is not only out of the traditional friendship, but also meets the needs of the people to carry out exchanges and cooperation in culture and education.

China has always been strictly implementing the relevant provisions of the Security Council resolutions and maintaining strict regulation over academic exchanges. There is no prohibited academic exchanges, scientific research cooperation or joint studies between Chinese universities with the DPRK. China hopes that the Panel will work on the basis of the resolutions and the facts, and refrain from expanding the interpretation of the resolutions.

In addition, when investigating relevant cases, the Panel should engage with the Chinese side through the channel of the Chinese Mission to the United Nations, instead of directly sending letters to Chinese universities. China requests that the Panel, as a professional body, does not include the universities in its report to avoid sending any wrong signals.

Source : The Panel

Annex 15: Replies from "Sister University" of Kim Il Sung University

1) Reply from Cuba

[Translation from Spanish]

Translated from Spanish

Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations

Note No. 85/2021

New York, 24 February 2021

Sir,

Pursuant to the request for information from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) contained in note No. S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.15, I have the honour to convey the following information:

A framework cooperation agreement on academic and scientific exchange was signed between Kim Il Sung University in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the University of Havana on 18 July 2014, and remains in effect until 2024. The agreement is fully in line with the relevant Security Council resolutions.

Since the signing of the agreement, no activities have been undertaken between the two universities.

There are no students from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the Registry of Graduates of the University of Havana for the period 2017–2020.

Unrelated to the agreement signed by the two institutions, four nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are currently enrolled in undergraduate studies at the University of Havana. They are studying for bachelor's degrees in law, social communication, English language and tourism, and are relatives of diplomats of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea accredited in Cuba.

[redacted]

Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established

pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)

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Cuba is firmly committed to fulfilling its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and international law and thus strictly complies with Security Council resolutions.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(*Signed*) Pedro Luis **Pedroso Cuesta**

Ambassador

Permanent Representative

Source : The Panel

(Original)

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
Misión Permanente ante las Naciones Unidas
315 Lexington Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Nota No.85/2021

Nueva York, 24 de Febrero 2021

Estimado [redacted]

Atendiendo a la solicitud de información contenida en la nota S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.15, del Panel de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009) del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas, tenemos a bien trasladar la información siguiente:

La Universidad Kim Il Sung de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y la Universidad de La Habana firmaron un Convenio Marco de Colaboración para el Intercambio Académico y Científico, el 18 de julio de 2014, con vigencia hasta el 2024. Dicho Convenio está en plena correspondencia con las resoluciones pertinentes del Consejo de Seguridad.

Se informa, además, que desde la firma del Convenio Marco de Colaboración para el Intercambio Académico y Científico no se han desarrollado acciones entre ambas Universidades.

En el Registro Histórico de Estudiantes egresados de La Universidad de La Habana, en el período 2017-2020, no figuran estudiantes de la RPDC.

Sr. [redacted]
Coordinador del Panel de Expertos establecido
en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009) del Consejo de Seguridad

En la actualidad, no vinculado al citado Convenio firmado entre ambas instituciones, están matriculados en estudios de pregrado en la Universidad de La Habana cuatro (4) estudiantes nacionales de la RPDC, en las carreras de Licenciatura en Derecho, Comunicación Social, Licenciatura en Lengua Inglesa y Licenciatura en Turismo. Son familiares de diplomáticos de ese país acreditados en Cuba.

Cuba está firmemente comprometida con el cumplimiento de sus obligaciones en virtud de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas y el Derecho Internacional y en ese sentido cumple estrictamente con las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad.

Aprovecho esta ocasión para trasladarle el testimonio de su más alta consideración.

Misión Permanente de Cuba O.N.U.

Pedro Luis Pedroso Cuesta
Embajador
Representante Permanente

Source : The Panel

2) Reply from Universitas Indonesia

UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
Veritas, Probitas, Iustitia

Kampus Salemba Jl. Salemba Raya No. 4, Jakarta 10430
Kampus Depok Kampus Universitas Indonesia Depok 16424
Tel. 62.21. 7867 222/ 7884 1818 Fax. 62.21. 7884 9060
Email pusadmui@ui.ac.id | www.ui.ac.id

Depok, 22 February 2021

Our Ref. : S - 809 /UN2.SU/OTL.00.01/2021
Subject : Inquiry regarding education cooperation with Kim Il Sung University

[redacted]
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Dear Sir,

1. We have acknowledged the receive of written request from the Panel of Experts (PoE) of the 1874 Sanction Committee with reference numbers of S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.477 dated 31 December 2020, which was addressed to Universitas Indonesia (UI), requesting information regarding education cooperation with the Kim Il Sung University (KISU).

2. As mentioned in the written request, we would like to inform that there have been **inaccuracies** on the referred university where the correct one should be Universitas Indonesia (UI). Both UI and the Kim Il Sung University (KISU), with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia and according to respective national regulations, have signed a **non-legally binding** and Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) grade Agreement on Educational and Scientific Exchange and Cooperation between KISU and UI ("**the Agreement**"), on 18 March 2015.

3. By its characteristic, the provisions of the Agreement are in general form and stipulate non-binding rights and obligation between the parties, such as implementation plan as well as financing scheme. The scopes of the agreement are limited to joint research and education exchange program; participation in the international symposium, conference, and training organized by the host university; and administrative facilitation, where possible, for the visit of scholars between the two universities.

4. Based on the said scopes, UI and KISU are **not 'sister university'** and, furthermore, **no declaration** has been made from our side in referring such relations between both parties.

5. Under the Agreement, UI and KISU initiated a **socio-cultural program** through a public lecture on North Korean Language and Culture at the Faculty of Cultural Studies of the UI on 17 March 2015. Moreover, the representative of the UI had been participating as a member of delegation of a mission which facilitated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia in May 2015. **Since 2016** until today, **no further program or activities** under the Agreement has been conducted or organized between UI and KISU.

6. Therefore, considering the time of the conclusion of the Agreement in 2015 as well as the scope of the cooperation conducted has been limited to **socio-culture program** and, obviously, **not related** to contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, the education cooperation between UI and KISU **should not be considered as incompliance** against relevant UNSCR, in particular the referred UNSCR 1874 (2009); 2270 (2016); 2321(2016); and 2397 (2017).

7. We would like to reiterate our support to the implementation of relevant UNSC resolutions on DPRK.

Sincerely yours,

[redacted]

CC:

1. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia
2. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations

Source : The Panel

3) Reply from Syria

THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC TO THE UNITED NATIONS
820 Second Ave., 15th Floor, New York, N. Y. 10017
Tel: (212) 661-1313
Fax: (212) 983-4439
E-mail: exesec.syria@gmail.com

PM/2021/ 547

24 February 2021

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations presents its compliments to The Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and with reference to Note Verbal No. S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.476 of 31 December 2020, regarding the request of information on academic exchange between Damascus University and the DPRK's Kim il Sung University,

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations has the honor to inform you with the following:

- There are four Korean Non Degreed students In the Faculty of Humanities and Arts - Department of English Literature - at Damascus University, and they were accepted under an agreement for scientific cooperation and academic exchange between Damascus University and the DPRK's Kim il Sung University, signed on 04/21/2016.

The agreement includes: exchange of visits for faculty members, exchange of students, publications, scientific documents and scientific research.

- There are four other Korean Non Degreed students, as children of Korean diplomats who are serving at their country's embassy in Damascus, In the Faculty of Humanities and Arts - Department of English Literature - at Damascus University,

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to The Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the assurances of its highest esteem and consideration.

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC NEW YORK

Bassam Sabbagh
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

- The Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

Source : The Panel

4) Reply from Vietnam

[redacted]

From: [redacted]
Sent: Monday, March 8, 2021 7:03 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: FW: Info regarding Hanoi National University

Please register.

From: [redacted]
Sent: Monday, 08 March, 2021 6:53 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: Info regarding Hanoi National University

Dear [redacted]

Ref: Communication S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.475

We're sorry for this late reply, with which the updated information arrived when PoE Final Report this year was under circulation already:

1. On 1 August 2012, Ha Noi National Universities signed an MoU with Kim Il Sung University.
However, then after, the two Universities did not have any cooperation on education, training, science research, or student and staff exchange.

2. From 2017, Ha Noi National University did not have any cooperation, co-activities, did not receive any teachers, researchers, experts or scientists from the DPRK.
In addition, there was not any sponsorship, finance support, or permit to access to database or information system of Ha Noi National University.

3. Also from 2017, there have been 16 students from DPRK to study in Ha Noi National University, on languages such as Vietnamese, English and Chinese.
These students paid by themselves for their studies.

Sincerely,


[redacted]
Permanent Mission of Viet Nam to the United Nations

1

Source : The Panel

Annex 16: "International Friendship" universities listed on the website of Kim Chaek University of Technology

Kim Chaek University website



Source: Kim Chaek University of Technology website, ""International Friendship" http://www.kut.edu.kp/index.php/page/index?si=21. (accessed 25 June 2021)

Annex 17: Replies from "International Friendship" universities listed on the website of Kim Chaek University of Technology

1) Reply from Russia on Pacific National University

По информации Тихоокеанского государственного университета, данное высшее учебное заведение не проводит совместных исследований и не осуществляет научно-технического сотрудничества с КНДР в областях, связанных с распространением ОМУ и средств его доставки, а также не имеет трудовых договорных отношений с гражданами КНДР.

Source : The Panel

2) Reply from the University of Trieste (Italy)

Prot. n. 91183 del 06/07/2021

UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI TRIESTE
Rettorato e Direzione Generale
Unità di Staff Comunicazione e Relazioni esterne

Dear
[redacted]
Coordinator of the Panel Established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Subject: your kind request reference S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.173

Dear [redacted]
in relation to your kind request about the relationships between University of Trieste and the DPRK's Kim Chaek University of Technology we are pleased to inform you as follows:

1. There are no formal relationships between the two universities, by no means of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) nor a Student Exchange Agreement (SEA).
2. We haven't been hosting any student from DPRK, no students are listed in our databases, and we therefore confirm that we have not provided any kind of support to DPRK.
3. The only official contact of a faculty member of the University of Trieste with DPRK was in 2005/2006 when a professor of geographical economy belonging to the Department of Political Sciences received an occasional visa to North Korea, during his research year in Mongolia, and downstream published an article entitled "Interpreting North Korea. Eastern Stalinism and signs of opening to the West" (http://hdl.handle.net/11368/1927488). In any case, this was not related to WMD matters.

Since there are no official relationships, the friendship mentioned in the Kim Chaek University of Technology website, might be probably related to personal relationships of some teachers/researchers (the university of Trieste counts more than 2.000 academic staff) of which we are not aware.

Yours faithfully,
Trieste,

The Rector
[redacted]

Università degli Studi di Trieste
Piazzale Europa, 1
I - 34127 Trieste
www.units.it – [redacted]

[redacted]

Source : The Panel

Annex 18-1: Missile launches by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 25 March 2021

The reported flight performance noted in paragraph 16 and Table 1 is consistent with the observed features of the newly-tested missile and its new 5-axle wheeled transport erector launcher (TEL) in images[2] published by the DPRK in Rodong Sinmun and KCNA on 26 March 2021 (see figures annex 18-1-1 and annex 18-1-2). This missile and its TEL appear to be the new SRBM and TEL displayed during the Military Parade on 14 January 2021 and identified as a possible modified and enlarged version of the previously displayed and tested SRBM KN-23 (see S/2021/211, para. 18, figure 5 and annexes 11 and 12; S/2020/151, para. 194, Table 3 and annexes 58-1 and 59-1).

Figure Annex 18-1-1: Test launch of the new SRBM – "New-type tactical guided missiles test-fired" (DPRK)



Source: Photographs from Rodong Sinmun – KCNA (from DPRK Central Television) / *Annotation*: The Panel

[2] The DPRK has been shown on some previous launch occasions to modify or falsify photographic images presumably for propaganda purposes.


According to the DPRK authorities the “new-type tactical guided missiles” can carry a warhead of 2.5 tonnes[3]. This could appear to be consistent with analysis of the images published on 14 and 25 March 2021 (see figure annex 18-2). But several Member States assessed that this weight is probably related to the dry mass[4] instead of the warhead weight, which could be less important. According to one Member State, despite this elongated version of KN-23 it is not certain that the new payload could reach 2.5t but it might be loaded with a high explosive “bunker buster” type conventional weapon. While further information is required to reach a conclusion, initial analysis suggests that it would be possible for the SRBM to deliver a nuclear warhead. The Panel has previously noted that the report of the eighth congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea, held in January 2021, declared that DPRK would pursue the development of tactical nuclear weapons (see S/2021/211, para.18). Moreover, according to a Member State, with a lighter payload, the weapon would have a longer range and might qualify as a medium range ballistic missile (MRBM).

Several Member State assess that the range of the 25 March test is around 600 km. The overall shape of the missile suggests that it is built for aerodynamic flight. Its trajectory is semi ballistic with an apogee around 60 km followed by a pull-up maneuver. If the trajectory were a simple parabola, the missile’s range would be 450 km, but with the pull-up maneuver the range would reach 600-620 km.

According to the article and pictures from KCNA[5], Ri Pyong Chol (KPi.076), then a Member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea and Secretary of the Party Central Committee[6], attended the missile launches (see figure annex 18-1-2).

[3] According to a Member State, the weight of the warhead of the missile would be around 1.3 tonnes instead of the 2.7 as announced by the DPRK.
[4] Mass without the solid propellant mass but with the mass of the warhead.
[5] Source: Article “New-type tactical guided missiles test-fired - The Academy of National Defense Science of the Demo-cratic People's Republic of Korea test-fired newly-developed new-type tactical guided missiles on March 25” from KCNA Voice of Korea (EN),26 March 2021, available at https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1616706026-838802969/new-type-tactical-guided-missiles-test-fired/?t=1626294053495
[6] According to media reports, Ri Pyong Chol has subsequently been demoted. https://www.nknews.org/2021/07/top-military-official-confirmed-out-as-kim-jong-un-makes-key-holiday-appearance/

Figure Annex 18-1-2: Comparison between new SRBM (Jan 2021), KN-23 (Jan. 2021, Oct. 2020, May 2019)




Source: Photographs from KCNA, with annotation by the Panel

Annex 18-2: Estimation of the size of the new ICBM, the two new SLBMs (Pukguksong-4 and Pukguksong-5) and the new SRBM:

(*Dimensions are estimated*)


Figure Annex 18-2-1: The new super large ICBM (so far unnamed by the DPRK media)
According to a Member State, the ICBM has a length of 25.8 m; first stage length: 17.3 m; diameter: 2.6-2.9 m; second stage: 4.6 m and the shroud almost of equivalent length. Its mass at take-off would be around 106 tons; mass of first stage around 90 tons (include 84.5 tons of fuel); second stage: 13.3 tons (include 12.2 tons of fuel); shroud: 0.7 tons; payload: 1.7 tons.



Source: Photographs from Rodong Sinmun – KCTV / *Annotation:* The Panel based on a Member State's assessment.


Estimation of the size of the two new SLBMs (Pukguksong-4 and -5)

Figure Annex 18-2-2: The new SLBM Pukguksong-4.



Source: Photographs from Rodong Sinmun – KCTV/ Annotation: The Panel based on a Member State's assessment.


Figure Annex 18-2-3: The new SLBM Pukguksong-5.



Source: Photographs from Rodong Sinmun – KCTV / Annotation: The Panel based on a Member State's assessment.

Estimation of the size the new SRBM

Figure Annex 18-2-4: The new SRBM




Source: Photographs from Rodong Sinmun – KCTV / Annotation: The Panel based on a Member State’s assessment.

Annex 19: Activity observed at the Nampo naval shipyard and at the Sinpo south shipyard since February 2021

In November 2020, the submersible missile test stand barge was removed from the secure boat basin (38° 43′ 06″ N 125° 23′ 39″ E) at **Nampo naval shipyard** and relocated in December to a maintenance or construction area 300m away (38° 43′ 08″ N 125° 23′ 28″ E) where it is mounted on a temporary static trolley on rails. (see Figure annex 19-S/2021/211 para. 23, annex 15).

Regular satellite imagery observation of the submersible missile test stand barge at **Nampo naval shipyard** showed that it seemed to have not been moved from its new location (38° 43′ 08″ N 125° 23′ 28″ E) from December 2020 to June 2021. Potential work on the submersible barge could be related to its maintenance or upgrading for the launch of new SLBMs.

Figure Annex 19-1: Submersible missile test stand barge in Nampo undergoing repair or modernisation 300 m away (38° 43′ 08″ N 125° 23′ 28″ E) from the Secure boat basin (38° 43′ 06″ N 125° 23′ 39″ E)



Source: Planet Labs Inc. June 11, 2021, 05 58 UTC; April 28, 2021, 05 12 UTC; December 20, 2020 05 12 UTC

The activity related to the ballistic missile submarine programme continued from March to June 2021 at the **Sinpo south shipyard**, through regular moves of the floating drydock (length 50 m width 12m) (see S/2017/150, para.47 Annex 5-1) as well as the regular movements of another barge (30m x10m) from its initial location to a berth along the new dock at the front of the entrance of the new construction hall, and back again.

Between 17 March and 24 March 2021, the floating drydock (length 50 m width 12m) (see S/2017/150, para.47, Annex 5-13) has moved from the pier (40° 01′ 08″ N 128° 09′ 51″ E) where it was berthed between Dec 2014-Aug 2015 and again between Dec 2015-Mar 2021, to the southwest side of the dock (40° 01′ 20″ N 128° 09′ 47″ E) (see S/2020/151, annex. 60; S/2020/840, para.12; S/2021/211, para.23, annex 15, figure 15-5). This dock is at the front of the entrance of the new construction hall and is dedicated to the launch of the new ballistic missile submarine currently under construction in the hall.

Between 24 March and 30 March, a barge (30m x10m) reached the northeast side of the dock (40° 01′ 21″ N 128° 09′ 50″ E, see figure annex 19-2).

Between 13 April and 9 May the submersible drydock (length 50 m width 12m) stayed at its initial location (40° 01′ 08″ N 128° 09′ 51″ E) along the pier.

From 10 May to 19-24 May the floating drydock (length 50 m width 12m) has moved again from the pier (40° 01′ 08″ N 128° 09′ 51″ E) to the southwest side of the dock (40° 01′ 20″ N 128° 09′ 47″ E) at the front of the entrance of the construction hall (see figure annex 19-3).

Figure Annex 19-2: From March to April 2021, the floating drydock (length 50m width 12m) and a barge (30m x 10m) have regularly moved from their initial location to a berth along the new dock in front of the new construction hall and vice versa



Source: Planet Labs Inc. March 17, 2021; 08 35 UTC – March 24, 2021; 04 55 UTC - March 30, 2021 03 44 UTC - May 9, 2021; 00 46 UTC - May 24, 2021 01 17 UTC - June 7, 2021; 01 55 UTC

Figure Annex 19-3: From April to June 2021, the floating drydock (length 50m width 12m) and a barge (30m x 10m) have regularly moved from their initial location to a berth along the new dock in front of the new construction hall and vice versa



Source: Planet Labs Inc. March 17, 2021; 08 35 UTC – March 24, 2021; 04 55 UTC - March 30, 2021 03 44 UTC - May 9, 2021; 00 46 UTC - May 24, 2021 01 17 UTC - June 7, 2021; 01 55 UTC

Annex 20: Developments at the Pyongsong March 16 factory automotive plant (South Pyongan)

The upgrading of the Pyongsong March 16 Factory automotive plant in Pyongsong (see S/2021/211, para.15, and S/2020/151, para. 198) has continued. The renovation of the western building has continued while the activity of large vehicles continues to be detected (see Figure annex 20-1 and see S/2021/211, para.15, annex 11).

The new construction (Picture: area -1-, 39° 16′ 54″ N 125° 52′ 24″ E) is completed (See S/2021/211, annex 11, figure 11). The renovation of the western building (picture: area -2-, 39° 16′ 52″ N 125° 51′ 58″ E) has continued as well as the earthworks (picture: area -3-, 39° 16′ 51″ N 125° 51′ 52″ E) to probably widen the peripherical track.

The movements of a possible heavy-lift crane with a telescopic boom could be observed on satellite imagery up to 8 November 2020 (see area -4-, 39°16'56.66"N 125°51'39.76"E) in front of a semi-underground vehicle maintenance and storage facility (at 800 m westwards from the building where the Hwasong-15 was assembled in 2017 before the ICBM test launch on 29 November 2017).

Figure Annex 20-1: Activity in Pyongsong March 16 factory automotive plant



Source: Google Earth November 8, 2020 and Planet Labs Inc April 5, 2021 01 57 UTC and June 5, 2021 08 18 UTC


Annex 21: Developments at Kusong tank factory (No. 95 Factory, see S/2021/211, annex 13) and at No. 112 Factory

The overall modernization of the Kusong tank factory (No. 95 Factory) in charge of BM TEL production has continued in the first half of 2021. A new building is also under construction near No. 112 Factory since 2020 where a IRBM Hwasong-12 was launched on 14 May 2017. It marks the trend, already reported, that the infrastructure development of the BM programme continues (see in the report S/2021/211 para.21 annex 13).

A massive range of construction activity is currently underway since August 2020: at the southwest of the complex (40° 03′ 23″ N 125° 13′ 20″ E) and at the northeast (40° 03′ 50″ N 125° 13′ 57″ E) of the "**Kusong Tank Factory**" (aka "Kusong-Taegwan" , "Tank Plant - 95 Factory", "No. 95 Factory"), (see figure annex 21-1) the two areas delimited by dotted yellow lines).

Since 2020, a building has also been under construction at **Plant No. 112** where an IRBM Hwasong-12 was launched on 14 May 2017. The Plant No. 112 is located less than 3 km west of Plant No. 95 (40° 04′ 07″ N 125° 11′ 52″ E, see figure annex 21-2 areas delimited by dotted yellow lines).

Figure Annex 21-1: The "Kusong tank factory" renovation continues in the first half of 2021



Source: Planet Labs Inc. June 19, 2021 01 37 UTC; February 2, 2021, 08 09 UTC

Figure Annex 21-2: A building under construction in Factory No. 112



Source: Planet Labs Inc. Dec. 4, 2020, 02 56 UTC; Dec. 5, 2020, 02 58 UTC; Feb. 2, 2021, 08 09 UTC

Annex 22: At the Sanum Dong scientific and ballistic missile research complex the canopy and construction were removed from Feb to March 2021

Figure Annex 22: The canopy (length around 50 m width around 6 m, location: 39° 8'29.70"N 125°45'58.96"E, erected between 29 February and 5 March 2020 (see S/2020/840 para.14, annex 10)) has been removed since the beginning of 2021.



Source: Planet Labs Inc. April 5, 2021 01 57 UTC

Annex 23: At the Sinpo south shipyard resumption of the construction of the pier located in front of the buried submarine shelter

The resumption of the construction of the pier (waterbreak/quay, 40° 00′ 32″ N 128° 08′ 50″ E) located in front of the buried submarine shelter has been underway since early May 2021, whereas the construction of this shelter itself still seems to be slowed down (40° 0'42.23"N 128° 8'51.60"E ; see S/2021/211, annex 15, Figure 15-1, and S/2020/151, annex 61, figure 61-2, 61-3, and S/2017/150, annex 5-12, 5-13). Support barges and equipment were detected along the pier which is made up of assembled concrete caissons.

Figure Annex 23: Resumption of the construction (or renovation) of the jetty (breakwater/ quay) in the first half of 2021 while the construction of the buried shelter still seems to have slowed down



Source: Planet Labs Inc. May 9, 2021 00 46 UTC; June 27, 2021 O5 44 UTC

Annex 24: At the Sinpo south shipyard, new buildings are currently under construction at the static test stand area.

In addition of the various submersible barge activity (see figure annex 19-2) in the area between the secure boat basin and the new submarine construction hall in the Sinpo south shipyard, new buildings are under construction near the missile engine test infrastructure since February 2021 (see figure annex 23 and 24).

Figure Annex 24: The construction of the new buildings (40° 01′ 08″ N 128° 09′ 27″ E) in the area of the engine test stand (40° 01′ 05″ N 128° 09′ 25″ E) has continued from February to May 2021.



Source: Planet Labs Inc. May 9, 2021 00 46 UTC, March 30, 2021 0344 UTC; Feb 10, 2021 01 51 UTC

Annex 25: January 18th Factory: possible engine test stand (westside)

The January 18 General Machinery Factory (aka January 18th Factory located 39°33'19.88"N 125°51'20.23"E) was reported to be involved in the manufacture of Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) (see S/2020/151 annex 67). The new design and implementation of a Flexible Manufacturing System (FMS) were implemented there too. The identification of a possible horizontal missile engine test stand (see figure annex 25) could support the assessment that the factory is also involved in the manufacture of ballistic missiles. The analysis of the Panel corroborates a recent think tank[7] assessment.

Figure Annex 25: At Kaechon January 18th Factory, a possible horizontal engine test stand (39° 33′ 09″ N 125° 50′ 20″ E)



Source: Planet Labs Inc. May 22, 2021 02 23 UTC, Google Earth March 20, 2020; Sept. 9, 2017; Sept. 19, 2014

[7] A "Arms Control Wonk" report on 26 May 2021 provided analysis that characterized the site of "the January 18th Factory" as rocket engine production site due to past information and a probable horizontal missile engine test stand see "The Stands they are a Changin", 26 May 2021, available at https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1211934/the-stands-they-are-a-changin/

Annex 26: Ballistic Missile bases and specific airbase infrastructure activity

Through satellite imagery, the Panel continued to observe work on the infrastructure of ballistic missile operating bases such as “Hoejung-ri missile base” (see figure annex 26-1), “Kumchon-ri missile Base”) (see figure annex 26-2 and a think tank report[8]) and Sangnam-ri Missile operating base (see S/2020/840, para. 13, annex 9, figure 3-4-6) (see figure annex 26-3) as well as airbases such as “Sunchon airbase” (see figure annex 26-4) previously used for BM launch tests. According to a Member State, deception measures are continuously updated at the BM base through the use of underground galleries, bunkers, semi-buried drive-throughs (for refueling the ICBM and MR/IRBM) and various means of concealment and camouflage (see figure annex 26-2) (see the previous report on that issue S/2021/211, para.24, annex 16-18, and S/2020/840 para.13 annex 9).

New launch pads are built in the immediate vicinity of the entrances to the underground galleries where the BM systems are stored. In this context, according to the Member State, the current trend is to use smaller, dispersed galleries with their own camouflaged launch pad. (see figure annex 26-2) In Kumchon-ri missile Base, where the new generation of the solid propellant SRBM such as the KN-23 could be deployed, manual activity and building construction were detected. The same analysis could be made of the activity at the Sangnam-ri Missile operating base (40°50'7.46"N 128°32'47.42"E).


This assessment is consistent with the assessment of another Member State that the DPRK is capable of launch from any place and at any time. So that, the DPRK appears to be seeking to improve its ability to conduct surprise attacks by enhancing secrecy and rapid deployability to make it difficult to detect signs of a launch.

[8] The Center for Strategic and International Studies-Beyond Parallel (CSIS) report on 6 September 2019 provided analysis that characterized the site of the “Kumchon-ni Missile Operating Base” as an MRBM missiles base (see “Undeclared North Korea: The Kumchon-ni Missile Operating Base 6 September 2019, available at https://beyondparallel.csis.org/ undeclared-north-korea-the-kumchon-ni-missile-operating-base/)

Activity in "Hoejung-ri missile base" (41°22'44.93"N 126°54'38.16"E)


(see S/2021/211 Para.24 Annex 18) In front of the massive underground facility, the access road and a stabilised platform (10m x 10m) have been built (41°21'56.37"N 126°55'41.91"E). A TEL could easily reach this potential launch platform to fire its missile. According to a Member State, for several months the DPRK has been consolidating stabilised platforms located close to the entrances of the underground galleries where the TELs and BMs are stored, allowing them rapidly to reach this new area for use as a launch pad.

Figure Annex 26-1: The stabilisation of a potential TEL launch pad and delimitation of the access way to the underground entrance, continued from March to June 2021 at the "Hoejung-ri missile base"



Source: Planet Labs Inc. June 21, 2021, 05 15 UTC; June 18, 2021 08 53 UTC; May 17, 2021 05 17 UTC

Figure Annex 26-2: Kumchon-ri Missile Operating Base activity (38°57'52.48"N 127°35'11.98"E) concealment and stabilisation of the potential launch pad close to three underground gallery entrances which are located along the valley at 1st SW 38° 57′ 58″ N 127° 36′ 07″ E – 2nd Middle 38° 57′ 58″ N 127° 36′ 11″ E – 3rd NE 38° 58′ 00″ N 127° 36′ 17″ E



Source: Planet June 04, 2021, 04 57 UTC; January 17, 2021 UTC

Figure Annex 26-3: Sangnam-ri Missile operating base (40°50'7.46"N 128°32'47.42"E)[9]. Concealment and stabilisation of the potential 2 launch pads (at NW 40° 49′ 45″ N 128° 33′ 08″ E, SE 40° 49′ 42″ N 128° 33′ 10″ E) close to underground gallery entrance (at NW 40° 49′ 44″ N 128° 33′ 08″ E and at SE 40° 49′ 43″ N 128° 33′ 09″ E)



Source: Planet Labs Inc. June 8, 2021 00 08 UTC, January 17, 2021 02 09 UTC, Google Earth October 28 2015

[9] See also the CSIS report “Undeclared North Korea: The Sangnam-ni Missile Operating Base”, 15 February 2019, available at https://beyondparallel.csis.org/undeclared-north-korea-sangnam-ni-missile-operating-base/

Infrastructure activity in the Sunchon airbase from April to June 2021

A massive upgrade of Sunchon airbase is under way. Usually the most modern fighters of the DPRK are based on this site (See figure annex 26-4 on 28 November 2019) but this airbase was also used as a launch site for new SRBM KN-25 mobile launches test (launch pad location: 39°24′48″ N, 125°53′18″ E, flight range 370 km, altitude 90 km) on 31 October 2019 (see red dot "L" on Figure below and S/2020/840 para.194 table 3 and annex 7).[10]

Since April 2021, a massive plan of renovation work involving the construction of additional runway area (creation of a concrete surface as apron 260 m x 70 m at NW: 39° 25′ 00″ N 125° 53′ 26″ E, at SE: 39° 24′ 36″ N 125° 53′ 48″ E and 344 m expansion south-eastwards of the runway 39° 24′ 07″ N 125° 54′ 01″ E) has been underway (See figure annex 26-4).

[10] See also the recent CSIS report "North Korea Upgrades Sunchon Airbase", 24 June 2021, available at https://beyondparallel.csis.org/north-korea-upgrades-sunchon-airbase/

Figure Annex 26-4: Massive expansion and refurbishment works at Sunchon Airbase since April 2021



Source: Planet Labs Inc June 5, 2021 08 18 UTC, February 24, 2021 02 29 UTC, Google Earth November 28, 2019

Annex 27: Procurement of illicit and WMD related commodities through Mr. Kim Jong Dok's network

Specifications of goods ordered by KMGT with third country-based companies (Member State Information)

According to a Member State, below is the list of goods (in Korean) contained in four orders by KMGT (January~February 2021) regarding possible "choke-point" items for DPRK's nuclear and ballistic programmes:

January 2021 :

No	품명	규격	수량	단위	비고
1	저탄망간철	Mn≧75%,C≦0.5%,Si≦2%,P≦0.03,립도50㎜	0.24	t	
2	환강	강45,Φ155 ㎜	11.85	t	80m
3	환강	강35, Φ130㎜	2.5	t	24m
4	환강	강3, Φ50㎜	4.07	t	264m
5	환강	강3, Φ80㎜	2.53	t	64m
6	환강	강3, Φ225㎜	3.74	t	12m
7	불수환강	1Cr18Ni9Ti, Φ30㎜	155	kg	28m
8	불수환강	1Cr18Ni9Ti, Φ65㎜	4.58	t	176m
9	불수환강	1Cr18Ni9Ti, Φ630㎜	652	kg	2m
10	환강	65Mn, Φ35㎜	60	kg	8m
11	강판	강3,≠8㎜	5.77	t	92㎡
12	강판	강3,≠20㎜	8.79	t	56㎡
13	불수강판	1Cr18Ni9Ti,≠4㎜	11	t	352 ㎡
14	불수강판	1Cr18Ni9Ti, ≠10㎜	11.3	t	144 ㎡
15	불수강판	1Cr18Ni9Ti, ,≠20㎜	2.5	t	16㎡
16	ㄷ형강	강3,ㄷ120*100*5㎜	1	t	88m
17	ㄴ형강	강3,ㄴ75*5㎜	1.76	t	304m
18	ㄴ형강	강3,ㄴ150*10㎜	1.29	t	560m
19	인발강관	강3,Φ62*6㎜	0.53	t	64m
20	인발강관	강3,Φ150*10㎜	0.69	t	20m
21	인발강관	1Cr18Ni9Ti, Φ30*3㎜	0.6	t	304m
22	인발강관	1Cr18Ni9Ti, Φ100*4㎜	0.27	t	28m
23	용접봉	J422,Φ4㎜	1.04	t	
24	불수강용접봉	A022, Φ4㎜	0.64	t	
25	진공변(자동변)	D671F-16,P:1.6㎫,DN:30㎜ ,남경미월변유한공사(南京美悦阀门有限公司)제품임,구체적인 기술적특성과 사진자료요구	16	개	
26	진공변(자동변)	D671F-16,P:1.6㎫,DN:75㎜ ,남경미월변유한공사(南京美悦阀门有限公司)제품임,구체적인 기술적특성과 사진자료요구	32	개	
27	공기압축기	배기:1㎥ /분,압력0.9Mpa,3상,380V/50Hz,이동식,사진자료요구	7	대	
28	내산성뽐프	2㎥/h,양정높이10m, 전동기포함	8	대	
29	가정용물뽐프	4㎥/h,양정높이10m,압력0.1㎫ 단상220V,전동기포함	7	대	
30	물려과기	4㎥/h	8	대	
31	진공압력계	압력0.1㎫,사진자료요구	7	개	
32	고압호수	Φ22*3*1400㎜,압력:0.1㎫,(참고:강선이 있어야함,호수가 쭈그러들지 말아야 한,사진자료요구)	11.2	m	8개

33	고압호수	φ22*4.5*6000㎜,압력:0.1㎫ ,고무관.사진자료요구	48	m	8개
34	고압호수	φ38*4*17400㎜,압력:0.1㎫,(참고:강선이 있어야함,호수가 쭈그러들지 말아야 함.사진자료요구)	139.2	m	8개
35	고압호수	φ85*5*5000㎜,압력:0.1㎫,(참고:강선이 있어야함,호수가 쭈그러들지 말아야 함.사진자료요구)	40	m	8개
36	고압호수	φ110*6*4500㎜,압력:0.1㎫,(참고:강선이 있어야함,호수가 쭈그러들지 말아야 함.사진자료요구)	36	m	8개
37	조임띠	불수강Φ22	64	개	
38	조임띠	불수강Φ38	288	개	
39	조임띠	불수강Φ85	64	개	
40	조임띠	불수강Φ110	48	개	
41	웜감속기	웜감200-32-Ⅱ	8	대	
42	원추로라베아링	7315(d75,D160,B37,T40㎜)	16	개	
43	원추로라베아링	7312(d60,D130,B31,T33.5㎜)	16	개	
44	볼트,나트조	불수강,M12*85㎜,용수자리쇠포함	120	조	
45	볼트	불수강,M12*20㎜,용수자리쇠포함	120	개	

February 2021 :

No	품명	규격	수량	단위
1	저탄망간철	Mn≥75%,C≤0.5%,Si≤2%,P≤0.03%,립도50㎜	0.24	t
2	환강	45강,Φ35㎜	1.3	t
3	환강	45강, Φ55㎜	1.4	t
4	환강	45강, Φ80㎜	1.9	t
5	환강	45강, Φ90㎜	1.5	t
6	환강	45강, Φ125㎜	1.15	t
7	환강	45강, Φ155㎜	3	t
8	환강	45강, Φ225㎜	1.25	t
9	내열내산환강	1Cr18Ni9Ti, Φ22㎜	0.5	t
10	내열내산환강	1Cr18Ni9Ti, Φ40㎜	0.85	t
11	합금환강	65Mn, Φ35㎜	0.06	t
12	강판	강3,≠.4㎜	0.3	t
13	강판	강3,≠.8㎜	7.13	t
14	강판	강3,≠.16㎜	1.7	t
15	강판	강3,≠19.5㎜	3	t
16	내열내산강판	1Cr18Ni9Ti,≠4㎜	7.6	t
17	내열내산강판	1Cr18Ni9Ti,≠5㎜	2	t
18	내열내산강판	1Cr18Ni9Ti, ≠8㎜	4.2	t
19	내열내산강판	1Cr18Ni9Ti, ,≠10㎜	0.8	t
20	구형강	강3,⊏120*100*120*5㎜	1	t
21	산형강	강3,∟75*75*5㎜	1.7	t

22	산형강	강3, ㄴ100*100*8mm	2.8	t
23	산형강	강3, ㄴ140*140*10mm	5.7	t
24	인발관	강3, Φ63*4mm	0.4	t
25	인발관	강3, Φ150*10mm	0.5	t
26	내열내산인발관	1Cr18Ni9Ti, Φ32*3mm	0.35	t
27	내열내산인발관	1Cr18Ni9Ti, Φ108*4mm	0.16	t
28	사불화수지봉	Φ220*5000mm	45	kg
29	용접봉	J422, Φ4mm	0.8	t
30	불수강용접봉	A102, Φ4mm	0.48	t
31	원추로라베아링	7315(d75,D160,B37,T40mm)	16	개
32	원추로라베아링	7312(d60,D130,B31,T33.5mm)	16	개
33	윔감속기	NMRV200-4-32,AB형,60Hz (전동기포함,축간거리200mm,전동기출력4 kW,감속비32) (참고: 축간거리200,감속비 32,AB형이 기준요구임)	8	대
34	자동발브	D671F-16,P:1.6MPa,DN:40 mm,매질:공기,매질:공기(공기에 의하여 열리고 닫겨야 함)	16	개
35	자동발브	D671F-16,P:1.6MPa,DN:80mm, 매질:공기(공기에 의하여 열리고 닫겨야 함)	32	개
36	고압호스	φ22*3*1400mm,압력:0.1MPa,(강선이 있는 투명비닐관으로써 흡입시 쭈그러들지말것)	8	개
37	고압호스	φ22*4.5*6000mm,압력:0.1MPa,고무관	8	개
38	고압호스	φ38*4*17400mm,압력:0.1MPa,(강선이 있는 투명비닐관으로써 흡입시 쭈그러들지말것)	8	개
39	고압호스	φ85*5*5000mm,압력:0.1MPa, (강선이 있는 투명비닐관으로써 흡입시 쭈그러들지말것)	8	개
40	고압호스	φ110*6*4500mm,압력:0.1MPa, (강선이 있는 투명비닐관으로써 흡입시 쭈그러들지말것)	8	개
41	내산뽐프	耐酸的, 2m³/h,양정높이5m, 전동기포함,내산성(매질이 초산 또는 질산)	8	대
42	물뽐프	4m³/h,양정높이10m,압력0.1MPa 단상220V,전동기포함	8	대
43	물려과기	4m³/h,Φ100*500mm정도 임,물뽐프에서 려과된 물이 음료수정도이여야 함.	8	대
44	공기압축기	배기량:0.9m³/min, 압력0.9Mpa,3상,380V/50Hz,이동식	8	대
45	유면계	Φ20*3-380mm, 유기유리	8	개

46	[illegible]	압력0.1MPa	8	개
47	관조임띠	불수강Φ22	64	개
48	관조임띠	불수강Φ38	384	개
49	관조임띠	불수강Φ85	64	개
50	관조임띠	불수강Φ110	48	개
51	볼트,나트조	불수강,M12*85mm,용수자리쇠포함	960	조
52	볼트	불수강,M12*20mm,용수자리쇠포함	960	개
53	규소강판	50w470,두께0.5mm,너비1200mm,무방향성,전동기생산용	3.5	t
54	케블지	두께0.08mm*C,전동기생산용	0.35	t
55	케블지	두께0.05mm*C,전동기생산용	0.28	t
56	폴리에스테르박막	두께 0.05mm,	0.3	t
57	볼베아링	6314(d70mm,D150mm,B35mm)	8	개
58	원통로라베아링	N314(d70mm,D150mm,B35mm,분리형)	8	개
59	알루미늄괴	99.6%	0.2	t

March 2021 :

No	품명	규격	수량	단위	단가	금액
1	저탄망간철	Mn≧75%,C≦0.5%,Si≦2%, P≦0.03%,립도50mm	0.24	t		
2	환강	45강, Φ35mm	1.3	t		
3	환강	45강, Φ55mm	1.4	t		
4	환강	45강, Φ80mm	1.9	t		
5	환강	45강, Φ90mm	1.5	t		
6	환강	45강, Φ125mm	1.15	t		
7	환강	45강, Φ155mm	3	t		
8	환강	45강, Φ225mm	1.25	t		
9	내열내산환강	1Cr18Ni9Ti Φ22mm	0.5	t		
10	내열내산환강	1Cr18Ni9Ti, Φ40mm	0.85	t		
11	합금환강	65Mn, Φ35mm	0.06	t		
12	강판	강3, ≠.4mm	0.3	t		
13	강판	강3, ≠.8mm	7.13	t		
14	강판	강3, ≠.16mm	1.7	t		
15	강판	강3, ≠19.5mm	3	t		
16	내열내산강판	1Cr18Ni9Ti, ≠4mm	7.6	t		
17	내열내산강판	1Cr18Ni9Ti, ≠5mm	2	t		
18	내열내산강판	1Cr18Ni9Ti, ≠8mm	4.2	t		
19	내열내산강판	1Cr18Ni9Ti, , ≠10mm	0.8	t		
20	구형강	강3, ㄷ120*100*120*5mm	1	t		
21	산형강	강3, ㄴ75*75*5mm	1.7	t		
22	산형강	강3, ㄴ100*100*8mm	2.8	t		
23	산형강	강3, ㄴ140*140*10mm	5.7	t		
24	인발관	강3, Φ63*4mm	0.4	t		
25	인발관	강3, Φ150*10mm	0.5	t		
26	내열내산인발관	1Cr18Ni9Ti, Φ32*3mm	0.35	t		
27	내열내산인발관	1Cr18Ni9Ti, Φ108*4mm	0.16	t		

28	[illegible]	Φ220*5000㎜	45	kg		
29	용접봉	J422, Φ4㎜	0.8	t		
30	불수강용접봉	A102, Φ4㎜	0.48	t		
31	원추로라베아링	7315(d75,D160,B37,T40㎜)	16	개		
32	원추로라베아링	7312(d60,D130,B31,T33.5㎜)	16	개		
33	웜감속기	NMRV200-4-32,AB형,60Hz (전동기포함,축간거리200 ㎜,전동기출력4kW,감속비32) (참고: 축간거리200,감속비 32,AB형이 기준요구임)	8	대		
34	자동발브蝶阀	P:1.6MPa,DN:40㎜,	16	개		
35	자동발브蝶阀	P:1.6MPa,DN:80㎜,	32	개		
34-1	자동발브 气动法兰式蝶阀	P:1.6MPa,DN:40㎜,	16	개		
35-2	자동발브 气动法兰式蝶阀	P:1.6MPa,DN:80㎜,	32	개		
36	고압호스	ф22*3*1400㎜,압력:0.1MPa,(강선이 있는 투명비닐관으로써 흡입시 쭈그러들지말것)	8	개		
37	고압호스高压软管	외경φ22,내경φ13*두께4.5*6000mm, 압력:0.1MPa,고무관	8	개		
38	고압호스	ф38*4*17400㎜,압력:0.1MPa,(강선이 있는 투명비닐관으르써 흡입시 쭈그러들지말것)	8	개		
39	고압호스	ф85*5*5000㎜,압력:0.1MPa, (강선이 있는 투명비닐관으로써 흡입시 쭈그러들지말것)	8	개		
40	고압호스	ф110*6*4500㎜,압력:0.1MPa, (강선이 있는 투명비닐관으로써 흡입시 쭈그러들지말것)	8	개		
41	내산뽐프酸泵	耐酸的, 2㎥/h,양정높이5m, 전동기포함,내산성(매질이 초산 또는 질산)	8	대		
42	물뽐프	4㎥/h,양정높이10m,압력0.1MPa 단상220V,전동기포함	8	대		
43	물려과기	4㎥/h, Φ100*500㎜정도 임,물뽐프에서 려과된 물이 음료수정도이여야 함.	8	대		
44	공기압축기	배기량:0.9㎥/min, 압력0.9Mpa;3상,380V/50Hz,이동식	8	대		
45	유면계	Φ20*3-380㎜, 유기유리	8	개		
46	진공계	압력0.1MPa	8	개		
46-1	진공계耐震压力	압력0.1MPa	8	개		
47	관조임띠	불수강Φ22	64	개		
48	관조임띠	불수강Φ38	384	개		
49	관조임띠	불수강Φ85	64	개		
50	관조임띠	불수강Φ110	48	개		
51	볼트,나트조	불수강,M12*85㎜,용수자리쇠포함	960	조		
52	볼트	불수강,M12*20㎜,용수자리쇠포함	960	개		
53	규소강판	50w470,두께0.5㎜,너비1200㎜ ,무방향성, 전동기생산용	3.5	t		
54	케블지	두께0.08㎜*C,전동기생산용	0.35	t		
[illegible]	[illegible]	두께0.05㎜*C,전동기생산용	0.28	t		

[illegible]	[illegible]	두께 0.05㎜,	0.3	t		
57	볼베아링	6314(d70㎜,D150㎜,B35㎜)	8	개		
58	원통로라베아링	N314(d70㎜,D150㎜,B35㎜,분리형)	8	개		
59	알루미늄괴	99.6%	0.2	t		

April 2021 :

번호	품명	규격	수량	단위	단가
1	저탄망간철	Mn≧75%,C≦0.5%,Si≦2%, P≦0.03%,립도50㎜,GB/T 3795-1996	0.24	t	2160
2	환강	45강,Φ35㎜ ,GB/T699-1999	1.3	t	1185
3	환강	45강, Φ55㎜	1.4	t	910
4	환강	45강, Φ80㎜	1.9	t	1230
5	환강	45강, Φ90㎜	1.5	t	955
6	환강	45강, Φ125㎜	1.15	t	955
7	환강	45강, Φ155㎜	3	t	1275
8	환강	45강, Φ225㎜	1.25	t	1320
9	내열내산환강	1Cr18Ni9Ti,Φ22㎜,SUS304	0.5	t	3165
10	내열내산환강	1Cr18Ni9Ti,Φ40㎜,SUS304	0.85	t	3125
11	합금환강	65Mn,φ6mm ,GB/T 13304	0.07	t	1215
12	강판	강3,≠.4㎜ ,Q235	0.3	t	1165
13	강판	강3,≠.8㎜ ,Q235	7.13	t	1165
14	강판	강3,≠.16㎜,Q235	1.7	t	1150
15	강판	강3,≠19.5㎜,Q235	3	t	1150
16	내열내산강판	1Cr18Ni9Ti,≠4㎜ ,SUS304	7.6	t	3110
17	내열내산강판	1Cr18Ni9Ti,≠5㎜,SUS304	2	t	3110
18	내열내산강판	1Cr18Ni9Ti, ≠8㎜,SUS304	4.2	t	3110
19	내열내산강판	1Cr18Ni9Ti, ,≠10㎜,SUS304	0.8	t	3110
20	구형강	강3,ㄷ120*100*120*5㎜,Q235	1	t	1150
21	산형강	강3,ㄴ75*75*5㎜,Q235	1.7	t	1110
22	산형강	강3,ㄴ100*100*8㎜,Q235	2.8	t	1110
23	산형강	강3,ㄴ140*140*10㎜,Q235	5.7	t	1135
24	인발관	강3,Φ63*4㎜,Q235	0.4	t	1230
25	인발관	강3,Φ150*10㎜,Q235	0.5	t	1210
26	내열내산인발관	1Cr18Ni9Ti,Φ32*3㎜,SUS304	0.5	t	3325
27	내열내산인발관	1Cr18Ni9Ti,Φ108*4㎜,SUS304	0.16	t	3265
28	사불화수지봉	Φ220*5000㎜	0.045	t	
29	용접봉	J422,Φ4㎜	0.8	t	1160
30	불수강용접봉	A102, Φ4㎜	0.48	t	3375
31	원추로라베아링	7315(d75,D160,B37,T40㎜), 30315	16	개	23
32	원추로라베아링	7312(d60,D130,B31,T33.5㎜), 30312	16	개	10
33	감속기 (전동기포함)	NMRV-40-AB-B8-4KW-B3, 감속비 32,전동기4KW포함	8	대	450

34	자동발브	Q641F-16P, P:1.6㎫,DN:40㎜, 공기기동식	16	개	210
35	자동발브	Q641F-16P,P:1.6㎫,DN:80㎜, 공기기동식	32	개	336
36	고압호스	ϕ22*3*1400㎜,압력:0.1㎫, (강선이 있는 투명비닐관으로써 흡입시 쭈그러들지말것)	8	개	1.3
37	고압호스	외경ϕ22,내경ϕ13*두께 4.5*6000㎜,압력:0.1㎫,고무관	8	개	1.08
38	고압호스	ϕ38*4*17400㎜,압력:0.1㎫, (강선이 있는 투명비닐관으로써 흡입시 쭈그러들지말것)	8	개	6.6
39	고압호스	ϕ85*5*5000㎜,압력:0.1㎫, (강선이 있는 투명비닐관으로써 흡입시 쭈그러 들지말것)	8	개	15.3
40	고압호스	ϕ110*6*4500㎜,압력:0.1㎫, (강선이 있는 투명비닐관으로써 흡입시 쭈그러 들지말것)	8	개	21.3
41	내산뽐프 (전동기포함)	FS32X25-11, 4㎥/h,양정높이11m, 전동기0.75kw포함,내산성 (매질이 초산 또는 질산)	8	대	195
42	물뽐프(전동기포함)	SL-1100C,4㎥/h, 양정높이10m, 압력0.1㎫단상220V,전동기 1.1kw포함 ,DN:40	8	대	250
43	물려과기	SLY-10P.4㎥/h,물뽐프에서 려과된 물이 음료수정도이여야 함.DN:40	8	대	350
44	공기압축기	W-0.9/16, 배기량:0.9㎥/min, 압력0.9Mpa,3상,380V/50Hz,이동식	8	대	1224
45	유면계	YWZ-350T, Φ20*3-380㎜, 유기유리 ϕ20*3-길이380mm	8	개	10
46	진공계	Y-100, 압력0.1㎫	8	개	5
47	관조임띠	불수강Φ22	64	개	0.05
48	관조임띠	불수강Φ38	384	개	0.08
49	관조임띠	불수강Φ85	64	개	0.15
50	관조임띠	불수강Φ110	48	개	0.2
51	볼트,나트조	SUS304,M12*85㎜, 용수자리쇠포함	960	조	0.51
52	볼트	SUS304,M12*20㎜, 용수자리쇠포함	960	개	0.123
53	규소강판	50w470,두께0.5㎜, 너비1200㎜,무방향성, 전동기생산용	3.5	t	1715
54	케블지	두께0.08㎜*C, 전동기생산용	0.35	t	2200

55	케블지	두께0.05㎜*C, 전동기생산용	0.28	t	2200
56	폴리에스테르박막	두께 0.05mm, 자호없음	0.3	t	3300
57	볼베아링	6314(d70㎜,D150㎜,B35㎜)	8	개	8
58	원통로라베아링	N314(d70㎜,D150㎜, B35㎜,분리형)	8	개	15
59	알루미늄괴	99.6%, GB/T1196-93	0.2	t	3250

Source: Member State

Annex 28a: *Hai Zhou 168 (fka Smooth Sea 28)*

The *Hai Zhou 168*, formerly known as *Smooth Sea 28* (IMO: 8514045), was docked at a port area in Thailand from December 2016 to September 2018, based on data from a specialised maritime AI platform. During this time, the vessel underwent heavy modification work to its deck and superstructure (see figure annex 28a-1). This was likely in preparation for its transition to becoming the *Smooth Sea 22* (IMO: 9870991), a fraudulent vessel identity.


Figure Annex 28a-1: Smooth Sea 28 undergoing heavy modification work from 2017 to 2019



Source: Google Earth Pro, annotated by the Panel

In August 2018, the vessel changed its name from *Smooth Sea 28* to *Hai Zhou 168* after coming under new ownership. Shortly afterwards, in September 2018, the vessel departed Thailand for a shipyard in Ningde in Fu'an, China (see figure annex 28a-2). This was the same shipyard the *Mouson 328* (IMO: 9021198) was located before it took on the new fraudulent identity of the Dominica-flagged *Cherry 19*.

Figure Annex 28a-2: *Hai Zhou 168's* location voyage from Thailand to China, September 2019




Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

*Coordinates of vessel in inset satellite imagery: 26° 50' 27.6" 119° 41' 20.3994"

The vessel was given a new identity and IMO number as *Smooth Sea 22* (IMO: 9870991) when it sailed back to Thailand, and where it has since sailed a domestic route.

On 2 January 2019, after over three months at the shipyard in Ningde, *Hai Zhou 168* changed its identifiers to *Hang Xin 8* as it sailed out of the Baima river where it was moored. *Hang Xin 8* appeared to update its vessel profile to the 'newly built' Belize-flagged *Cheng Xin 1* (IMO: 9870991) / *Smooth Sea 22* soon after departing the shipyard in Ningde, marking its changeover to a new vessel (see figure annex 28a-3).


Figure Annex 28a-3: January 2019 - *Hai Zhou 168* changed out its identifiers to become the 'newly built' *Cheng Xin 1*



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

By 12 January 2019, the *Cheng Xin 1* aka *Smooth Sea 22* berthed at the same dock the *Hai Zhou 168* was berthed in February 2018, Bangkok, before it sailed towards Ningde, China (see figure annex 28a-4).

Figure Annex 28a-4: *Smooth Sea 22* back in Bangkok, Thailand



Source: Windward, Google Earth, annotated by the Panel

The vessel laundering created an empty AIS identity slot which was subsequently filled occasionally by the *Subblic* (IMO 8126082), based on high resolution satellite imagery. The *Subblic* has been recommended by the Panel for designation for delivering unreported refined petroleum to the DPRK since 2019.

The *Subblic* is known to have used *the Hai Zhou 168's* AIS profile when the *Hai Zhou 168* recorded extended gaps in its AIS transmissions on all but two occasions of the *Subblic's* recorded dates of delivery.

A number of similarities arise when comparing with the Panel's previous investigations into *Mouson 328*. Both the *Mouson 328* and *Hai Zhou 168* were previously owned by the same entity, Smooth Sea Co., Ltd, sailing respectively as *Smooth Sea 29* and *Smooth Sea 28*. In both cases, the same shipyards in Thailand and in China appeared to have been used in the vessel identity

launder process. Both the *Mouson 328* and *Hai Zhou 168* took on a different identity after departing the Ningde shipyard. Maritime records indicated that the vessel *Smooth Sea 22* was recorded launched at Fujian Yihe Shipbuilding Industry Co., Ltd. This was the same shipyard that had reportedly carried out repair and maintenance work on *Rui Hong 916* (IMO: 9058866), following the vessel's acquisition from the Hong Kong incorporated Ruis (HK) Marine Co., Limited in January 2019. The Panel has recommended *Rui Hong 916* (IMO: 9058866) for designation to have conducted a ship-to-ship transfer with the DPRK vessel *Kum Un San* (IMO: 8720436) on 28 May 2019. The Panel is verifying additional information it has received concerning the sale of the *Rui Hong 916*.

Panel investigations indicated that both *Hai Zhou 168* and *Smooth Sea 22* were owned and managed by the Hong Kong-registered Cheng Xin Shipping Co. Ltd (hereafter "Cheng Xin Shipping") from January to March 2019. *Smooth Sea 22* is currently owned and managed by the Thailand-registered. Smooth Sea Co., Ltd, also the former owner and manager of *Hai Zhou 168* when it sailed as *Smooth Sea 28*.

The Panel is awaiting Thailand's response to its enquiries.

Cheng Xin Shipping has yet to respond to the Panel's enquiries.

China responded:

> **1. Vessels**
>
> **(1) OC.73, OC.160**
>
> On *Diamond 8* transmitting as *Changshun 8*, according to China's investigation, the flag state of *Diamond 8* is Mongolia, while *Changshun 8* is a Honduras vessel previously named as *Honduras/Bonvoy 6*. These two vessels are of different types, therefore it's difficult for them to transmit as each other. Since 2020, neither of the two vessels has entered Chinese ports.
>
> On *Subblic* transmitting as *Hai Zhou 168*, according to China's investigation, neither of the two vessels has entered Chinese ports since 2020.

Source: The Panel

Annex 28b: Note verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Thailand

No. 56101/104

The Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) and, with reference to the Coordinator's Letter No. S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.320 dated 10 November 2020, requesting information related to the Panel's investigation on suspected sanctions evasion involving the vessel "Mouson 328", has the honour to transmit the said information herewith for the latter's kind perusal.

The Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009), the assurance of its highest consideration.

PERMANENT MISSION OF THAILAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Permanent Mission of Thailand
to the United Nations, New York
18 February B.E. 2564 (2021)

Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009),
<u>NEW YORK</u>.

Attachment

Information requested by
the Panel of Experts established pursuant to UNSC resolution 1874 (2009)
as per the Panel of Experts' Note No. S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.320
dated 10 November 2020

The Royal Thai Government investigated the activities involving the vessel(s) *Mouson 328* and *Smooth Sea 29* or *Cherry 19* and wishes to inform the Panel of Experts (POE) as follows:

1. Registry of the *Mouson 328*

There is insufficient evidence to confirm the connection of the vessel *Mouson 328* to either *Cherry 19* or *Smooth Sea 29,* both in terms of IMO numbers or registry.

2. Information on Flag Registry *Smooth Sea 29* is an oil tanker, registered as a Thai vessel with the registry number 630001113 and IMO number 9896945. *Smooth Sea 29* was formerly registered as *Cherry 19* under the Dominica's registry. Further investigation found that the Certificate of Deletion of *Cherry 19* submitted upon its registration to the Thai authorities is suspected to be forged. Presently, the Thai authorities are reexamining the registry of *Smooth Sea 29* with the possibility to revoke its registration.

3. Location of *Smooth Sea 29* from November 2019 to present

Cherry 19 departed Ningde Port, Fujian, China and arrived at Wangchao Port, Bangkok, Thailand on 28 November 2019. On 24 June 2020, *Cherry 19* was registered as a Thai vessel under the name *Smooth Sea 29*. After the registration, on 30 June 2020, *Smooth Sea 29* departed Wangchao Port, Bangkok, and arrived at Samut Songkhram Port, Samut Songkhram Province on 2 July 2020. On 26 November 2020, the vessel departed Samut Songkhram Port and arrived at Chonburi Port, Chonburi Province, on 27 November 2020. The vessel has since then been anchored at Ao Udom Port, Chonburi Province and has submitted the notice on non-usage of vessel to the Thai Marine Department on 21 December 2020.

4. Lost AIS Signal of *Cherry 19* and *Smooth Sea 29*

4.1 From November 2019 - June 2020, *Cherry 19* was docked at Wangchao Port, Bangkok for repair and maintenance at Whanchao Shipyard Co., Ltd. The vessel therefore had been anchored at the Wangchao Port on Chao Phraya River for 7 months.

4.2 From July - October 2020, *Smooth Sea 29* was docked at Ruammitr Dockyard Co., Ltd.'s Port for additional maintenance. During this period, the vessel's engines and electric generators were turned off, causing the lost of AIS signal. Later in October 2020, Brilliant Performance Co., Ltd. was hired to repair the AIS signal system.

4.3 From November 2019 - October 2020 *Cherry 19* or *Smooth Sea 29* has not been used for any shipments.


* * * * * *

Source: Member State

Annex 29a: *Billions No.18 (aka Kingsway)*

The *Billions No.18* (IMO: 9191773) was designated on 28 December 2017 for having conducted a ship-to-ship transfer of refined petroleum with the DPRK tanker *Rye Song Gang* 1 (IMO: 7389704) in October 2017. The Panel had reported that the owner and sole shareholder of *Billions No.18*, (the late) Chen Shih-Hsien, had also sought to supply marine diesel together from other tankers to DPRK tankers[11]. A month later in January 2018, *Billions No.18* re-transmitted briefly as *Kingsway* under the same IMO number (IMO: 9191773) before its AIS transmission disappeared (see figure annex 29a-1). The vessel was listed as de-registered from the Mongolia ship registry in June 2021.

Figure Annex 29a-1: *Billions No.18* briefly transmitting as *Kingsway* following designation, January 2018



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

[11] Chen was reported to be the owner of *Billions No.18* and two other tankers that were contracted to supply an additional 95,000 metric tons of fuel over the course of nine shipments to the same entity that purchased the fuel supplied to the *Rye Song Gang 1*. S/2018/171.

Following its designation, the vessel swapped into a new fraudulent identity as the Mongolia-flagged *Apex* (IMO: 8528864). The Panel obtained evidence of an identity laundering operating in which the entities behind *Kingsway* likely submitted fraudulent IMO number application documentation, modified its physical appearance, and tampered with its AIS transmission in order to disguise *Kingsway* as the *Apex*.

Panel investigations indicated that the vessel's laundering process likely began when the *Apex's* IMO number was created when the vessel changed ownership from the Chinese registered Taizhou Zhesheng Shipping Co Ltd to the Belize-incorporated Better Smart Ltd in mid-2018. The vessel also changed its registry and name from the China-flagged *Zhe Sheng 26* to Mongolia-flagged *Uni Wealth*.

Panel analysis of various photographs of the *Uni Wealth* and *Zhe Sheng 26* taken from online shipping websites show two vessels with very different structures that confirms that the *Uni Wealth* is not the same vessel as *Zhe Sheng 26* as claimed. *Uni Wealth* was therefore a fraudulent identity used as a cover for the *Kingsway*. In late 2018, *Uni Wealth*, still owned and operated by Better Smart Ltd, was re-named *Apex* at Keelung port area (see figures annex 29a-2 and 29a-3).

The Panel wrote to Taizhou Zhesheng Shipping Co Ltd, inter alia, seeking documentation on the vessel's sale. The Panel has yet to receive a response from the company.

Figure Annex 29a-2: *Apex* voyage route and identifiers, July to November 2018





Figure Annex 29a-3: Change of vessel from *Uni Wealth* to *Apex*, 2 November 2018



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

Between 2019 to 2021, *Apex* conducted voyages in the East China Sea and South China Sea. While in waters near the Singapore Strait on 9 November 2019, the vessel transmitted a name change to *Shun Fa*. While maritime databases showed *Apex* transmitting the name *Shun Fa* in November 2019, official records[12] continued to register the vessel sailing as *Apex*. Maritime tracking databases show the *Shun Fa* sailed between the East China Sea and South China Sea between November 2019 till end of 2020 without recording any port calls. The vessel exhibited suspicious behavior with periods of unaccounted dropped AIS transmissions and loitering in mid-sea locations for several days. These signatures indicate that *Shun Fa* had likely conducted ship-to-ship activities with other vessels. Online photographs of the vessel taken in January 2021 show *Shun Fa* painted on the vessel's stern.

Better Smart Ltd, a company incorporated in Belize[13] with a domiciled business address at Kaohsiung, is the entity that owned and operated *Apex* since mid-2018 when the vessel was sailing as the Mongolia-flagged *Uni Wealth*. The sole Director of Better Smart Ltd is Mr Chen Chao-Jung[14]. Information the Panel has reviewed indicates the vessel was likely laundered in mid-2018.

A Malaysia registered entity, Yong An Shipping Sdn Bhd (hereafter "Yong An Shipping") , provided, *inter alia*, corporate registry services to Better Smart Ltd / Mr. Chen. The Panel wrote to Yong An Shipping seeking relevant information and documentation on the ship as well as services rendered to Mr. Chen, as well as the latter's contact information.

Mongolia responded with information and documentation concerning the *Shun Fa (aka Apex*) showing the vessel had changed ownership a few times, with such ownership changes not updated on maritime databases (see also annexes 29b and 29c).

Yong An Shipping has yet to respond to the Panel's enquiries.

Mr. Chen has yet to respond to the Panel's enquiries.

Belize has yet to respond to the Panel's enquiries.

Source: The Panel

[12] IMO website.
[13] Better Smart Ltd is currently listed as inactive based on information from Belize Corporate registry.
[14] IHS Markit.

Annex 29b: Extract of *Shun Fa*'s registration application form showing vessel ownership

CC CC

MONGOLIA
MONGOLIA MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

Application to Register a Ship
(Form M1)

Chapter 3 of the Regulations for Registration of ship 2003

Mongolia Ship Registry Pte Ltd
133 New Bridge Road
#16-02 Chinatown Point
Tel: (65) 6225 0125
Fax: (65) 6225 0305
Email:
operation@mngship.org
Website: www.mngship.org

A. SHIP'S PARTICULARS

Ship Name (for registration) SHUN FA	Type of Ship OIL TANKER	Year Built 1998	Keel Laid 1998
Place / Country Built CHINA	IMO Number of Ship 8528864	Gross Tonnage 5830	National Gross Tonnage N/A
Net Tonnage 2750	National Net Tonnage N/A	Deadweight -	Hull Material (steel, etc) STEEL
Length of Ship (Metres) ® LOA: 108.20 ITC-69:	Breadth (Metres) 18.60	Moulded Depth (Metres) 10.50	Moulded Draught (Metres)
Builder's Name ZHEJIANG HONGGUAN SHIPBUILDING CO LTD, CHINA			Previous Registry MONGOLIA
Previous Owner NEW EAST INVESTMENT INC			Ship Name (in Previous Registry) APEX

B. SHIP VOYAGE INFORMATION

Sea Area A1 + A2 + A3	Trading Area UNLIMITED
For special registration, please fill in the following information.	
Voyage Limitations	
Port of Departure	Port of Arrival
Estimate Date of Departure	Estimate Date of Arrival

C. OWNER'S PARTICULARS

Name JOY WEALTHY TRADING LIMITED	IMO Number of Owner Name of Person in Charge EDISON
Address ROOM 05, LEVEL 12, LANDMARK NORTH, 39 LUNG SUM AVENUE, SHEUNG SHUI, HONG KONG	Telephone Facsimile E-mail

® Length of ship (LOA) – Overall length of the ship.
Length of ship (ITC-69) – Length of the ship as defined under International Tonnage Convention

Page 1 of 3

Source: Member State

Annex 29c: Cancellation Form for the *Shun Fa* issued by the Mongolia Maritime Administration

MONGOLIA ADMINISTRATION
MONGOLIA MARITIME

MONGOLIA

SHIP REGISTRY
MONGOLIA MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

Cancellation Form

Mongolia Maritime Administration
#606 Government Building-11
J Sambuu's Street-11
Chingeltei District, 4th Khoroo
Ulaanbaatar 15141
Tel: 976-11310642
Fax: 976-11310642
Email: info@monmarad.gov.mn
Website: www.monmarad.gov.mn

By this means we inform that all certificates from MONGOLIA SHIP REGISTRY related to

Name of Ship	IMO No.	Official Number
SHUN FA	8525564	47411998

Have been cancelled by Administration; reported by PSCO Korea as using falsified ship details, proved by FSI.

☒ Other reasons:

INVALIDATED CERTIFICATES:

CERTIFICATE	NUMBER
PERMANENT CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRY	47411998
PERMANENT MINIMUM SAFE MANNING CERTIFICATE	47411998
PERMANENT SHIP RADIO STATION LICENCE	47411998

REGISTRAR

MARITIME ADMINISTRATION MONGOLIA

Name: BAZARRAGCHAA ALTAN-OD Signature: Date: 2021.06.02

Distribution: ☒ Owner/Manager ☒ Agent ☐ Other

MONGOLIA SHIP REGISTRY

Approved by ... Revised by ... Date of Revision Page 1 of 1

Source: Member State

Annex 30a: *Diamond 8's* (IMO: 9132612) fraudulent transmissions


Satellite imagery obtained by the Panel showed *Diamond 8* in the Ningde anchorage area on 30 April 2021 (UTC) broadcasting as *Chang Shun 8* on a Mongolia-associated MMSI number: 457222000, where the vessel remained in those waters at least into May 2021 (see figure annex 30a-1 and 30a-2).

Figure Annex 30a-1: Satellite Imagery of the *Diamond 8* (IMO: 9132612) as the '*Chang Shun 8*' near Ningde, China, on 30 April 2021 (UTC)



Source: Member State

Figure Annex 30a-2: A specialized maritime AI platform display showing the location of the *Diamond 8* transmitting as *Chang Shun 8* (MMSI: 457222000), May 2021



Source: Windward, *Annotation*: The Panel

Annex 30b: Note verbal from Mongolia on *Chang Shun 8*

MONGOLIA

PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

6 East 77th Street, New York, N.Y. 10075
Tel: (212) 861-9460, Fax: (212) 861-9464

NUB/33/2021

The Permanent Mission of Mongolia to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) and has the honour to transmit information on vessel CHANGSHUN 8 (MMSI:457222000).

The vessel CHANGSHUN 8 was registered to the Mongolian Maritime Administration on 04 September 2020 and excluded from the registration on 24 December 2020 by the reason of possible violation of the relevant resolution of UNSC.

During its registration period CHANGSHUN 8 was using communication number MMSI 457 222 000.

The Permanent Mission of Mongolia avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) the assurances of its highest consideration.

Necessary documentations are enclosed herewith.

19 May 2021

New York

B.J

United Nations Security Council
Panel of Experts established pursuant to the resolution 1874 (2009)
New York

MONGOLIA MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

MONGOLIA

SHIP REGISTRY
MONGOLIA MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

Cancellation Form

Mongolia Maritime Administration
#606 Government Building-11
J Sambuu's Street-11
Chingeltei District, 4th Khoroo
Ulaanbaatar 15141
Tel: 976-11310642
Fax: 976-11310642
Email: info@monmarad.gov.mn
Website: www.monmarad.gov.mn

By this means we inform that all certificates from MONGOLIA SHIP REGISTRY related to

Name of Ship	IMO No.	Official Number
CHANG SHUN 8	8682969	48762001

Have been cancelled by Administration: due to ties with DPRK

☒Other reasons:

INVALIDATED CERTIFICATES:

CERTIFICATE	NUMBER
PROVISIONAL CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRY	48762001
PROVISIONAL MINIMUM SAFE MANNING CERTIFICATE	48762001
PROVISIONAL SHIP RADIO STATION LICENCE	48762001
CARVING AND MARKING NOTE	48762001
CONTINUOUS SYNOPSIS RECORD	CSR - 3/48762001
DECLARATION OF MARITIME LABOUR COMPLIANCE PART I	MLC -48762001

REGISTRAR

MARITIME ADMINISTRATION MONGOLIA

Name: BAZARRAGCHAA ALTAN-OD   Signature: [redacted] Date: 2020.12.24

Distribution: ☒Owner/Manager ☒Agent ☐Other: ____

MONGOLIA SHIP REGISTRY

Approved by: Revised by: Date of Revision: Page 1 of 1

Source: Member State

Annex 31: *Bonvoy 3* (aka *Fu Shun 3*)

MONGOLIA MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

MONGOLIA

MONGOLIA MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

PROVISIONAL CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRY

Issued under the provisions of
Chapter 3 of the Regulations for Registration of Ships 2003

Official Number	Call Sign	IMO Ship Number
49112088	JVPK7	8714085

Name of Vessel
FU SHUN 3

Name and Address of Owner	IMO Registered Owner Number	Shares (%)
LU CHANG SHIPPING (HK) CO.,LTD Shop F28 1/F, Cathay Pacific 88 Malls, No.25 Wanchai Rd, Wanchai, Hong Kong.	6177286	100

Description of Vessel			
Type of Vessel Oil Tanker	Year of Built 1988	Hull material Steel	Previous Registry / Name Sierra Leone / BONVOY 3
Gross Tonnage 2385	Length(Metres) LOA - - ITC -- 84.50	Name of Builder Daedong Shipbuilding Co.,Ltd, Busan, Korea	
Net Tonnage 1120	Breadth(Metres) 13.60	Number of Engines 1	Type of Engine / Total Power (KW) Diesel / 1765
Deadweight -	Depth(Metres) 6.80	Speed of Vessel (Knots) 12.00	Engine Make / Model SSHI-Hanshin / 6EL-35

Date of Provisional Registry	Port of Registry	Date of Expiry
06 November 2020	Ulaanbaatar	06 May 2021

Issued at Singapore on 06 November 2020.

The Registrar of the Mongolia Ship Registry, by the powers vested thereupon by the Regulations for Registration of Ships 2003,hereby authorizes this Provisional Registration of Vessel **FU SHUN 3**.

MARITIME ADMIN MONGO [redacted]

REGISTRAR
MONGOLIA SHIP REGISTRY
MONGOLIA MARITIME ADMINISTRATION (OPERATIONS)
MONGOLIA SHIP REGISTRY

MSR/PROV CR/REV.3/2010

Source: Member State

Annex 32: *Xing Ming Yang 888's* (IMO: 8410847) fraudulent transmissions and red flag indicators


The *Xing Ming Yang 888* (IMO: 8410847) has been intermittently broadcasting a fraudulent MMSI: 334191000, sailing as the Honduras-flagged *Vi Fin* since 2020. The vessel was previously reported by the Panel with prolonged periods of dark activity as well as transmitting on other fraudulent identifiers[15]. The vessel has been recommended by the Panel for designation for conducting ship-to-sip activity with the DPRK-flagged *Mu Bong 1* (IMO: 8610461) in June 2018[16].

As a further red flag indicator, the *Xing Ming Yang 888* also used a fraudulent call-sign 9LU2843 that was formerly associated with another vessel that delivered refined petroleum to the DPRK, *Vifine* (IMO: 9045962). The *Vifine* was featured in the Panel's report for conducting ship-to-ship transfer with the *New Konk*, another direct delivery vessel. The Panel also highlighted the shared ownership and management links between the two vessels.

In May 2021, the vessel again transmitted as *Vi Fin,* a consistent pattern of deception it has exhibited since 2020 while in Chinese territorial waters (see figure annex 32-1). The *Xing Ming Yang 888* has been sailing stateless without a known registered flag since November 2018, subjecting it to maritime laws of the country whose territorial waters it is located in. These vessels can be investigated, detained or impounded under national law and under operative paragraph 9 of resolution 2397 (2017).

[15] Paragraph 46 (f), S/2021/211.
[16] S/2021/211.

Figure Annex 32-1: *Xing Ming Yang 888* transmitting as *Vi Fin*, in November 2020, December 2020, and May 2021




Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel, Satellite Imagery: Planet Labs and Member State

Annex 33a: Locations frequented by direct delivery vessels

Many of the now de-flagged vessels previously recommended by the Panel for designation for direct delivery of refined petroleum to the DPRK on numerous occasions[17], have been observed in Chinese territorial waters. The following are sample satellite imagery of vessels recommended for designation located in waters in the Ningde, China, between August 2020 and March 2021.

Figure Annex 33a-1: Direct Delivery tankers at Sansha Bay, 11 November 2020



Source: Maxar Technologies and Member State

[17] S/2020/151, S/2020/840, S/2021/211.

Example of Direct Delivery vessels that frequent waters off Ningde


Satellite imagery showing the direct delivery[18] vessel *Bonvoy 3* (IMO: 8714085) anchored in Sansha Bay on 30 January 2021 and another satellite imagery capture of the vessel anchored again in Sansha Bay on 9 March 2021.

Figure Annex 33a-2: *Bonvoy 3* at Sansha Bay, 30 January 2021



Source: Planet Labs

Figure Annex 33a-3: *Bonvoy 3* at Sansha Bay, 9 March 2021




Source: Airbus Defence and Space and Member State

[18] This is a term the Panel has used for non-DPRK flagged vessels that deliver refined petroleum to the DPRK. The refined petroleum is procured including through ship-to-ship transfers.

Satellite imagery on 24 March 2021 showing two direct delivery vessels, *Diamond 8* (IMO: 9132612) and *Rich United* (IMO: 9129213) near Dongyin Island.

Figure Annex 33a-4: *Diamond 8* near Dongyin Island, 24 March 2021



Source: Member State


Figure Annex 33a-5: *Rich United* near Dongyin Island, 24 March 2021



Source: Member State

Bonvoy 3, along with other direct delivery vessels: *New Konk*, *Subblic* and *Xin Hai* near Dongyin Island on 26 August 2020.

Figure Annex 33a-6: Direct Delivery tankers at Dongyin Island, 26 August 2020



Source: Maxar Technologies and Member State

Satellite imagery on 27 March 2021 showing the designated vessel *Yuk Tung* (IMO: 9030591) near Xiyang Island, Ningde. The *Yuk Tung* was designated on 30 March 2018.

Figure Annex 33a-7*: Yuk Tung* near Xiyang Island, 27 March 2021



Source: Member State

Satellite imagery on 16 March 2021 showed the direct delivery vessel *New Konk* (IMO: 9036387) docked at a shipyard at Fu'an, Fujian Province, China. The coordinates show a shipyard in Fujian Province where Fujian Yihe Shipbuilding Industry Co Ltd is located[19]. This was the same coordinates reported by the Panel where both the *Mouson 328* (IMO: 9021198)[20] and *Hai Zhou 168* (IMO: 8514045) (see paragraphs 30 to 34), were located, as vessels that underwent vessel identity swaps.

Figure Annex 33a-8: *New Konk* berthed at Fu'an, 11 March 2021



Source: Member State

[19] Member State.
[20] Paragraphs 21 to 36 and Annex 22, S/2021/211.

Annex 33b: Member State's list of vessels of interest entering China's waters, October 2020 to April 2021

DATE DD/MMM/YY	VOI NAME	PLA VESSEL NAME	LAT/LONG
10/11/2020	AQUAMARINE	N/A	29:39N 122:45E
10/19/2020	MEGA PRINCESS	N/A	31:11N 123:57E
11/1/2020	HOKONG	N/A	28:00N 121:29E
11/9/2020	HAI SHUN	N/A	26:07N 120:32E
11/12/2020	BONVOY 3	N/A	26:19N 120:27E
11/20/2020	XING MING YANG 888	N/A	25:16N 119:52E
11/20/2020	POWER	N/A	27:34N 121:25E
11/29/2020	HENG RONG	N/A	25:15N 119:46E
12/10/2020	MOUSON 328	N/A	2405N 11851E
12/27/2020	XING MING YANG 888	N/A	2408N 11823E
1/1/2021	XING MING YANG 888	N/A	32:45N 122:31E
1/3/2021	PACIFIC PRINCESS	N/A	26:00N 120:00E
1/11/2021	MOUSON 328	N/A	31:05N 122:49E
1/14/2021	JOINT LUCK	N/A	29:00N 121:45E
1/18/2021	HAI ZHOU 168	N/A	26:00N 120:00E
1/20/2021	JOINT LUCK	N/A	26:16N 120:30E
1/21/2021	JOFFA	N/A	26:00N 120:00E
1/26/2021	INFINITE LUCK	N/A	26:16N 120:40E
2/17/2021	XINHAI	N/A	25:00N 119:22E
3/8/2021	HANG YU 8	N/A	27'00N121'30E
3/15/2021	POWER	FUCHI 890	27'00N121'30E
3/19/2021	HANG YU 8	N/A	27'00N121'30E
3/20/2021	PACIFIC PRINCESS	N/A	27'00N121'30E
3/22/2021	SUBBLIC	N/A	25'00N120'00E
3/31/2021	SAM JONG 2	N/A	31'30N123'00E
3/31/2021	SIN PYONG 2	N/A	31'30N123'00E
3/31/2021	AN SAN 1	N/A	31'30N123'00E
4/1/2021	XIN HAI	N/A	2618N 12025E
4/1/2021	JOFFA	N/A	2627N 12000E
4/2/2021	HANG YU 8	N/A	2936N 12145E
4/2/2021	SAM JONG 2	N/A	2818N 12200E
4/2/2021	HAI JUN	N/A	2628N 11959E
4/3/2021	SIN PYONG	N/A	3003N 12333E
4/3/2021	UN HUNG	N/A	2716N 12129E
4/3/2021	DIAMOND 8	N/A	2627N 11959E
4/15/2021	POWER EASY	N/A	2629N 12130E
4/22/2021	CHERRY 168	N/A	3100N 12330E

Unknown or unable to confirm info
StS Associated Vessel of Interest
Non-DPRK Delivery Vehicle
DPRK Tanker

*NOTE:
- The vessels highlighted in yellow along with the vessels highlighted in orange denote non-DPRK vessels that delivered refined petroleum to the DPRK.
- The coordinates in green highlight denote approximate locations.

Source: Member State

To the Panel's enquiry into the *Diamond 8* seeking, *inter alia*, confirmation on the actual identity of the vessel transmitting on the Mongolia-associated MMSI 457222000, dates during which the vessel transmitted under the said MMSI and any actions conducted into the vessel pursuant to the relevant Security Council resolutions, including paragraph 9 of resolution 2397 (2017), China responded:

1. Vessels

(1) OC.73, OC.160

On *Diamond 8* transmitting as *Changshun 8*, according to China's investigation, the flag state of *Diamond 8* is Mongolia, while *Changshun 8* is a Honduras vessel previously named as *Honduras/Bonvoy 6*. These two vessels are of different types, therefore it's difficult for them to transmit as each other. Since 2020, neither of the two vessels has entered Chinese ports.

On *Subblic* transmitting as *Hai Zhou 168*, according to China's investigation, neither of the two vessels has entered Chinese ports since 2020.

To the Panel's enquiry concerning the rest of the vessels sought in the main text and this Annex into information on *inter alia*, on the DPRK vessels' activities, the identifiers on which the vessels were transmitting and the validity of those identifiers, as well as the vessels' dates, origin and destination, and their stated purpose in Chinese waters, China responded:

(5) OC.77, OC.154, OC.155, OC.157, OC.161

According to China's verification, the vessel *Shunkai*, together with most vessels alleged to be delivering coal to China, and vessels suspected to be delivering refined petroleum products to the DPRK including *Sin Phyong 2, An San 1, Aquamarine, Hai Shun* and *Xing Ming Yang 888* have not entered Chinese ports since 2020.

Source: The Panel

Annex 34: DPRK and DPRK-associated vessels transmitting fraudulent AIS identifiers in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters


The Panel has observed on a specialized maritime tracking platform the transmission of fraudulent identifiers over AIS by DPRK and other suspect vessels seeking to evade sanctions that have affected multiple flag registries. The Panel has shared its observations along with supplementary high-resolution satellite imagery from a Member State, with the flag registries in question. The Panel welcomed any additional observations the relevant flag state authorities may have concerning the issue at hand.


The following are sample instances where of DPRK-flagged and DPRK-associated vessels in Chinese territorial waters transmitting identifiers with suspect indicators and therefore subject for further investigations by the relevant Chinese maritime authorities.

Su Ri Bong (IMO: 8605727)

The DPRK-flagged *Su Ri Bong* has delivered DPRK-origin coal on multiple occasions to Ningbo-Zhoushan waters for ship-to-ship transfer and reported in the Panel's past reports. The *Su Ri Bong* was advertised to be sold for scrap back in June 2019 but has continued to return to Chinese waters to deliver its coal. The vessel has been known to transmit fraudulent identifiers. A Member State reported that the *Su Ri Bong* carried coal to Ningbo-Zhoushan waters while transmitting fraudulent identifiers from March to May 2021. These included transmitting variations of a vessel name '*Zhou Shan*' and '*Zoushan*' and transmitting a Panama-associated MMSI number without an IMO number or ship dimensions (see figure annex 34-1).

Figure Annex 34-1: Storyboard of DPRK-vessel *Su Ri Bong* (fka *Pu Zhou* and *Fu Xing 12)* (IMO: 8605727) transmitting identifiable fraudulent identifiers, March to May 2021








Source: Member State

<u>*Lucky Star* (IMO: 9015278)</u>

The DPRK-associated vessel *Lucky Star* was reported by the Panel in its reports as far back as 2019 to have illegally exported DPRK-origin coal. The vessel was issued a national port ban by the Republic of Korea in December 2018. On 10 March 2021, the *Lucky Star* was recorded in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters transmitting fraudulent identifiers without reporting its dimensions (see figure annex 34-2).

Figure Annex 34-2*: Lucky Star* transmitting identifiable fraudulent identifiers, March 2021




Source: Member State

<u>*Chang Phyong* (IMO: 9338981)</u>

The DPRK vessel *Chang Phyong* last transmitted on its AIS profile in May 2017 (MMSI: 44556600). The vessel fraudulently transmitted as the Sri Lanka-flagged *QiuHai* with no reported IMO number on 12 March 2021 near the Shandong peninsula, China, before re-transmitting around 15 March 2021 in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters until at least 28 March 2021 (see figure annex 34-3). In May, elsewhere in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters, the *Chang Phyong* transmitted on its historical Kiribati-associated MMSI with no reported IMO number. The vessel also transmitted its vessel type as a futuristic “wing in Ground-effect”.

Figure Annex 34-3: *Chang Phyong* transmitting identifiable fraudulent identifiers, March 2021




	Actual	Reported AIS
Vessel Name	CHANG PHYONG	QIUHAI
Call Sign	HMZG3	BPGE
Flag	DPRK	Sri Lanka
Vessel Type	Cargo	Wing in Ground-effect
IMO	9338981	Not Reported
MMSI	445566000	437347304
Length	82.5 m	98 m
Beam	14.2 m	30 m

Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel; satellite imagery: Member State

Un Bong 2 (IMO: 8913186)

The DPRK vessel *Un Bong 2* was reported by the Panel in its reports as far back as 2018 to have illegally transshipped DPRK-origin coal. In 2020, the Panel's recorded the vessel near Huangxing Island in Ningbo-Zhoushan on 29 April 2020 as exporting DPRK-origin coal. In March 2021, *Un Bong 2* was recorded transmitting on its historical identifier sailing as Tanzania-flagged *Jin Long*. Tanzania had de-flagged the vessel in June 2016[21]. It also transmitted as another alleged Tanzania-flagged vessel with an unregistered IMO number (see figure annex 34-4).

Figure Annex 34-4: *Un Bong 2* transmitting identifiable fraudulent identifiers, March 2021



Source: Member State

[21] IMO website.

Tanzania informed the Panel that the DPRK vessels *Un Bong 2* (IMO: 8913186), formerly sailing as *Jin Long* under the Tanzania flag in 2016, had been de-registered on 10 October 2016. Additionally, Tanzania had never registered any vessels with IMO: 9017886 or IMO: 9313186, identifiers under which *Un Bong 2* was fraudulently transmitting. Tanzania stated "If they were found flying Tanzania flag, they are flying it illegally" (see figure annex 34-5).

Figure Annex 34-5: Note verbale and extract of attachment from Tanzania on fraudulent AIS transmissions

THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Tel: (212) 697-3612
Fax: (212) 697-3618
E-mail: newyork@nje.go.tz
tanzania@un.int

307 East 53rd Street
Suite 500
New York, NY 10022

Ref: No. TZNY/U.10/15 (1)

The Permanent Mission of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations presents its compliments to the United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009) and has the honour to submit to the later response from the Government of Tanzania (Zanzibar Maritime Authority), regarding suspect vessels' on-going broadcast of false AIS information as foreign-flagged vessels to evade sanctions, raised by the later note no. S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.241 of 29 June 2021

The Mission has further honour to inform the later that the government deregistered MV. UN BONG 2, IMO NO. 8913186 on 10th October 2016. And Tanzania has never registered IMO Numbers 9017886 and 9313186. If they were found flying Tanzania flag, they are flying it illegally.

The Permanent Mission of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009) the assurances of its highest consideration.

New York, 21 July 2021

United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009),

NEW YORK.

ZANZIBAR MARITIME AUTHORITY

PHONE NO: +255 24 2236795
FAX NO: +255 024 2236796
WEBSITE: www.zma.go.tz
E-MAIL: info@zma.go.tz

P. O. BOX 401
ZANZIBAR
TANZANIA

ZMA/RSZ/150/1/VOL.6/1185 **10th October, 2016**

STAR MOON SHIPPING CO., LTD.
TRUST COMPANY COMPLEX, AJELTAKE ROAD,
AJELTAKE ISLAND MAJURO,
MARSHALL ISLANDS MH96960

REF: DEREGISTRATION OF JIN LONG
IMO NO. 8913186

Reference is made to the above subject matter.

Having been notified of the United Nations (UN) sanctions slapped against North Korea, as per United Nations security Council (UNSC) resolution 2270 (2016), adopted on 02 March, 2016, we are compelled to act and execute measures to deregister your above mentioned vessel so as to abide by the relevant provisions of the resolution. This is because the vessel been submitted to our Government as a North Korean Vessel.

This act on our part is in line with the Government directive, and is in conformity with UNSC resolution 2270 (2016) operative paragraph 19 which requires member states to deregister and refrain from registering any vessel that is owned, operated, or crewed by North Korea.

Hence, this is to inform you that our Authority has struck off the vessel from Tanzania Zanzibar International Register of Shipping, effective from the date of this letter. This implies that from the effective date the vessel can no longer legally fly the Tanzania flag in its sailing operation, whatsoever.

We require you to respect and heed this act.

Thank you,

[redacted]

FOR: DIRECTOR GENERAL
ZANZIBAR MARITME AUTHORITY

Source: Member State

China responded:

(5) OC.77, OC.154, OC.155, OC.157, OC.161

According to China's verification, the vessel *Shunkai*, together with most vessels alleged to be delivering coal to China, and vessels suspected to be delivering refined petroleum products to the DPRK including *Sin Phyong 2, An San 1, Aquamarine, Hai Shun* and *Xing Ming Yang 888* have not entered Chinese ports since 2020.


Source: The Panel

Annex 35a: *Gold Star* sanctions evasion methods


Panel investigations, publicly available data and Member State information indicated the *Gold Star* (IMO: 9146247) engaged in ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK-flagged and DPRK-associated vessels on multiple occasions in late 2019 and continuing into 2020 when it was sailing as then Sierra Leone-flagged *Silver Star 1* and subsequently as then Cameroon-flagged *Gold Star*.

According to a media report[22], the *Gold Star* was alleged to have engaged in a ship-to-ship transfer with the DPRK tanker *Yu Son* (IMO: 8691702) in June 2020. Panel research based on AIS tracks from a specialized maritime AI platform into the *Gold Star* and *Yu Son's* May / June 2020 voyages, along with an analysis into the *Gold Star's* ownership and management history, indicated the media information warranted deeper investigations. A Member State subsequently provided information of the *Gold Star* and *Yu Son's* May and June 2020 voyage tracks (see figure annex 35a-1).

Figure Annex 35a-1: Ship-to-ship transfer between the *Gold Star* (IMO: 9146247) and *Yu Son* (IMO: 8691702), May / June 2020



22 Pyongyang Papers.



Source: Member State

The Member State provided additional information that the vessel had engaged in additional ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK-flagged tankers on multiple occasions over a period of time from late 2019 and continuing into 2020 when it was sailing as the then Sierra Leone-flagged *Silver Star 1* and as the then-Cameroon-flagged *Gold Star* (see table annex 35a). According to the Member State, the suspected transfers with DPRK tankers took place within Chinese territorial waters as well as on the high seas off the east coast of the DPRK. The Member State further assessed that a DPRK entity, Mulgil Trading General Corporation, was also directly involved in hiring the *Gold Star* to engage in the unreported importation of refined petroleum products to the DPRK.


Table Annex 35a: List of suspected ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK vessels

- Late-November to early December 2019: *Silver Star 1* and DPRK tanker *Kum Jin Gang 3* (IMO: 8791667)
- Early February 2020: *Silver Star 1* and DPRK tanker *Pu Ryong* (IMO: 8705539)
- Mid-February 2020: *Silver Star 1* and DPRK tanker *Chil Bo San* (IMO: 8711021)
- Mid-February 2020: *Silver Star 1* and DPRK tanker *Sam Ma 2* (IMO: 8106496)
- Mid-February 2020: *Silver Star 1* and DPRK tanker *Yu Jong 2* (IMO: 8604917)
- Early April 2020: *Silver Star 1* and DPRK tanker *Sam Ma 2* (IMO: 8106496)
- Mid-April 2020: *Silver Star 1* and DPRK tanker *Yu Jong 2* (IMO: 8604917)
- Late May / Early June 2020: *Gold Star* and DPRK tanker *Yu Son* (IMO: 8691702)

Panel investigations conducted into the vessel's history indicated an earlier connection to DPRK illicit activities. The *Gold Star*, sailing as the *Sky Ace 1* has been a subject of past Panel report concerning planned oil transfers between vessels owned or operated by the late Chen Shih-Hsien and his associated company holdings, and DPRK tankers[23]. The *Yu Son* also had a history of conducting illicit ship-to-ship transfers[24].

According to information from a Member State, the *Gold Star*, sailing as then Sierra-Leone flagged *Silver Star 1*, loaded fuel oil from an oil terminal in Yanpu, Hainan Island, and subsequently conducted two ship-to-ship transfers with the DPRK tanker *Kum Jin Gang 3* (IMO: 8791667) in mid-November and in early December 2019. A Chinese entity facilitated the transfer of fuel oil from the oil terminal to the vessel. AIS transmissions on a maritime tracking platform confirmed the location of the vessel in November 2019 (see figure annex 35a-2):

Figure Annex 35a-2: Location of *Gold Star*, then sailing as *Silver Star 1*, Yangpu, China, November 2019




Source: Windward and Google Earth Pro, annotated by the Panel

[23] Paragraph 72 and Annexes 22 to 25 of S/2018/171 of 5 March 2018.
[24] Paragraph 5 and Figure II of S/2019/691 of 30 August 2019.


Both vessels did not transmit AIS signal on commercial maritime databases over the investigative period of interest, with the *Kum Jin Gang 3* stopping transmission since April 2019[25]. The *Kum Jin Gang 3* was the formerly Belize-flagged *Wan Heng 11*, was designated on 30 March 2018 for having itself conducted a ship-to-ship transfer with the DPRK-flagged *Rye Song Gang 1* (IMO: 7389704) on 13 February 2018. Maritime tracking platforms showed the *Gold Star* back at Yangpu port area in Hainan Island from August to November 2020 (see figure annex 35a-3).

Figure Annex 35a-3: Excerpts from specialized commercial maritime platforms showing the *Gold Star's* (IMO: 9146247) location at Yangpu, Hainan Island, August and September 2020

<u>August 2020</u>



<u>September 2020</u>



Source: Windward, Planet Labs, and IHS Markit, annotated by the Panel

[25] Information as of May 2021.

Following the *Gold Star's* departure from a Ningde port in China in November 2020, AIS tracking data showed the vessel remaining in Chinese waters until February 2021. According to the Member State, the vessel, which remained anchored in waters outside Zhanjiang port with limited provisions, need for medical assistance, and the inability to enter another port, transferred the ship's operational control to an unnamed entity in Indonesia. The vessel next appeared in the territorial waters of Timor Leste in May 2021.

China responded:

(2) OC.75

Gold Star left Yangpu, Hainan in late November 2019, it has not entered Chinese ports since then. The Chinese side does not have information regarding the alleged transfer of refined petroleum products by this vessel.

There is no ports-entry request submitted to Chinese ports by *Ocean Star* in November 2020. The port clearance document annexed to the Panel's letter is fake. *Ocean Star* did not enter Chinese ports, and *Gold Star* did not enter Chinese ports under fraudulent identity of *Ocean Star*.

The Hong Kong SAR company J&C Shipping, mentioned in the Panel's letter as the operator of *Gold Star*, was canceled in March 2021. There is no record of this company's import and export trade or its involvement in DPRK-related smuggling activities. China hopes that the Panel does not readily believe information which is inconsistent with facts.

The Russian Federation has yet to respond to the Panel's enquiry.

Timor Leste has yet to respond to the Panel's enquiry.

J&C Shipping Co. Ltd

Information available to the Panel indicates that Cheng Bin, a manager at J&C Shipping, was directly involved in the operation of the *Silver Star 1* / *Gold Star's* illicit activities, including directing the off-loading of refined petroleum to the DPRK and / or DPRK-affiliated vessels. Publicly available information show Cheng Bin appears as Director / Shareholder of a number of companies incorporated in Hong Kong SAR and in mainland China, such as Qingdao SBS International Corporation Limited (China) / 青岛市新公元贸易有限公司.

J&C Shipping has not responded to the Panel's enquiry.
Mr. Cheng Bin has not responded to the Panel's enquiry.

Union Bureau of Shipping

The Panel also investigated the entities and individuals that may have facilitated, directly or indirectly, these illicit refined petroleum transfers. In addition to investigations conducted into J&C Shipping Co. Ltd, the Panel found a China-based entity, Union Bureau of Shipping (hereafter "Union Bureau"), had provided services and / or issued certification to the *Gold Star*. Union Bureau was also listed on a specialized maritime platform as having provided shipping related services including: corporate registry services and / or served as a Document of Compliance holding company for the following de-flagged vessels the Panel had investigated as having violated operative paragraph 5 of resolution 2397[26] (see also annex 35b):


(i) *Hokong* (IMO: 9006758) that delivered refined petroleum products to the DPRK in 2019 and 2020;
(ii) *Unica* (IMO: 8514306) that delivered refined petroleum products to the DPRK in 2019 and 2020;
(iii) *Subblic* (IMO: 8126082) that delivered refined petroleum products to the DPRK in 2019 and 2020;
(iv) *Vifine aka Tealway FV* (IMO: 9045962) that delivered refined petroleum products to the DPRK in 2019; and
(v) *New Konk* (IMO: 9036387) that conducted a ship-to-ship transfer with the *Vifine* in 2019 and delivered refined petroleum products to the DPRK in 2020.

The Panel continues to await a response from Union Bureau.

Source: The Panel

[26] S/2020/151 of 3 March 2020

Annex 35b: Port Clearance document showing fraudulent identifiers used by *Gold Star*, November 2020



国 际 航 行 船 舶 出 口 岸 许 可 证

No. 200802020037852213

存	船 名	海洋之星	国 籍	蒙古
根	驶往港	巴淡岛	驶离时间	2020-11-30 16:00

签 发 人： 郭少良

2020 年 11 月 30 日

中华人民共和国宁德白马港海事处 船舶进出口岸核准专用章

No. 200802020037852213

中 华 人 民 共 和 国

国 际 航 行 船 舶 出 口 岸 许 可 证

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA PORT CLEARANCE

船 名 Name of Ship	海洋之星 OCEAN STAR	国 籍 Nationality	蒙古 Mongolia
驶往港 Next Port	巴淡岛 BATAM	驶离时间 Time of Departure	2020-11-30 16:00

签 章: 白马港海事处

Issued by:

时 间:

Date and time: 2020-11-30 16:00:00

中华人民共和国宁德白马港海事处 船舶进出口岸核准专用章

备注

Remarks

1、本证自签发时起24小时内有效。

This clearance remains valid within 24 hours from the time issued.

2、本证涂改无效

Correction will render this clearance invalid.

Source: Member State

According to China, this port clearance document is fake. See China’s reply in annex 35a


Annex 36a: Then Sierra Leone-flagged *Ji Yuan's (aka Chang Long*) (IMO: 9044140) voyages, 2019 to 2021

Panel analysis into AIS tracking information of the *Ji Yuan* showed the vessel also transmitting as the *Ataizhouxinluo* (MMSI: 300800121). The *Ji Yuan,* transmitting as the *Ataizhouxinluo,* could be tracked much further sailing towards the DPRK. The vessel last transmitted an AIS signal in February 2021 near Kaohsiung port[27].

Tracking data of the *Ji Yuan* on a specialized commercial maritime database platform showed the vessel exhibited instances of transmitting as another vessel since 2019 through at least 2020, suggesting the possibility of a second transponder carried on board. When the *Ataizhouxinluo's* AIS signal was captured in DPRK waters around 30 September 2019 (EST), an AIS signal jump of the vessel back Southwest around 26 September 2019 after the vessel beginning to sail Northeast indicates another vessel, possibly the original *Ataizhouxinluo* operating locally in the Chengjiagang port area, China, that also transmitted the same MMSI. This could indicate a spoofing technique to further obfuscate AIS profiles.

The following are sample instances of a highly likely fraudulent transmission on the MMSI: 300800121, sailing alternatingly as *Ataizhouxinluo* or as *Guanyunyu60203.*


Figure Annex 36a-1: *Ji Yuan* and *Ataizhouxinluo* in the Hong Kong port area showing similar AIS voyage information, September 2019



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

[27] As of May 2021.


Figure Annex 36a-2: 'Meeting' between *Ji Yuan and Ataizhouxinluo* but showing same AIS tracks during the voyage, September 2019



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel


Figure Annex 36a-3: Voyage route of *Ji Yuan / Ataizhouxinluo* in November 2019 showing positional jumps

Example of positional jumps indicate two vessels are operating on the *Ataizhouxinluo* MMSI



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

Figure Annex 36a-4: *Ji Yuan* was shown on AIS tracking database in July 2020 at Hong Kong port area



Source: Windward, Planet Labs, annotated by the Panel

The Panel also sought assistance from the United Kingdom, Sierra Leone, Mongolia and related entities concerning the vessel and its cargo.

Sierra Leone provided the requested documentation to the Panel including shipping documentation (see annex 36b). The *Ji Yuan* was ex-officio cancelled and deleted from the Sierra Leone ship registry on 3 April 2020, with the included reason of the vessel's engagement with activities prohibited by Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK (see annex 36c).

Mongolia provided information and documentation on the *Ji Yuan (aka Chang Long*) (see annexes 36d – 36g) and confirmed the vessel's de-registration on 14 June 2021.

The United Kingdom responded that it was following up on the requested information into the relevant companies and would revert with more details in due course.

Source: The Panel

Annex 36b: Sample of shipping documentation of the Document of Compliance holding company for *Ji Yuan*

JY - 00047

SHORT TERM
DOCUMENT OF COMPLIANCE

Issued under the provisions of the
International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea, 1974, as amended,

Under the Authority of Government of the

REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE
by
UNION BUREAU OF SHIPPING

Name of the Company : JIYUAN SHIPPING LTD

Address of the Company : UNIT G25 WATERFRONT STUDIOS,
1 DOCK ROAD, E16 1AH LONDON, UNITED
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN LRELAND

Company Identification Number : 6115715

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT the safety management system of the Company has been audited and that it complies with the requirements of the International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (ISM Code) for the types of ships listed below (delete as appropriate):

~~Passenger ship~~
~~Passenger high-speed craft~~
~~Cargo high-speed craft~~
~~Bulk carrier~~
~~Oil tanker~~
~~Chemical tanker~~
~~Gas carrier~~
~~Mobile offshore drilling unit~~
Other cargo ship

This Short Term Document of Compliance remains in force until the Full Term Document of Compliance has been delivered on board, but not later than 24th April 2020.

Issued at DALIAN, CHINA on 25th January, 2020

UNION BUREAU OF SHIPPING

LIU/UBSH0002

Auditor to
UNION BUREAU OF SHIPPING

Source: Member State

Annex 36c: De-registration certificate of Ji Yuan, 3 April 2020

REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE

CERTIFICATE OF DE-REGISTRATION
REMOVAL FROM REGISTER

Issued in accordance with the Sierra Leone Merchant Shipping Act of 2003, Part III, Section 20 & 21.

Certificate No. VHQ-200-20-0878

Name of Vessel: JI YUAN		Official No. SLR10399
Call Sign: 9LU 2412	Port of Registry: FREETOWN	IMO No. 9044140
MMSI No: 667 001 600	Type of Vessel: Container Ship	Gross Tonnage: 3986
Owner's Name and Address: JIYUAN SHIPPING LTD., UNIT G25 WATERFRONT STUDIOS, 1 DOCK ROAD, E16 1AH, LONDON, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland		Owner's IMO No: 6115715

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that:

1. The registration of the vessel described above as Sierra Leonean ship was terminated and on the date given below and an entry was made in the merchant ship Register to this effect.
2. At the time of de-registration the following particulars of encumbrances and rights were registered on the vessel:

The vessel has outstanding dues to the register of Sierra Leone.

3. The reason for de-registration of the vessel is:

Other: Engaged in activities prohibited by UNSC resolutions related to the DPRK

Place and Date of issuance

Freetown, Sierra Leone on 03 April 2020 at 12:26 UTC

[redacted]

ASSISTANT REGISTRAR RAFAELLA CHRISTOFI SLMARAD


This is an electronically generated certificate. It has been digitally signed and stamped.

Rafaella Christofi - Assistant Registrar

To Whom It may Concern: Authenticity of this certificate can be verified through the Flag Administration's website at www.slmarad.com based on the Certificate Number or by contacting directly the Flag Administration through the contact details at the bottom of the certificate.

Source: Member State

Annex 36d: Bill of Sale of vessel *Ji Yuan* (IMO: 9044140), 26 July 2019



Prescribed by the Commissioners of Customs & Excise with the consent of the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

Form No. 10A

X.S. 79A

BILL OF SALE (Body Corporate)

IMO Number	Name of Ship	Number, year and port of registry	Whether a sailing, steam or motor ship	Horse power of engines (if any)
9044140	MV SUNNY CEDAR	Built 1992, DAE SUN SHIPBUILDING & ENGINEERING CO., LTD.	Motor ship	5,320PS

	Meters	CM	Number of tons	
			GRT	NRT
Length	107	00	3,980	1,878
Breadth	17	20		
Depth	8	30		

And as described in more detail in the Certificate of the Surveyor and the Register Book.

We, (a) KOREA MARINE TRANSPORT CO., LTD. (hereinafter called "the Transferors") having our principal place of business at 15th Floor, Hanjin Bldg., Namdaemun-ro 63, Jung-gu, Seoul, Republic of Korea, in consideration of the sum of USD 1,100,000 (United States Dollars One Million and One Hundred Thousand) in cash paid to us by (b) GOOD JOB TRADING LIMITED, RMS 05-15 13A/F SOUTH TOWER WORLD FINANCE CTR HARBOUR CITY 17 CANTON ROAD TSIM SHA TSUI KL, HONG KONG (hereinafter called "the Transferee(s)") the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, transfer ALL (100%) shares in the Ship above particularly described, and in her boats and appurtenances, to the said Transferee(s).

Further, we, the said transferors for ourselves and our successors covenant with the said Transferee(s) and (c) THEIR assigns, that we have power to transfer in manner aforesaid the premises hereinbefore expressed to be transferred, and that the same are free from ANY and (d) ALL MORTGAGES, ENCUMBRANCES AND MARITIME LIENS OR ANY OTHER DEBTS WHATSOEVER.

In witness whereof we have hereunto affixed our common seal on 26th July, 2019.

KOREA MARINE TRANSPORT CO., LTD.,

[redacted]

(a) Insert title in FULL of the Body Corporate, (b) Insert name and address in full and description of transferee or transferees. (c) Insert "his", "her", or "their".
(d) If there be any subsisting Mortgage, or outstanding Certificate of Mortgage or Sale, add "save as appears by the Registry of the said Ship".
(e) Description of Witnesses : Directors, Secretary, etc. (as the case may be).

NOTE:- *A purchaser of a registered British Vessel does not obtain a complete title until the Bill of Sale has been recorded at the Port of Registry of the ship; and neglect of this precaution may entail serious consequences.*

NOTE:- *Registered Owners or Mortgagees are reminded of the importance of keeping the Registrar of British Ships informed of any change of residence on their part.*

Sec. F. 2058 (Oct 1971)

1548-934992-12M-7/72-817-NP

*Note: The Panel holds the notarized document for the Bill of Sale.

Source: Member State

Annex 36e: Bill of Sale of vessel *Ji Yuan* (IMO: 9044140), 15 August 2019

Prescribed by the Commissioners of Customs & Excise with the consent of the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

FormNo. 10A

X.S.79A

BILL OF SALE (BodyCorporate)

IMO Number	Name of Ship	Official number, year and port of Registry	Whether a sailing, steam or motor ship	Horse power of engines (if any)
9044140	SUNNY CEDAR	JJR-920573 1992JEJU	Motor ship	5320PS

	Meters	Centimeters	Number of tons	
			Gross	Net
Length	107	00		
Breadth	17	20	3980	1878
Depth	8	30		

And as described in more detail in the Certificate of the Surveyor and the Register Book.

We, (a) GOOD JOB TRADING LIMITED (hereinafter called "the Vendors") having our principal place of business at RMS 05-15 13A/F SOUTH TOWER WORLD FINANCE CTR HARBOUR CITY 17 CANTON ROAD TSIM SHATSUI KL, HONGKONG, in consideration of the sum of USD 1.00 (ONE UNITED STATES DOLLARS ONLY) or other valuable consideration paid to us by (b) JIYUAN SHIPPING LTD, with registered address at UNIT G25 WATERFRONT STUDIOS, 1 DOCK ROAD, LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM, E16 1AH (hereinafter called "the Purchaser(s)") the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, transfer ALL(100%)shares in the Ship above particularly described, and in her boats and appurtenances, to the said Transferee(s).

Further, we, the said transferors for ourselves and our successors covenant with the said Transferee(s)and(c) THEIR assigns, that we have power to transfer in manner aforesaid the premises hereinbefore expressed to be transferred, and that the same are free from ANY ENCUMBRANCES (d) ALL DEBTS, MORTGAGES, TAXES AND MARITIME LIENS ANDCLAIMS.

In witness whereof we have hereunto executed this bill of sale on 15 AUG 2019

For & on behalf of GOOD JOB TRADING LIMITED.

[redacted]

By : [redacted]
Title :Attorney in fact

(a) Insert title in FULL of the Body Corporate, (b) Insert name and address in full and description of transferee or transferees. (c) Insert "his", "her", or "their"
(d) If there be any subsisting Mortgage, or outstanding Certificate of Mortgage or Sale, add "save as appears by the Registry of the said Ship"
(e) Description of Witnesses : Directors, Secretary, etc. (as the case maybe).

NOTE:- A purchaser of a registered British Vessel does not obtain a complete title until the Bill of Sale has been recorded at the Port of Registry of the ship; and neglect of this precaution may entail serious consequences.

NOTE:- Registered Owners or Mortgages are reminded of the importance of keeping the Registrar of British Ships informed of any change of residence on their part

Sec F 2058(Oct 1971)

1548-934992-12M-7/72-817-NP

*Note: The Panel holds the notarized document for the Bill of Sale.

Source: Member State

Annex 36f: De-registration and Statement of Withdrawal of Certificates of Chang Long (fka *Ji Yuan*)

Statement For Withdraw the Statutory Certificates

To whom it may concern,

This is to declare that: All the following statutory certificates of M/V CHANG LONG (IMO9044140) issued by this RO International Marine Survey Association under the Authority of the Government of Mongolia have been withdrawn due to she was de-registration by MSR on 14 June 2021. And this RO will not be responsible for the ship's condition covered by following certificates from the date of issuing this statement.

1. International tonnage certificate (ITC) IM-20-01-222
2. Cargo ship safety construction certificate (CSSC) IM-20-01-223
3. Cargo ship safety equipment certificate (CSSE) IM-20-01-224
4. Cargo ship safety radio certificate (CSSR) IM-20-01-225
5. International load line certificate (ILLC) IM-20-01-226
6. International oil pollution prevention certificate (IOPP) IM-20-01-227
7. International air pollution prevention certificate (IAPP) IM-20-01-228
8. International sewage pollution prevention certificate (ISPP) IM-20-01-229
9. International energy efficiency certificate (IEEC) IM-20-01-230
10. International ballast water management certificate (IBWMC) IM-20-01-231
11. International anti-fouling system certificate (AFS) IM-20-01-232
12. Safe management certificate (SMC) IM-20-01-235
13. International ship security certificate (ISSC) IM-20-01-236
14. Maritime labor certificate (MLC) IM-20-01-237

INTERNATIONAL MARINE SURVEY ASSOCIATION IMSA

Issued By: **International Marine Survey Association**

On 15 June 2021.

Source: Member State

Annex 36g: Mongolia Ship Circular

MONGOLIA SHIP REGISTRY
MONGOLIA MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

Circular No. 03-19

03 May 2019

TO: SHIP-OWNERS/ OPERATORS MANAGERS, AND INDIVIDUALS

SUBJECT: REGISTRATION AND DE-REGISTRATION PROCEDURE

PURPOSE

This Maritime Circular is to provide guidelines for the registration and cancellation of vessels who is presumable to breach a Mongolia laws and UN Sanctions.

REGISTRATION AND APPLICATION

1. The Mongolia registrar will check the vessels background and previous history.
2. The Shipowners and the managers must submit all the documents required by Mongolia Ship registry.
3. Mongolia Ship Registry has right to reject the vessel's application if consider as suspicious.
4. Mongolia Ship Registry has right to require "Letter of Undertaking" additionally from owner (The letter sample enclosed in Annex 1)

DE-REGISTRATION AND CANCELLATION OF CERTIFICATES

The Mongolia Ship Registry has right to cancel the vessels' registration in such cases:

1. Violation of Mongolia Laws and Regulations
2. Violation of UN and EU sanctions.
3. Violation of MLC and its requirements
4. Transportation of prohibited and banned cargoes.
5. High number of PSC detentions

This circular will enter into effect as of 01st June 2019.

For any inquiries, please contact us.

Mongolia Ship Registry

[redacted]

Source: Member State

Annex 37a: *Wol Bong San (fka Xin Hai*) (IMO: 7636638)

The unknown-flagged tanker *Xin Hai* (IMO: 7636638) came under the DPRK fleet and was renamed *Wol Bong San* in March 2020. The vessel's history is indicative of other vessels the Panel investigated that transitioned to become DPRK-flagged. Indicators included: not updating ownership information and DPRK-associated ties in the vessels' management history.

The *Xin Hai* was formerly Sierra Leone-flagged from October 2017 to November 2019. The vessel was de-registered with the provided reason to the ship registry that it was "sold and transferred" (see annex 37b). However, maritime databases have not registered an updated sale nor new flag registry since then till the vessel was flagged under the DPRK and renamed *Wol Bong San*, in March 2020[28]. A satellite imagery captured showed the *Xin Hai* docked at Nampo, DPRK, in November 2020 (figure annex 37a). The vessel has not transmitted an AIS signal since October 2019[29].

Figure Annex 37a: *Xin Hai* (nka as *Wol Bong San*), Nampo, DPRK, 10 November 2020



Source: Member State

[28] The information was updated some time in 2021, with its DPRK-flagged status backdated to March 2020.
[29] Windward.

The *Xin Hai'*s registered owner, BVI-registered Zong Heng Ltd, listed Baili Shipping & Trading Ltd (hereafter "Baili Shipping")[30], a Hong Kong incorporated entity[31] that also served as the vessel's manager and operator, as its care of address. Baili Shipping, however, according to Hong Kong corporate registry records, was dissolved in March 2018, indicating that the vessel ownership was not updated with the IMO. This is consistent with the Panel's past reporting of vessels that had conducted sanctionable activity that continued to list former owners or managers as an added layer of obfuscation, while conducting sanctions evasion activities.

The Panel notes that the facilitators behind entities that operate suspect vessels that have gone on to the flagged under the DPRK have links with other vessels that are DPRK-linked.

For instance, information provided to the Panel by an entity associated with the designated vessel *Yuk Tung* (IMO:9030891) lists the *Ocean Explorer* (IMO: 9388792) has having conduced a ship-to-ship transfer on 28 October 2018 with the *Xin Hai*. The *Ocean Explorer* conducted a ship-to-ship transfer with the *Yuk Tung* sailing as "*Maika*" a day later on 29 October 2019[32].

Baili Shipping's sole Director and shareholder lists a Chinese national named Zhang Qiao. The Panel listed Zhang Qiao as associated with the designated *Jie Shun* (IMO: 8518780), a vessel that was interdicted in 2019 while sailing *enroute* from the DPRK towards the Suez Canal, transporting DPRK ammunition and iron ore on board[33].

Baili Shipping was also listed as the Document of Compliance holder for the then Mongolia-flagged *Tian Tong* (IMO: 8712348) from January 2016 to November 2017 prior to the vessel being re-flagged under the DPRK. It served in a similar capacity with other DPRK vessels prior to their coming under the DPRK fleet, including DPRK-flagged: *Myong Sin* (IMO: 9045182) and *Ever Glory* (IMO: 8909915) that were mentioned in Panel reports exporting DPRK-origin coal.

Source: The Panel

[30] *百利船舶貿易有限公司*

[31] Room 2105, DL 1374, Trend Center, 29-31, Cheung Lee Street, Chai Wan, Hong Kong, China.

[32] S/2019/171

[33] S/2017/150.

Annex 37b: Certificate of De-Registration, *Xin Hai* (IMO: 7636638)

REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE

CERTIFICATE OF DE-REGISTRATION
REMOVAL FROM REGISTER

Issued in accordance with the Sierra Leone Merchant Shipping Act of 2003, Part III, Section 20 & 21.

Certificate No. VHQ-200-19-2949

Name of Vessel: XIN HAI		Official No.: SLR10485
Call Sign: 9LU 2498	Port of Registry: FREETOWN	IMO No.: 7636638
MMSI No: 667 001 695	Type of Vessel: OIL TANKER	Gross Tonnage: 5105
Owner's Name and Address: ZONG HENG LIMITED, Vistra Corporate Services Centre, Wickhams Cay II, Road Town, Tortola, VG1110, Virgin Islands (British)		Owner's IMO No: 6011341

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that:

1. The registration of the vessel described above as Sierra Leonean ship was terminated and on the date given below and an entry was made in the merchant ship Register to this effect.

2. At the time of de-registration the following particulars of encumbrances and rights were registered on the vessel:

The vessel is free from all registered Encumbrances and Mortgages on the register of Sierra Leone.

3. The reason for de-registration of the vessel is:

Sold and transferred:

Place and Date of issuance

Freetown, Sierra Leone on 13 November 2019 at 08:53 UTC

[redacted]

This is an electronically generated certificate. It has been digitally signed and stamped.

Assistant Registrar

To Whom it may Concern: Authenticity of this certificate can be verified through the Flag Administration's website at www.slmarad.com based on the Certificate Number or by contacting directly the Flag Administration through the contact details at the bottom of the certificate.

Sierra Leone Maritime Administration SLMARAD
info@slmarad.com www.slmarad.com


VHQ-200-19-2949 Page 1 of 1

Source: The Panel

Annex 38a: *Sin Phyong 5 (fka Woo Jeong)* (IMO: 8865121)

The *Woo Jeong* was ROK-flagged from May 2010 to September 2019[34]. Sometime in 2021, the vessel was updated as DPRK-flagged. The *Woo Jeong* last transmitted an AIS signal around 27 July 2019 (EST) off Shidao, China (see figure annex 38a). Prior to this, the vessel sailed a domestic route. ROK authorities confirmed the dates the vessel sailed under its ship registry and provided documentation on the vessel.

Figure Annex 38a: Excerpt from a specialized maritime database platform showing voyage details of the *Woo Jeong*, July 2019



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

[34] Member State.

Maritime database information[55] listed the vessel was owned and operated by the ROK-incorporated Young Sung Global Co Ltd (hereafter “Young Sung Global”) from June 2012 until July 2019. In October 2020, the vessel was reported to have come under the DPRK ownership of Korea Myongryu Trading Co.

According to Young Sung Global, it signed a ship brokerage agreement on 1 July 2019 with a Busan-based ship brokering entity that “carried out the overseas sale of *Woo Jung* [sic]”. A Chinese broker for the buyer was identified via a Seoul-based ship brokering entity. The buyer was seeking to purchase the vessel “where fast delivery was possible”. A Memorandum of Agreement for the ship sale (see annex 38b) was signed on 8 July 2019, with the transfer of the vessel to the buyer, Deepika Shipping and Trading Ltd, within the same month (see annex 38c). Young Sung Global provided other documentation related to the vessel’s sale.

Investigations continue.

Source: The Panel

[35] Ibid.

Annex 38b: Excerpts : Addendum to the Memorandum of Agreement of sale for *Woo Jeong*

Addendum No. 1

to the MOA dated 8th July 2019

made between

JY SNP CO., LTD
on behalf of the Owners (YOUNG SUNG GLOBAL CO., LTD)
(as Sellers)

And

DEEPIKA SHIPPING AND TRADING LTD or their nominee
(as Buyers)

for MT "WOO JEONG" (The "Vessel")

It is hereby mutually agreed by the Sellers and the Buyers that:

A) In exchange for payment of the Purchase Price, the Sellers shall furnish the Buyers with the following documents:

1. (1) One original notarized **Bill of Sale**, (Form No. 10A) in favor of the Buyers certifying that the vessel is free from all encumbrances, mortgages, maritime liens, taxes and/or any other debt or claims whatsoever duly signed by the director or the Sellers or their duly appointed Attorney and dated. The full name and designation of the signatory to the Bill of Sale to be clearly specified on the Bill of Sale.

2. Original **Transcript of Registry** issued by Korean Ship Registry stating that the vessel's register is free from registered encumbrances, mortgages. This certificate must not be dated more than 3 working days prior to Sellers tendering the Notice of Readiness and must not reference any mortgages, maritime liens, debts, taxes, financial liabilities/obligations whatsoever on the vessel. (If its not in English, the English translation to be notarized). The Sellers and Buyers agreed that the Sellers provide the "Real Estate Register in Korean language + translated in English which should be duly notarized.

3. **Minutes of the Resolutions of the Board of Directors** of the Sellers signed by the Directors of the Sellers resolving the sale of the Vessel in accordance with the terms and conditions of the MOA, approving same and appointing/authorizing the Attorney(s)-in-Fact to, inter alia, execute and deliver the Bill of Sale, the Protocol of Delivery and Acceptance and any other documents required for the legal and physical delivery of the Vessel, and to agree on the quantity of the remaining bunkers, unused lubricating oils

1

[redacted] [redacted]

2. Original Power of Attorney authorizing person to execute the MOA and its Addenda, to execute the delivery documents. To execute the "Protocol of Delivery and Acceptance" with the Sellers, authorize representatives and to complete all formalities of the documentary closing of the vessel for and on behalf of the Buyers

C). Documents to be executed by Sellers and Buyers:

1. Protocol of Delivery and Acceptance to be executed in 3 original copies by Sellers and Buyers authorized representatives at the place of closing and the place of physical delivery stating the date, time and place of the physical delivery of the Vessel.

This addendum No.1 to be deemed as an integrated part of the MOA.

For and on behalf of Buyers:

[redacted]

Name:

Title: bb

For and on behalf of Sellers:

For and on behalf of
Deepika Shipping and \Trading Ltd

[redacted]

Authorized Signature(s)

Name:

Title:

Addendum No. 2

Vessel: **MT "WOO JEONG" (IMO No.8865121)** (hereinafter called the "Vessel")
Sellers: **JY SNP CO., LTD**
Buyers: **DEEPIKA SHIPPING AND TRADING LTD**
New Buyers : **ZHANG RUSHENG**

With reference to the Memorandum of Agreement made on 8th July 2019 by and between the Sellers and the Buyers on the sale of the Vessel (the MOA), it is mutually agreed by both parties as follows:-

DEEPIKA SHIPPING AND TRADING LTD hereby nominate **ZHANG RUSHENG, PASSPORT NO. E38277026** as Buyers of the Vessel and **JY SNP CO., LTD** acknowledge this nomination which is accepted by the Nominee.

1) The Nominee's performance of the MOA is fully guaranteed by **DEEPIKA SHIPPING AND TRADING LTD**

All other terms, conditions and exceptions of the MOA, Addendum No.1 shall remain unchanged and effective in full force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have signed and executed this Addendum No.2 in duplicate this 10th day of July, 2019.

For **JY SNP CO., LTD**

[redacted]

Name:
Title : Attorney – In - Fact

For **DEEPIKA SHIPPING AND TRADING LTD** *For and on behalf of* Deepika Shipping and Trading Ltd

[redacted] *...rized Signature(s)*

Name:
Title : Representative Director

For **ZHANG RUSHENG**

[redacted]

Name:
Title : Director

Source: The Panel

Annex 38c: Export Declaration Certificate

시점확인필
GTSA1740
0004
USD 1165.43
USD 1165.43
UNI-PASS

수출신고필증(수출이행, 갑지)

※ 처리기간 : 즉시

신고자 관세법인 사인 서정남
신고번호 43052-19-070665X
세관.과 030-15
신고일자 2019-07-18
신고구분 H 일반P/L신고
C/S구분 A

수출대행자 주식회사 제이와이엣센피
(통관고유부호) 제이와이-1-18-E-01-9 수출자구분 B
수출화주 (주)영성글로벌
(통관고유부호) 영성글로-1-96-1-01-7
(주소) 부산광역시 중구 대청로 148 (중앙동 2가)
(대표자) [redacted] (소재지) 48957
(사업자등록번호) 604-81-31662

거래구분 11 일반형태
종류 A 일반수출
결제방법 TT 단순송금방식
목적국 CN PR. CHNA
적재항 KRPUS 부산항
선박회사 (항공사)
선박명(항공편명)
출항예정일자
적재예정보세구역 03046000
운송형태 10 BU
검사희망일 2019/07/18
물품소재지 49000 월드씨포트 부산 영도구 해양로 33-52 03099999 /

제조자 미상
(통관고유부호) 제조미상-9-99-9-00-0
제조장소 48957 산업단지부호 999
L/C번호
물품상태 0
사전임시개청통보여부 N
반송 사유

구매자 ZHANG RUSHENG(ON BEHALF OF DEEPIKA SHIPPING ANG TRADING
(구매자부호) CNZHANGR0015R
환급신청인 (1:수출대행자/수출화주, 2:제조자)
자동간이정액환급 NO

• 품명 · 규격 (란번호/총란수 : 001/001)
품명 USED TANKER
거래품명 USED OIL TANKER
상표명

모델 · 규격	성분	수량(단위)	단가(USD)	금액(USD)
	1 란 울지	계속		

세번부호 8901.20-0000
순중량 1,579,000.0 (KG)
수량 1 (U)
신고가격(FOB) $510,000 ₩594,369,300
송품장부호 JY-CI-190715
수입신고번호
원산지 JP---N
포장갯수(종류) 1(GT)
수출요건확인 (발급서류명)

총중량 1,579,000.0 (KG)
총포장갯수 1(GT)
총신고가격 (FOB) $510,000 ₩ 594,369,300
운임(₩) 0
보험료(₩) 0
결제금액 FOB-USD-510,000.00
수입화물 관리번호
컨테이너번호 N

※신고인기재란
세관기재란

BUSAN MAIN CUSTOMS 부산세관 THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

운송(신고)인
기간 부터 까지
적재의무기한 2019/08/17
담당자
신고수리일자 2019/07/18

발 행 번 호 : 2019843317192(2019.07.24) Page : 1/2

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Source: The Panel

Annex 39: *Tae Phyong 2 (fka Ming Zhou 6)* (IMO number: 8602763)

Updated information confirmed the *Ming Zhou 6* was acquired by the DPRK and re-named *Tae Phyong 2* in July 2020. Since then, a Member State reported the *Tae Phyong 2* had returned to deliver DPRK-origin coal in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters and proceeded to load bagged cargo of unknown origin at Longkou port, China. China informed the Panel that " … *Tae Phyong 2* entered Longkou port empty-loaded, and sailed to Nampo port after loading the fertilizers and pesticides".

The Panel reported that the DPRK was suspected to have acquired the formerly China-flagged vessel *Ming Zhou 6* through a joint venture between China and DPRK entities set up to transfer the vessel (IMO: 8602763)[36]. Publicly available information reported the vessel sold around May 2019 for demolition by its owner and operator, Ningbo Marine Co. Ltd. (hereafter, Ningbo Marine). According to a commercial maritime database, the *Ming Zhou* 6 was then recorded as 'broken up'[37].


The vessel was reported sold with a 'scrap ship sale contract'[38] and a May 2019 delivery at Wenzhou Anchorage to Chinese national: Su Jianpo[39]. Two other individuals Chen Jinbao and Weng Mingguo were also reported by the Member State to have been directly involved in the delivery of *Ming Zhou 6* to the DPRK. Information provided by a Member State indicates that the DPRK acquired the vessel by late May 2020 following a joint venture agreement the DPRK-based Jinmyong Trading Corporation (hereafter "Jinmyong Trading") and the China-based Dandong Economic Cooperation Border Maritime Processing Company in November 2019, with Jinmyong Trading acquiring the *Ming Zhou 6* by late May 2020. A second DPRK-based company, Mulgil Trading General Corporation, which has overseas offices in Dandong, China according to the same Member State, helped to facilitate the acquisition.

A specialized maritime AI platform showed the *Ming Zhou 6* with an AIS transmission in May 2019 in Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province before ceasing transmission. A vessel transmitting its identification with the IMO number 8602763 and with the registered owner given as Ningbo Marine was recorded on the same commercial maritime database transmitting AIS on 1 October 2019 (EST) off Pingtan Island, Fujian Province.

China replied that the *Ming Zhou 6's* registration was cancelled in May 2019, with no records of the vessel entering or leaving Chinese ports. The vessel is one of the largest acquired cargo vessels. The vessel was captured on satellite imagery laden with DPRK-origin coal at Nampo in July 2020 (see figure annex 39-1). In March 2021, the vessel was recorded loading bagged cargo of unknown origin at Longkou port, China (see figure annex 39-2).

36 Paragraph 71-72, S/2021/211.
37 IHS Markit
38 *Source*: http://nbmc.com.cn/download.jsp?id=832
39 苏建坡

Figure Annex 39-1: Storyboard of *Ming Zhou 6* ending up in the DPRK, 2019-2020




Source: Member State

Figure Annex 39-2: *Tae P(h)yong 2* (fka *Ming Zhou 6*) loading bagged cargo of unknown origin, Longkou, China, March 2021



Source: Member State

Figure Annex 39-3: ***Tae P(h)yong 2*** **(fka** ***Ming Zhou 6*****) voyage, March 2021**




Source: Windward, Planet Labs, annotated by the Panel
Note: Inset imagery is for location purpose and not reflective of the actual date of capture per the AIS transmission overlay.

Annex 40: *Enterprise* (IMO: 9153331)

The DPRK-associated *Enterprise* has continued to sail and export DPRK-origin coal despite it being suspended from the Togo ship registry since June 2020[40]. In 2021, the *Enterprise* returned to Ningbo-Zhoushan waters (see figures annex 40-1 and 40-2).


Figure Annex 40-1: *Enterprise* alongside other DPRK vessels, Ningbo-Zhoushan, China, 25 March 2021



Source: Member State

[40] S/2021/211.

Figure Annex 40-2: *Enterprise* alongside other DPRK vessels, Ningbo-Zhoushan, China, 5 April 2021



Source: Member State

Panel investigations show a connection between the owners and operators of the *Enterprise* with those of the designated *Jie Shun* (IMO: 8518780).[41]

Networks

The Panel reported that about four months prior to the *Enterprise*'s arrival at Nampo, DPRK, the vessel's ownership and management was transferred to entities with listed addresses in China. Tai Yuan Shipping Co Ltd (hereafter "*Tai Yuan*") was recorded as the vessel's group owner since June 2019, with the vessel's registered owner as Blue Sky Shipping Co Ltd (hereafter "Blue Sky"). Blue Sky is listed in the care of Dalian Taiyuan International Shipping Agency Co Ltd (hereafter "Dalian Taiyuan")[42]. Dalian Taiyuan, the vessel's operator and manager since June 2019, lists an address in Dalian, Liaoning Province[43].

[41] Vessel was designated in October 2017.
[42] IMO website.
[43] Room 2112B , World Trade Center, 25 Tongxing Jie, Zhongshan Qu, Dalian, Liaoning, 116001, China.

Shipping records obtained by the Panel show the managers of *Enterprise* as Dalian Taiyuan with a different address: #32, Wuwu Road, Zhongshan District, in Dalian (see figure annex 40-3). This address has the same co-located building address as Vast Win Trading Limited, the former owner of the designated *Jie Shun*. The *Enterprise's* former owner and operator when it was sailing as *Blue Sky*, Jitsu Limited, also lists the same associated address (see figure annex 40-4), indicating a continued management association despite a change in the names of the entities. Sale documentation of *Blue Sky* when it was purchased by Jitsu Limited, lists a Gu Min as the Jitsu Limited's sole Director (see figure annex 40-5). A "Ms Gu Min" was listed by the Panel has the Director of Bene Star, along with Mr Pan Wei Chao, Director of Pantech Shipping Ltd.; and Mr Li Qi, vice-president of Dalian Shenghao International Trade Ltd, as involved in the export of coal and iron ore from the DPRK[44]. Investigations continue.

Figure Annex 40-3: Last listed operator of *Enterprise* Dalian Taiyuan International Shipping Agency Co Ltd's address



REPUBLIQUE TOGOLAISE
TRAVAIL – LIBERTE – PATRIE

TOGOLESE MARITIME AUTHORITY
INTERNATIONAL SHIP REGISTRY

PROVISIONAL MINIMUM SAFE MANNING CERTIFICATE

Certificate Number: TG/MSM/139-38512/134/FE

TYPE OF SHIP : GENERAL CARGO
OFFICIAL NUMBER : TG-01241L
IMO NUMBER : 9153331
CALL SIGN : 5 V F X 6

NAME OF SHIP	GROSS TONNAGE	MAIN ENGINE'S PROPULSION
ENTERPRISE	4743	2427 KW

It is here by confirmed that having regard the provisions of the regulation V/14(2) of SOLAS 1974 as amended, taking into account the Principles of Safe Manning as contained in IMO Resolution A.1047 (27) related to the Safe Manning and the national requirement of the Togolese Republic, the above mentioned ship is considered safely manned, if whenever proceeds to sea, carries not less than the number and grades of personnel shown in this document, taking into account any special condition stated herein:

DECK AND ENGINE MANNING					
GRADE / CAPACITY	STCW REG.	NR.	GRADE / CAPACITY	STCW REG.	NR.
Master	II/2	1	Chief Engineer	III/3	1
Chief Mate	II/2	1	Second Engineer	III/3	1
Deck Officer(s)	II/1	1	Engineer Officer(s)	III/1	1
Deck Rating(s)-watch or Able seafarer Deck	II/4 or II/5	2	Electro-Technical Officer		
Deck Rating(s)	VI/1	1	Engine Rating(s) watch or Able Seafarer Engine	III/4 or III/5	1
			Electro –Technical Rating	III/7	1
			Engine Rating(s)	VI/1	1

CONDITIONS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT

1. **A minimum of Two (2) Watch keeping deck Officers or one dedicated radio Officer are required to have the appropriate GMDSS Radio operator certificate, General or Restricted, depending upon the ship's intended Area of Operation.**
2. **Trading area : UNRESTRICTED VOYAGE**
3. **Periodically unattended machinery space (Yes / No) : No**
4. **Operating Company: DALIAN TAIYUAN INT'L SHIPPING AGENCY CO., LTD.**
5. **ADDRESS: ROOM 409, ANDA BUSINESS BUILDING, NO.32 WUWU ROAD, HAIJUN SQUARE STREET, ZHONGSHAN DISTRICT, DALIAN CITY, LIAONING PROVINCE, CHINA**

This certificate is issued on the 14TH day of the month JUNE of the year 2019 under the authority of the Directorate of Maritime Affairs of the Government of the Togolese Republic and it remains valid until the [illegible] day of the month DECEMBER of the year 2019

For the International Ship Registry of Togo

[redacted]

Deputy Registrar

Source: Member State

[44] Paragraphs 66-69 and Annex 7, S/2017/150.

Figure Annex 40-4: Former owner and operator of *Enterprise* (sailing as *Blue Sky*), Jitsu Ltd, with a co-located building address with last listed operator of Enterprise, Dalian Taiyuan International Shipping Agency Co Ltd

REPUBLIQUE TOGOLAISE
TRAVAIL – LIBERTE – PATRIE

TOGOLESE MARITIME AUTHORITY
INTERNATIONAL SHIP REGISTRY

FORM 1
CONTINUOUS SYNOPSIS RECORD (CSR)
DOCUMENT NUMBER 08 FOR THE SHIP WITH IMO NUMBER: 9153331

Dates should be in format yyyy/mm/dd.

		Information
1	This document applies from (date):	2018/JULY/20
2	Flag State:	REPUBLIC OF TOGO
3	Date of Registration with the State indicated in 2:	2018/JUNE/20
4	Name of Ship:	BLUE SKY
5	Port of registration:	LOME
6	Name of current registered owner(s): Registered address(es):	JISU LIMITED (100%) UNIT 5, 27/F.,RICHMOND COMM.BLDG.,109 ARGYLE STREET,MONGKOK,KOWLOON,HONG KONG
7	Registered owner Identification Number	5968851
8	If applicable, name of current registered bareboat chatterer(s): Registered address(es):	N/A
9	Name of Company (International Safety Management): Registered address (es): Address(es) of its safety management activities:	JISU LIMITED UNIT 5, 27/F.,RICHMOND COMM.BLDG.,109 ARGYLE STREET,MONGKOK,KOWLOON,HONG KONG #32 WUWU ROAD , ZHONGSHAN DISTRICT,DALIAN,CHINA
10	Company Identification Number	5968851
11	Name of all Classification Societies with which the ship is classed:	UNIVERSAL MARITIME BUREAU CO.,LTD.
12	Administration/Government/Recognized Organization which issued Document of Compliance: Body which carried out audit (if different):	UNIVERSAL MARITIME BUREAU CO.,LTD.
13	Administration/Government/Recognized Organization which issued Safety Management Certificate: Body which carried out audit (if different):	UNIVERSAL MARITIME BUREAU CO.,LTD.
14	Administration/Government/Recognized Organization which issued International Ship Security Certificate: Body which carried out verification (if different):	UNIVERSAL MARITIME BUREAU CO.,LTD.
15	Date on which the ship ceased to be registered with the State indicated in 2:	N/A
16	Remarks	N/A

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT this record is correct in all respects

Issued by the Ship Registrar of the Togolese Directorate of Maritime Affairs

Date of issue: 2018/JULY/20

For the International Ship Registry of Togo
Vera N. Medawar
Registrar
[redacted]

This document was received by the ship and attached to the ship's CSR file on the following date
Date: ________ Signature: ________

Source: Member State

Figure Annex 40-5: Documentation of Jitsu Limited's purchase of *Blue Sky (nka Enterprise)*

BILL OF SALE (Body Corporate)

Form No. 10A

No. 79 A (Sale)

Official Number	Name of Ship	year and port of registry	Whether a sailing, steam or motor ship	Horse power of engines (if any)
IMO: 9153331	DADE DUNHUA	1996, NIL	MOTOR VESSEL	2,427 KW

	Meters	Centimeters	Number of Tons	
			Gross	Net
Length from fore part of stem, to the aft side of the head of the stem post/fore side of the rudder stock(ITC)	84	90		
Main breadth to outside of plating	17	70	4743	2763
Depth in hold from tonnage dock to ceiling amidships	12	00		

and as described in more detail in the Certificate of the Surveyor and the Register Book

We (a) CHINA SHUANGMUFENG SHIPPING CO., LTD (hereinafter called the "Transferors") having our principal place of business at Trust Company Complex, Ajeltake Road, Ajeltake Island, Majuro, Marshall Islands MH96960 in consideration of the sum of US$600,000 (Saying United States Dollars Six Hundred Thousand only) paid to us by (hereinafter called the "Transferees") the Receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, transfer ALL shares in the Ship above particularly described, and in her boats to the Transferees (b) JISU LIMITED with address Unit5, 27/F., Richmond Comm. Bldg., 109 Argyle Street, Mongkok, Kowloon, Hong Kong.

Further, we, the said Transferors for ourselves and our successors covenant with the said Transferees and (c) their assigns, that we have power to transfer in manner aforesaid the premises hereinbefore expressed to be transferred, and that the same are free of all encumbrances, maritime liens, mortgages, arrests, taxes and any other claims whatsoever.
In witness whereof we have hereunto affixed our common seal this……day of June of the year 2018.

For and behalf of the Transferors :

For and on behalf of
CHINA SHUANGMUFENG SHIPPING CO., LTD

By: [redacted]
Title: Director

Authorized Signature(s)

(a) Insert title in FULL of the Body Corporate. (b) Insert name and address in full and description of transferee or transferees. (c) Insert "his", "her" or "their".
(d) If there are subsisting Mortgage, or outstanding Certificate of Mortgage or Sale, add "save as appears by the Registry of the said Ship".
(e) Description of Witnesses: Directors, Secretary, etc. (as the case may be)

NOTE: - A purchaser of a registered British Vessel does not obtain a complete title until the Bill of Sale has been recorded at the Port of Registry of the ship; and neglect of this precaution may entail serious consequences
NOTE: - Registered Owners or Mortgagees are reminded of the importance of keeping the Registrar of British Ships informed of any case of residence on their part

ACCEPTANCE OF SALE

PARTICULARS OF THE VESSEL		
Registration No: 48800-17		Name of Vessel: DADE DUNHUA
Port of Registry: PANAMA		Type of Vessel: GENERAL CARGO SHIP
HP of Engine if any: 2427KW		Length: 84.90
Recorded in	Tonnage	Breadth: 17.70
Book	Gross: 4743	Depth: 12.00
Page	Net: 2763	*and as described in more details in the certificate of the surveyor and Register Book*
Entry	Underdeck	

ACCEPTANCE OF SALE

The undersigned GU MIN on behalf of and representing the Corporation named **JISU LIMITED** In the above Bill of Sale, in my position as DIRECOTR of the said Corporation. HEREBY ACCEPT for all legal purposes the sale and transfer effected by the said Bill of Sale to the said corporation by **CHINA SHUANGMUFENG SHIPPING CO., LTD** of the VESSEL **M/V DADE DUNHUA (TBN: M/V BLUE SKY)** referred to in the attached Bill of Sale.

Dated the 14TH *day of* JUNE, 2018

GU MIN AS DIRECTOR [redacted]

Name & Signature of PURCHASERS

*Remark : Applicant should record with ship's actual corresponding data.

Source: The Panel

Annex 41: DPRK documents related to Fishing Rights Transfer

According to information provided by a Member State, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues to sell fishing rights to a third country. Investigations carried out by the relevant authorities of that Member State on separate deployments of third country fishing fleets to and from the DPRK waters have revealed the following:

DPRK issued Fishing Rights Certificate and Insurance Policy

In January 2020, the Member State's Coast Guard conducted inspections on fishing fleets moving southward from DPRK waters and obtained several official documents, including a fishing rights certificate and insurance policy issued by the Korea National Insurance Corporation of DPRK, a United Nations-designated entity (KPe.048).





Fishing Rights Certificate ***Insurance Policy***


Source: Member State

It is stipulated in the fishing rights certificate that the initial "Term of fishing fill", the period for permitted fishing, was May to December 2019. An additional period for permitted fishing, January 1 to 15 2020, was added by handwriting. The insurance policy was issued in May 2019.

In May 2020, the Member State's Coast Guard was informed by radio from a fishing fleet heading towards DPRK waters that approximately 200 fishing vessels were engaged in fishing in DPRK waters. Some crew members of these fishing vessels mentioned that they would receive DPRK fishing rights certificates and fuel upon arrival in DPRK waters at a spot designated by DPRK officials.

"Punishment Work Area" and Guidelines for Fishing in the Area

In November 2020, inspections were carried out on several fishing vessels leaving southwards from DPRK waters due to deteriorating weather conditions. During these inspections, the Member State's Coast Guard obtained a DPRK map illustrating what was literally called a "punishment work area"[45], which included several inspection points and routes to enter/exit the area, and a guideline [46] for fishing activities in the area. These documents were issued by DPRK's Coast Guard and Emergency Disinfection Unit[47].





Map of the "Area" with Coordinates



Issued Guideline

Source : Member State

The first paragraph of the guideline reads "In respect to the dangers posed by (a third country's fishing vessels) to the DPRK regarding the <<New Coronavirus>> which is the gravest threat to the whole world and humanity, the (third country's) fishing vessels, who undergo punishment activities under the strict surveillance of the DPRK Coast Guard and Emergency Disinfection Unit, should strictly abide by the following administrative rules."

45 처벌작업구역 (in Korean)

46 The guideline appears to be administrative rules for the third country's fishing fleets to follow when fishing in DPRK waters.

47 조선민주주의인민공화국 해양경비대, 조선민주주의인민공화국 비상방역대 (in Korean)

The crew members of the inspected fishing vessels mentioned that fishing was allowed in that area only when it was permitted by the DPRK authorities. The Member State assessed that due to COVID-19, the fishing vessels and their crew members were seemingly required to undergo disinfection measures as a precondition to fishing under the strict surveillance of the DPRK authorities.

The Panel has reviewed the Korean language guidelines and finds it difficult to conclude why the area is called a “punishment work area”. However, fishing activity appears to be strictly restricted to this area and fishing vessels may only enter the area to fish with DPRK permission and some form of COVID-19 disinfection measures. There would be consequences – including as a form of “punishiment”, seizure of vessels, confiscation of fishing gear and the vessels’ catch, imposition of fines, and deportation – for fishing vessels which did not follow these strict guidelines.

Annex 42: China's reply to the Panel

2. Fishing rights (OC.175)

China's fishing authority and relevant coastal provinces have taken measures to strengthen management and demand the fishing companies and fishermen to strictly follow the Security Council resolutions. China's position on illegal acquiring fishing rights is clear, that is, such activities, once verified, will be dealt with in accordance with laws and regulations.

According to China's investigation, no substantial evidence was found on the alleged involvement of General Association of Koreans in China and Weihai Peninsula Vessel Fuel Co., Ltd.. The information provided by the Panel, which is based solely on fragmented reports from certain media, could not serve as basis for us to carry out in-depth investigation. China hopes the Panel does not include relevant information in its report.

Source : Member State

Annex 43: Coal exports by DPRK vessels in 2020[48]

In 2020, a Member State reported at least 4.8 million metric tons of coal and possibly other sanctioned minerals in 636 shipments to China, using a mix of ship-to-ship transfers in Chinese territorial waters and direct shipments aboard China-flagged coastal barges. DPRK-flagged and controlled vessels accounted for 58% of exports by volume, with these vessels offloading 96% of their coal via ship-to-ship transfer at Ningbo-Zhoushan Port, China. The remaining ship-to-ship transfer area took place in Chinese waters in the Lianyungang area. 42% of exported DPRK-origin coal were directly delivered by China-flagged coastal barges that picked up coal at DPRK ports and delivered the coal to Chinese ports primarily along the Yangtze River.

Table Annex 43: Shipment breakdown of the DPRK's maritime coal exports in 2020.

Vessel Type	Number of Shipments	Metric Tons Exported	Percentage
DPRK-controlled fleet	441	2,770,000	58%
China-flagged coastal barges	195	2,037,000	42%
Total	**636**	**4,807,000**	100%

Source: Member State


[48] Two experts expressed the view that the data in this annex needs to be further verified.

Annex 44: Ship-to-ship transfers of coal by DPRK vessels, Ningbo-Zhoushan, China

The 26 DPRK-flagged and DPRK associated vessels in the Ningbo-Zhoushan area on 5 April 2021 referenced in the Panel's report at paragraph 89, figure 12, were assessed by a Member State to have offloaded DPRK-origin coal via ship-to-ship transfers in Chinese territorial waters. Many of these vessels that have been featured in the Panel's past reports illicitly exporting coal to China since at least 2018.

The Panel's reports have also referenced the presence of DPRK vessels and of DPRK-origin coal transfers assessed to have taken place near or at a number of Chinese port jurisdictions, including near the Ningbo-Zhoushan area. figure annex 44 shows the various anchorages where DPRK vessels congregated between February and May 2021, with the higher density clusters near: Ma'an Liedao, Maji Shan, Qushan Dao, Daxizhai Dao, the Zhoushan Archipelago, and Zhujiajian Dao. These located waters have been highlighted in previous Panel reports[49] for the DPRK's export of its coal through ship-to-ship transfers to local vessels.

Figure Annex 44: DPRK vessels and DPRK associated vessels at anchor in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters, February to May 2021



Source: Member State

[49] S/2020/840 and S/2021/211.

The Panel wrote to China requesting information on the DPRK vessels present in Chinese waters, the identifiers they were transmitting under, these vessels' cargo, any ship-to-ship transfers conducted in Chinese waters with the type and amount of cargo offloaded, information on the receiving vessels' identities along with the entities and individuals that operated the receiving vessels and the offloaded coal cargo's end destination.

China responded:

(6) OC.74

The Panel's letter claimed that 26 DPRK-flagged and DPRK-associated vessels appeared in the Ningbo-Zhoushan area on 5

April, 2021. Relevant Chinese authorities conducted investigation accordingly. The 10 vessels with IMO number did not enter Chinese ports around 5 April 2021. Among these 10 vessels, *Kum Jing Gang* and *Un Bong 2* submitted port-entry requests to Dalian and Yantai respectively, but in fact they did not enter ports. Regarding the other 16 vessels without IMO number, China could not check their information as China is not the flag state of these vessels.

China attaches great importance to DPRK-related smuggling activities through ship-to-ship transfers. Relevant Chinese authorities have overcome numerous difficulties including the pandemic-related restrictions, done a great deal of job, and conducted careful investigation and verification on every single letter from the Panel. China hopes the Panel treats China's feedback in a prudent manner, and does not include in its report information which is unverified or inconsistent with the facts.

Source: Member State

Annex 45: Imagery of DPRK vessels in patrolled waters

This annex is confidential.


Annex 46: DPRK vessels exporting prohibited coal and importing humanitarian cargo in a single voyage

Of the 26 DPRK-associated cargo vessels that were anchored outside of Nampo Lock Gate as on 11 May 2021 (see figure 14, paragraph 99 of this report's maritime section), several of the vessels returned from Ningbo-Zhoushan empty after delivering North Korea-origin coal, according to a Member State. Half of the vessels returned from other Chinese ports, mostly Longkou Port, possibly with humanitarian aid such as fertilizer and foodstuffs. Some of those vessels, such as the DPRK-flagged *Tae Phyong 2* (IMO: 8602763), delivered coal to Ningbo-Zhoushan before transiting to Longkou. Most of these vessels will likely continue to wait before being allowed to offload cargo at Nampo or other ports along the Taedong River[51].

DPRK-flagged *Ko San* (IMO: 9110236)

Based on data sourced from maritime databases and Member State information, the DPRK vessel *Ko San* (IMO: 9110236) departed Chongjin, DPRK, by 29 May 2020. The *Ko San* dropped its AIS transmission around 3 June 2020 whilst east of Jeju Island, Republic of Korea, before retransmitting around 28 June 2020 as it approached Dalian, China. According to a Member State, the *Ko San* arrived at Ningbo-Zhoushan waters by 7 June 2020 and offloaded its coal cargo by 18 June 2020. Figure annex 46-1 showed the *Ko San* at anchor in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters alongside other DPRK vessels on 17 June 2020.

Figure Annex 46-1: *Ko San* in Ningbo-Zhoushan, China, 17 June 2020



Source: Member State


[51] For instance, the DPRK-flagged *Mi Yang 5* (IMO: 8620454) was reported to have waited outside of Nampo lock gate for around 100 days before entering to offload cargo on 11 May. The DPRK-flagged *Yon Pung 3* (IMO: 8314811) waited for 124 days before entering the lock gate with cargo it loaded at Longkou Port.

According to a Member State, humanitarian aid cargo for delivery to DPRK was loaded onto the *Ko San* at Dalian, China, on and around 1 July 2020. Information on commercial maritime database platforms show the *Ko San* arrived at Dalian port by 3 July 2020, with a draft change that indicated cargo was loaded onto the vessel. The vessel last transmitted an AIS signal in July 2020. In 5 April 2021, the vessel was back in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters by 5 April 2021 carrying DPRK-origin coal.

<u>DPRK-flagged *Min Hae* (IMO: 8672897)</u>


In the first week of March 2021, the DPRK-flagged *Min Hae* (IMO: 8672897) departed the DPRK with coal cargo for Ningbo-Zhoushan waters and then proceeded to call at Longkou Port before returning to the DPRK (see figure annex 46-2). The port information and tracking data from Longkou available to the Panel is at figure annex 46-3.

Figure Annex 46-2: Storyboard of DPRK-flagged *Min Hae's* (IMO: 8672897) voyage to export DPRK-origin coal and import humanitarian aid cargo in a single voyage, March to April 2021



Source: Member State

Figure Annex 46-3: *Min Hae* at Longkou port area, China, 23 April 2021



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel; Google Earth (insert satellite imagery as representative of the port location not by actual date; AIS signal overlay as on 23 April 2021)


<u>DPRK-flagged *Thae Song 8* (IMO: 9003653)</u>

The DPRK-flagged *Thae Song 8* (IMO: 9003653) was another vessel located outside Nampo Lockgate as on 11 May 2021 that exported DPRK-origin coal to Ningbo-Zhoushan waters and returned with humanitarian aid cargo. The Panel had reported the *Thae Song 8*, then sailing as *Forever Lucky*, exporting illicit DPRK-origin coal as far back as 2017.

The Panel's tracking records of the vessel indicated that prior to its arrival at Ningbo-Zhoushan waters, *Thae Song 8* had not transmitted on its AIS for at least seven months since August 2020. On 15 March 2021, the vessel was recorded on satellite imagery near Zhujiajian Dao, China, with coal in its holds, and within vicinity of other DPRK and DPRK-associated vessels (see figure annex 46-4). *Thae Song 8* was again located around a week later in another part of Ningbo-Zhoushan waters near Daxizhai Dao, China (see figure annex 46-5). A day earlier, the Chinese coast guard patrol craft was recorded transiting close by, along with eight other DPRK vessels located within vicinity. By 6 April 2021, *Thae Song 8* appeared berthed at the Longkou Terminal based on its AIS transmissions on a specialized commercial maritime tracking platform. By mid-April 2021, the vessel was back in the DPRK outside of Nampo Lockgate[52] (see figure annex 46-6).


[52] The vessel last transmitted on 21 April 2021, information as of 30 June 2021.

Figure Annex 46-4: ***Thae Song 8*** **near Zhujiajian Dao, Ningbo-Zhoushan, 15 March 2021**




Source: Member State

Figure Annex 46-5: ***Thae Song 8*** **near Daxizhai Dao, Ningbo-Zhoushan, 23 March 2021**



Source: Member State

Figure Annex 46-6: *Thae Song 8* located at Longkou Terminal, China, 6 April 2021



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel; Google Earth (insert satellite imagery as representative of the port location not by actual date; AIS signal overlay as on 6 April 2021

The Panel sought China's assistance on information of the activity of each of 26 DPRK vessel at figure 14, information on which of these vessels had off-loaded DPRK-origin coal or other banned commodities through ship-to-ship transfers in Chinese territorial waters in 2021, information on which vessels were involved in the transportation of DPRK-origin coal that also picked up humanitarian cargo at Chinese ports, as well as information on any barter trade in sanctioned DPRK coal exports in exchange for grain or other imports from China.

China responded:


(3) OC.76, OC.156

Thae Song 8, Min Hae, and *Tae Phyong 2* entered Longkou port empty-loaded, and sailed to Nampo port after loading fertilizers and pesticide. *Ko San* entered Dalian Beiliang port empty-loaded and left after loading rice. China did not find these vessels smuggling coal within Chinese territorial waters and had no reason for prohibiting them from entering ports empty-loaded and loading humanitarian cargo.

Source : Member State

Source : the Panel

Annex 47: DPRK-flagged vessels laden with coal, Taean Port, DPRK, 4 April 2021



Source : Member State

Annex 48: ITC Trade Map Data on DPRK Trade Statistics by Commodity (HS Code) (2020)

Source : ITC Trade Map / Unit : thousand USD

Total Exports : 156,867

HS CODE	Commodity type	Export Value
85	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles	50,148
72	Iron and steel	21,805
27	Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes	11,993
39	Plastics and articles thereof	9,847
84	Machinery, mechanical appliances, nuclear reactors, boilers; parts thereof	7,390
91	Clocks and watches and parts thereof	6,817
87	Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof	6,371
26	Ores, slag and ash	5,624
38	Miscellaneous chemical products	5,242
30	Pharmaceutical products	4,387
99	Commodities not elsewhere specified	3,842
90	Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof	2,851
67	Prepared feathers and down and articles made of feathers or of down; artificial flowers; articles of human hair	2,480
76	Aluminium and articles thereof	2,192

Total Imports : 558,071

HS CODE	Commodity Type	Import Value
15	Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes	84,343
24	Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes	39943
11	Products of the milling industry; malt; starches; inulin; wheat gluten	38,720
39	Plastics and articles thereof	36,041
17	Sugars and sugar confectionery	35,106
30	Pharmaceutical products	25,351
40	Rubber and articles thereof	24,478
29	Organic chemicals	18,076
27	Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes	17,877
54	Man-made filaments; strip and the like of man-made textile materials	17,283
10	Cereals	16,679
48	Paper and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard	15,825
28	Inorganic chemicals; organic or inorganic compounds of precious metals, of rare-earth metals, of radioactive elements or of isotopes	15,500
55	Man-made staple fibres	10,368

[yellow box] : may include restricted HS Code commodities

HS CODE	Commodity type	Export Value
29	Organic chemicals	1,906
40	Rubber and articles thereof	1,244
28	Inorganic chemicals; organic or inorganic compounds of precious metals, of rare-earth metals, of radioactive elements or of isotopes	1,167
22	Beverages, spirits and vinegar	1,046
95	Toys, games and sports requisites; parts and accessories thereof	786
64	Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such articles	702
48	Paper and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard	660
79	Zinc and articles thereof	641
73	Articles of iron or steel	636
96	Miscellaneous manufactured articles	584
31	Fertilisers	515
92	Musical instruments; parts and accessories of such articles	453
59	Impregnated, coated, covered or laminated textile fabrics; textile articles of a kind suitable for industrial use	448
61	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted	390

HS CODE	Commodity Type	Import Value
91	Clocks and watches and parts thereof	8,875
8	Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melons	8,266
94	Furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions and similar stuffed furnishings; lamps and lighting fittings, not elsewhere specified or included; illuminated signs, illuminated nameplates and the like; prefabricated buildings	8,002
56	Wadding, felt and nonwovens; special yarns; twine, cordage, ropes and cables and articles thereof	7,600
34	Soap, organic surface-active agents, washing preparations, lubricating preparations, artificial waxes, prepare waxes, polishing or scouring preparations, candles and similar articles, modelling pastes, 'dental waxes' and dental preparations with a basis of plaster	7,063
69	Ceramic products	6,934
21	Miscellaneous edible preparations	6,158
90	Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof	6,051
60	Knitted or crocheted fabrics	5,855
64	Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such articles	5,700
31	Fertilisers	5,471
3	Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates	5,137
61	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted	4,759
22	Beverages, spirits and vinegar	4,545

: may include restricted HS Code commodities

HS CODE	Commodity type	Export Value
3	Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates	364
33	Essential oils and resinoids; perfumery, cosmetic or toilet preparations	341
70	Glass and glassware	330
49	Printed books, newspapers, pictures and other products of the printing industry; manuscripts, typescripts and plans	319
24	Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes	255
34	Soap, organic surface-active agents, washing preparations, lubricating preparations, artificial waxes, prepared waxes, polishing or scouring preparations, candles and similar articles, modelling pastes, 'dental waxes' and dental preparations with a basis of plaster	228
94	Furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions and similar stuffed furnishings; lamps and lighting fittings, not elsewhere specified or included; illuminated signs, illuminated nameplates and the like; prefabricated buildings	221
83	Miscellaneous articles of base metal	200
63	Other made-up textile articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags	199
74	Copper and articles thereof	185
56	Wadding, felt and nonwovens; special yarns; twine, cordage, ropes and cables and articles thereof	184
16	Preparations of meat, of fish or of crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates	175
55	Man-made staple fibres	147

HS CODE	Commodity Type	Import Value
96	Miscellaneous manufactured articles	4,025
32	Tanning or dyeing extracts; tannins and their derivatives; dyes, pigments and other colouring matter; paints and varnishes; putty and other mastics; inks	3,836
38	Miscellaneous chemical products	3,729
4	Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey; edible products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included	3,725
63	Other made-up textile articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags	3,578
44	Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal	3,512
35	Albuminoidal substances; modified starches; glues; enzymes	3,425
59	Impregnated, coated, covered or laminated textile fabrics; textile articles of a kind suitable for industrial use	3,225
16	Preparations of meat, of fish or of crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates	2,964
67	Prepared feathers and down and articles made of feathers or of down; artificial flowers; articles of human hair	2,919
70	Glass and glassware	2,870
'33	Essential oils and resinoids; perfumery, cosmetic or toilet preparations	2,547
'23	Residues and waste from the food industries; prepared animal fodder	2,317

(yellow box) : may include restricted HS Code commodities

HS CODE	Commodity type	Export Value
82	Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal; parts thereof of base metal	137
60	Knitted or crocheted fabrics	136
32	Tanning or dyeing extracts; tannins and their derivatives; dyes, pigments and other colouring matter; paints and varnishes; putty and other mastics; inks	134
69	Ceramic products	114
17	Sugars and sugar confectionery	112
54	Man-made filaments; strip and the like of man-made textile materials	107
46	Manufactures of straw, of esparto or of other plaiting materials; basketware and wickerwork	92
21	Miscellaneous edible preparations	91
19	Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk; pastrycooks' products	67
68	Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar materials	67
42	Articles of leather; saddlery and harness; travel goods, handbags and similar containers; articles of animal gut (other than silkworm gut)	59
86	Railway or tramway locomotives, rolling stock and parts thereof; railway or tramway track fixtures and fittings and parts thereof; mechanical (including electromechanical) traffic signalling equipment of all kinds	54
41	Raw hides and skins (other than furskins) and leather	45
65	Headgear and parts thereof	44
52	Cotton	39
7	Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers	31
62	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted	28

HS CODE	Commodity Type	Import Value
'52	Cotton	2,170
'95	Toys, games and sports requisites; parts and accessories thereof	2,153
'19	Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk; pastrycooks' products	2,016
26	Ores, slag and ash	1,942
58	Special woven fabrics; tufted textile fabrics; lace; tapestries; trimmings; embroidery	1,723
62	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted	1,598
9	Coffee, tea, maté and spices	1,503
68	Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar materials	1,460
7	Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers	1,423
2	Meat and edible meat offal	1,377
84	Machinery, mechanical appliances, nuclear reactors, boilers; parts thereof	1,344
51	Wool, fine or coarse animal hair; horsehair yarn and woven fabric	1,237
99	Commodities not elsewhere specified	1,142
47	Pulp of wood or of other fibrous cellulosic material; recovered (waste and scrap) paper or paperboard	1,090
18	Cocoa and cocoa preparations	977
20	Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other parts of plants	668
87	Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof	537

[yellow box] : may include restricted HS Code commodities

HS CODE	Commodity type	Export Value
66	Umbrellas, sun umbrellas, walking sticks, seat-sticks, whips, riding-crops and parts thereof	27
71	Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals, metals clad with precious metal, and articles thereof; imitation jewellery; coin	20
8	Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melons	19
5	Products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included	14
58	Special woven fabrics; tufted textile fabrics; lace; tapestries; trimmings; embroidery	14
47	Pulp of wood or of other fibrous cellulosic material; recovered (waste and scrap) paper or paperboard	14
12	Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit; industrial or medicinal plants; straw and fodder	13
35	Albuminoidal substances; modified starches; glues; enzymes	12
20	Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other parts of plants	10
15	Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes	9
6	Live trees and other plants; bulbs, roots and the like; cut flowers and ornamental foliage	8
89	Ships, boats and floating structures	8
36	Explosives; pyrotechnic products; matches; pyrophoric alloys; certain combustible preparations	5
53	Other vegetable textile fibres; paper yarn and woven fabrics of paper yarn	5

HS CODE	Commodity Type	Import Value
85	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles	495
74	Copper and articles thereof	462
25	Salt; sulphur; earths and stone; plastering materials, lime and cement	399
66	Umbrellas, sun umbrellas, walking sticks, seat-sticks, whips, riding-crops and parts thereof	394
71	Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals, metals clad with precious metal, and articles thereof; imitation jewellery; coin	360
92	Musical instruments; parts and accessories of such articles	359
78	Lead and articles thereof	350
42	Articles of leather; saddlery and harness; travel goods, handbags and similar containers; articles of animal gut (other than silkworm gut)	330
53	Other vegetable textile fibres; paper yarn and woven fabrics of paper yarn	293
57	Carpets and other textile floor coverings	220
5	Products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included	175
12	Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit; industrial or medicinal plants; straw and fodder	153
14	Vegetable plaiting materials; vegetable products not elsewhere specified or included	153
65	Headgear and parts thereof	133

[yellow box] : may include restricted HS Code commodities

HS CODE	Commodity type	Export Value
25	Salt; sulphur; earths and stone, plastering materials, lime and cement	2
9	Coffee, tea, maté and spices	2

HS CODE	Commodity Type	Import Value
41	Raw hides and skins (other than furskins) and leather	121
37	Photographic or cinematographic goods	120
76	Aluminium and articles thereof	108
73	Articles of iron or steel	93
72	Iron and steel	61
6	Live trees and other plants; bulbs, roots and the like; cut flowers and ornamental foliage	51
43	Furskins and artificial fur; manufactures thereof	49
1	Live animals	37
82	Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal; parts thereof of base metal	30
97	Works of art, collectors' pieces and antiques	25
46	Manufactures of straw, of esparto or of other plaiting materials; basketware and wickerwork	18
13	Lac; gums, resins and other vegetable saps and extracts	13
49	Printed books, newspapers, pictures and other products of the printing industry; manuscripts, typescripts and plans	8
36	Explosives; pyrotechnic products; matches; pyrophoric alloys; certain combustible preparations	6
86	Railway or tramway locomotives, rolling stock and parts thereof; railway or tramway track fixtures and fittings and parts thereof; mechanical (including electromechanical) traffic signalling equipment of all kinds	5
83	Miscellaneous articles of base metal	3

[yellow box] : may include restricted HS Code commodities

Source : ITC Trade Map, annotated by the Panel

Annex 49: The Panel's template of enquiry for trade and customs

The Panel is writing to you with regard to the implementation of sanctions measures in the area of trade, including the export to and import from the DPRK, as stipulated in the above resolutions. Through them, the Security Council decided that the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft certain items and that all States shall prohibit the procurement from the DPRK of certain items by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK (see Annexes x, x and x). The Security Council furthermore requires all States to inspect all cargo to and from the DPRK, and stipulates that all prohibited items should be seized and disposed of when identified in inspections, in paragraph 18 of resolution 2270 (2016) and paragraph 20 of resolution 2397 (2017), respectively.

The Panel notes that Member States, while dutifully carrying out their obligations under the relevant resolutions, may occasionally face the challenge of having to determine whether certain items are prohibited from transfer to and/or from the DPRK by relevant resolutions, resulting in different practices in sanctions implementation among Member States.

In its effort to gather accurate trade data, especially in view of frequently observed discrepancies between the original national trade data and information published through open source trade databases such as ITC Trade Map, and to promote the best practices in the implementation of the relevant resolutions across Member States, the Panel would like to request relevant authorities of your country to provide the following information for the period of 2020 and 2021(1st quarter):

1) Integrated national data on trade with the DPRK, including the number of deliveries, commodities and their HS codes, as well as involved entities and individuals;
2) Please stipulate separately the recorded transactions in case they do not correspond to the standards set in the above-mentioned resolutions (please use the commodity list in the Annexes with the guidance to appropriately determine the cases of prohibited HS codes) with special attention to country codes;
3) Information regarding any cases of rejection of customs clearance or seizure of goods with the DPRK as a country of destination/consignment or transit;
4) Information regarding any cases of rejection of customs clearance or seizure of goods originating from the DPRK as a country of origin or manufacture;
5) For each of the above, please include the description of the goods, where possible as per contracts for delivery and other relevant documentation, HS codes of commodities, their quantity, prices and, where possible, copies of such documents;
6) The names, addresses and contact information of all entities and individuals involved in these transactions, and information on possible prior exports and imports involving the same entities; and
7) Any other relevant information and/or action taken by your customs authorities pursuant to obligations stemming from the above-mentioned resolutions.

The Panel would welcome any other information that you might consider relevant to its work as mandated by the Security Council in this regard. In addition, the Panel would like to assure you that any information you may consider confidential can be handled accordingly and used solely for the information of the Security Council and the 1718 Committee.

Source: the Panel

Annex 50: Comparison table of International Trade Statistics (2020) and replies provided by Members States on trade with the DPRK

** Note: DPRK Trade Statistics cover the period of 2020, while Member State's reply may cover not only 2020 but also 1st quarter of 2021.

* Unit : Thousand US$

No.	Member State(MS)	Trade Volume w/ DPRK(2020)		Restricted HS Code Trade w/ DPRK		MS's Reply
		Export to	Import from	Export to	Import from	
1	Armenia, Republic of	0	42		1(HS Code 59) 9(HS Code 84) 4(HS Code 85)	
2	Austria, Republic of	186	1			Nothing Applicable / No cases / Exports granted by the 1718 Comm. upon request of IFRC
3	Barbados	118	825		8(HS Code 56) 18(HS Code 61) 55(HS Code 84) 523(HS Code 85) 5(HS Code 89)	
4	Belize	0	6			Nothing Applicable / No cases
5	Bermuda	1	154		2(HS Code 84) 90(HS Code 85)	
6	Bolivia, Plurinational State of	679	389		147(HS Code 72) 27(HS Code 84) 37(HS Code 85)	
7	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0	88		13(HS Code 84) 2(HS Code 85)	
8	Botswana, Republic of	0	1		1(HS Code 84)	
9	Brazil, Federative Republic of	93	16	1(HS Code 85) 1(HS Code 72)	2(HS Code 58) 13(HS Code 84)	
10	Brunei Darussalam, Negara	0	462		5(HS Code 72) 1(HS Code 73) 38(HS Code 52) 1(HS Code 54) 15(HS Code 8) 9(HS Code 84) 236(HS Code 85) 2(HS Code 25)	
11	Bulgaria, Republic of	674	29			Nothing Applicable / No cases / relevant goods were nutritional additives
12	Cambodia, Kingdom of	47	78		14(HS Code 73) 16(HS Code 84)	
13	Canada	0	87		9(HS Code 74) 1(HS Code 61) 2(HS Code 63) 16(HS Code 84) 6(HS Code 85)	Nothing Applicable / No cases / Previous correspondence on July 2, 2020 regarding miscoding by Canadian statistical agencies
14	China, People's Republic of	491,059	48,001	2,559(HS Code 2710) 1,772(HS Code 2713) 31(HS Code 2712) 14(HS Code 2711) 316(HS Code 84) 122(HS Code 85) 468(HS Code 87) 19(HS Code 73) 17(HS Code 82)	11,499(HS Code 72) 14(HS Code 73) 5(HS Code 53) 2(HS Code 62) 6(HS Code 63)	ITC statistics are different from China's official figure mainly because ITC regards commodities produced in China and exported to 3rd party and then transferred to the DPRK as Chinese export to the DPRK / This is inconsistent with facts and the ITC does not update and correct their data in a timely manner

No.	Member State(MS)	Trade Volume w/ DPRK(2020)		Restricted HS Code Trade w/ DPRK		MS's Reply
		Export to	Import from	Export to	Import from	
15	Colombia, Republic of	761	630		7(HS Code 73) 118(HS Code 84) 38(HS Code 85)	Imports (HS Code 73, 84, 85) fall under restricted category / made additional enquiry and waiting of reply
16	Costa Rica, Republic of	0	2,361		11(HS Code 61)	Typing Error of Numerical Country Code
17	Czech Republic	0	87		1(HS Code 72) 2(HS Code 63) 1(HS Code 84) 6(HS Code 85)	
18	Denmark, Kingdom of	16	62		1(HS Code 73) 2(HS Code 84)	
19	Democratic Republic of Congo	7,079	516		33(HS Code 73) 9(HS Code 84)	
20	Egypt, Arab Republic of	133	0			Nothing Applicable / No cases No items that fall under the prohibited customs classification were traded with DPRK
21	El Salvador, Republic of	0	192		2(HS Code 63) 64(HS Code 84)	Trade was with ROK where mistake was made by the companies when reporting to customs systems / has not carried out trade with DPRK
22	Estonia, Republic of	0	17		17(HS Code 85)	Nothing Applicable / No cases
23	Ethiopia, Federal Democratic Republic of	8	3,637		1,827(HS Code 72) 100(HS Code 79) 509(HS Code 84) 158(HS Code 85)	
24	Finland, Republic of	0	1			Nothing Applicable / No cases
25	Gambia, Islamic Republic of the	0	61		3(HS Code 8) 2(HS Code 84)	
26	Georgia	463	726	344(HS Code 74)	49(HS Code 2710) 87(HS Code 72) 13(HS Code 73) 39(HS Code 3) 230(HS Code 84) 46(HS Code 85)	No trade conducted with the DPRK / referred to country code of DPRK instead of ROK
27	Germany, Federal Republic of	1,083	798	10(HS Code 84)	5(HS Code 59) 205(HS Code 61) 5(HS Code 62) 1(HS Code 63) 23(HS Code 7) 2(HS Code 84) 20(HS Code 85)	Individual actors erroneously referred to DPRK although the country of origin was ROK
28	Greece (Hellenic Republic)	19	0			Nothing Applicable / No cases
29	Guatemala, Republic of	0	21		3(HS Code 59) 4(HS Code 84)	Goods purchased by the importer were from ROK not from DPRK (erroneous input of country code)

No.	Member State(MS)	Trade Volume w/ DPRK(2020)		Restricted HS Code Trade w/ DPRK		MS's Reply
		Export to	Import from	Export to	Import from	
30	Guyana, Republic of	69	1,264	27(HS Code 72)	63(HS Code 72) 27(HS Code 73) 1,106(HS Code 84) 20(HS Code 85)	No trade with DPRK / erroneous record due to logging errors / competent authorities are introducing a Risk Profiel System in the ASYCUDA World System
31	Hungary	2	5		3(HS Code 84)	Export and Imports with DPRK were medicine ingredients and dental instruments respectively / No trade with DPRK on restricted commodities
32	India, Republic of	4,337	1,926	15(HS Code 2712) 37(HS Code 84) 34(HS Code 87) 33(HS Code 72)	166(HS Code 72) 12(HS Code 73) 115(HS Code 74) 47(HS Code 56) 34(HS Code 59) 3(HS Code 62) 7(HS Code 63) 684(HS Code 84) 132(HS Code 85)	
33	Indonesia, Republic of	1	770		18(HS Code 72) 2(HS Code 73) 319(HS Code 79) 5(HS Code 59) 29(HS Code 84) 1(HS Code 85)	Undergoing internal investigations and will provide more information
34	Italy, Republic of	167	63	139(HS Code 84) 26(HS Code 76)	2(HS Code 72)	
35	Kazakhstan, Republic of	0	3			Nothing Applicable / No cases
36	Kyrgyz Republic	0	39		7(HS Code 73) 28(HS Code 84) 1(HS Code 85)	Data is inaccurate / As a result of audit, assigned DPRK country code instead of ROK
37	Luxembourg, Grand Duchy of	2	5,127	2(HS Code 85)	4(HS Code 3) 6(HS Code 1604) 1(HS Code 59) 7(HS Code 7) 1(HS Code 8) 427(HS Code 84) 4,605(HS Code 85)	No registered trade with the DPRK / cases of erroneous encoding
38	Madagascar, Republic of	0	959		24(HS Code 63) 54(HS Code 84)	
39	Moldova, Republic of	0	21		17(HS Code 72) 2(HS Code 84)	
40	Mozambique, Republic of	350	4,365	350(HS Code 78)	1(HS Code 2710) 1(HS Code 72) 1(HS Code 73) 221(HS Code 79) 312(HS Code 3) 27(HS Code 54) 85(HS Code 55) 30(HS Code 63) 154(HS Code 84) 37(HS Code 85)	
41	Myanmar, Republic of the Union of	0	24,190		853(HS Code 72) 23,314(HS Code 85)	

No.	Member State(MS)	Trade Volume w/ DPRK(2020)		Restricted HS Code Trade w/ DPRK		MS's Reply
		Export to	Import from	Export to	Import from	
42	Namibia, Republic of	0	28		2(HS Code 84) 20(HS Code 85)	
43	Netherlands, Kingdom of the	269	558		40(HS Code 84)	Had exports from and imports to DPRK but none of these goods fell under the (restricted) HS codes of relevant resolutions
44	Nigeria, Federal Republic of	0	6,609		21(HS Code 73) 32(HS Code 59) 59(HS Code 63) 996(HS Code 84) 589(HS Code 85)	
45	North Macedonia, Republic of	0	546		31(HS Code 72) 1(HS Code 74) 7(HS Code 54) 18(HS Code 84) 9(HS Code 85)	
46	Pakistan, Islamic Republic of	0	175		5(HS Code 72) 15(HS Code 73) 10(HS Code 59) 3(HS Code 63) 58(HS Code 84) 16(HS Code 85)	Official import data corroborates that imports were legitimate and originated from other countries and not from DPRK / no trade with DPRK
47	Peru, Republic of	1,226	521		4(HS Code 63) 437(HS Code 84)	
48	Poland, Republic of	305	20,928		16(HS Code 72) 69(HS Code 73) 26(HS Code 74) 9(HS Code 3) 77(HS Code 56) 63(HS Code 61) 1(HS Code 7) 235(HS Code 84) 18,307(HS Code 85)	
49	Russian Federation	41,954	702	9,474(HS Code 2710) 1,519(HS Code 2711) 801(HS Code 84) 67(HS Code 85) 5(HS Code 86) 34(HS Code 87) 55(HS Code 73) 6(HS Code 74) 13(HS Code 76) 13(HS Code 82) 2(HS Code 83)	1(HS Code 72) 1(HS Code 73) 1(HS Code 61) 6(HS Code 62) 14(HS Code 84) 16(HS Code 85)	Cases of exports to DPRK where recepient was the Embassy of the Russian Federation to DPRK and Maintenance of Civil Aircraft / Wating for additional reply
50	Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of	135	526	108(HS Code 74) 26(HS Code 76)	81(HS Code 61) 7(HS Code 62) 81(HS Code 84) 43(HS Code 85)	Concernig both exports to and imports from DPRK, internal statistics revealed that targeted items were all related to different countries not DPRK
51	Senegal, Republic of	179	689	3(HS Code 74)	261(HS Code 73) 11(HS Code 54) 42(HS Code 84) 2(HS Code 85)	
52	Serbia, Republic of	0	2		1(HS Code 54)	No trade exchange has been carried out with the DPRK

No.	Member State(MS)	Trade Volume w/ DPRK(2020)		Restricted HS Code Trade w/ DPRK		MS's Reply
		Export to	Import from	Export to	Import from	
53	Singapore, Republic of	123	0			Forfeit shipment of wine on August 25, 2020 / informed Panel on September 15, 2020 / Other than above nothing applicable / No cases
54	Slovak Republic	0	406		85(HS Code 72) 261(HS Code 73) 1(HS Code 59) 101(HS Code 84) 6(HS Code 85)	
55	Slovenia, Republic of	0	1,065		1(HS Code 2712) 5(HS Code 73) 4(HS Code 59) 2(HS Code 61) 1(HS Code 63) 13(HS Code 12) 73(HS Code 84) 277(HS Code 85)	
56	South Africa, Republic of	456	1,099	8(HS Code 84) 251(HS Code 85) 1(HS Code 87) 8(HS Code 73) 18(HS Code 76)	2(HS Code 73) 8(HS Code 54) 12(HS Code 84) 1,054(HS Code 85)	No relevant cases of transactions relating to any goods or technologies with the DPRK
57	Spain, Kingdom of	167	387	5(HS Code 84) 4(HS Code 73)	2(HS Code 72) 1(HS Code 73) 1(HS Code 54) 3(HS Code 61) 13(HS Code 84) 118(HS Code 85) 3(HS Code 89)	
58	Sweden, Kingdom of	0	6		4(HS Code 73)	Nothing Applicable / No cases
59	Swiss Confederation	2,677	0			Nothing Applicable / No cases
60	Tajikistan, Republic of	0	109			Nothing Applicable / No cases
61	Thailand, Kingdom of	1,743	166	4(HS Code 84)	3(HS Code 73) 3(HS Code 84) 29(HS Code 85)	Entries mentioning the DPRK as the country of destination had subsequently been withdrawn, with the goods returned
62	Turkey, Republic of	331	93	323(HS Code 2710)	2(HS Code 73) 5(HS Code 84) 14(HS Code 85)	
63	Uganda, Republic of	255	4,388		31(HS Code 74) 62(HS Code 55) 16(HS Code 84)	
64	Ukraine	0	21		3(HS Code 61) 3(HS Code 62) 3(HS Code 85)	
65	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	38	12		1(HS Code 84) 8(HS Code 85)	Incorrect country code provided with shipping documentation
66	Uruguay, Oriental Republic of	0	12		1(HS Code 74) 1(HS Code 84) 6(HS Code 85)	Several customs operations were declared as originating from DPRK, but they were actually ROK

No.	Member State(MS)	Trade Volume w/ DPRK(2020)		Restricted HS Code Trade w/ DPRK		MS's Reply
		Export to	Import from	Export to	Import from	
67	Uzbekistan, Republic of	0	1			Nothing Applicable / No cases
68	Zambia, Republic of	2	765		37(HS Code 63) 51(HS Code 84) 94(HS Code 85)	
69	Zimbabwe, Republic of	23	681		1(HS Code 52) 28(HS Code 54) 6(HS Code 84)	

Source : ITC Trade Map, annotated by the Panel

Annex 51: List of HS Codes the Panel applies to monitor the sectoral ban

Below is the list of HS codes assigned for each category of goods under sectoral ban by relevant UN Security Council resolutions. This list superseds S/2018/171 annex 4 as amended by S/2018/171/Corr.1. See https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/prohibited-items for the complete list of prohibited goods and Implement Assistance Notes.

a. Items prohibited from being exported to the DPRK

Item	HS Codes	Description	Resolutions
Condensates and natural gas liquids	**2709**	Oils; petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals	Para. 13 of . 2375 (2017)
	2711	Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons	
Industrial machinery	**84**	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	Para. 7 of 2397 (2017)
	85	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers; television image and sound recorders and reproducers, parts and accessories of such articles	
Transportation vehicles [53]	**86**	Railway, tramway locomotives, rolling-stock and parts thereof; railway or tramway track fixtures and fittings and parts thereof; mechanical (including electro-mechanical) traffic signaling equipment of all kinds	Para. 7 of 2397 (2017)
	87	Vehicles; other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof	
	88	Aircraft, spacecraft and parts thereof [54]	
	89	Ships, boats and floating structures	
Iron, steel and other metals	**Chapters 72-83**		Para. 7 of 2397 (2017)
	72	Iron and steel	
	73	Articles of iron or steel	
	74	Copper and articles thereof	
	75	Nickel and articles thereof	
	76	Aluminum and articles thereof	
	77	Reserved for possible future use	
	78	Lead and articles thereof	
	79	Zinc and articles thereof	
	80	Tin and articles thereof	
	81	Other base metals; cermets; articles thereof	
	82	Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal; parts thereof of base metal	
	83	Miscellaneous articles of base metal	

[53] Pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 2321 (2016) and paragraph 14 of resolution 2397 (2017), States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of new helicopters, new and used vessels, except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis.

[54] Shall not apply with respect to the provision of spare parts needed to maintain the safe operation of DPRK commercial civilian passenger aircraft (currently consisting of the following aircraft models and types: An-24R/RV, An-148-100B, Il-18D, Il-62M, Tu-134B-3, Tu-154B, Tu-204-100B, and Tu-204-300).

b. Items prohibited from being imported from the DPRK

Item	HS Codes	Description	Resolutions
Coal	**2701**	Coal; briquettes, ovoids and similar solid fuels manufactured from coal	Para. 8 of 2371 (2017)
Iron Ore	**2601**	Iron ores and concentrates, including roasted iron pyrites	
Iron	**Chapter 72**	Iron and steel products (**7201-7229**)	
Iron and Steel products	**Chapter 73**	Iron and steel products (**7301-7326)**	
Gold	**261690**	Gold ores and concentrates	Para. 30 of 2270 (2016)
	7108	Gold (incl. put plated), unwrought, semi-manufactured forms or powder	
	710811	Gold powder, unwrought	
	710812	Gold in other unwrought forms	
	710813	Gold in other semi-manufactured forms	
	710820	Monetary gold	
Titanium	**2614**	Titanium ores and concentrates	
Vanadium	**2615**	Vanadium ores and concentrates	
Rare Earth Minerals	**2612**	Uranium or thorium ores and concentrates [**261210** and **261220**]	
	2617	Ores and concentrates, [Nesoi code **261790** - Other Ores and Concentrates]	
	2805	Alkali metals etc., rare-earth metals etc., mercury	
	2844	Radioactive chemical elements & isotopes etc.	
Copper	**Chapter 74**	Copper and articles thereof (**7401-7419**)	Para. 28 of 2321 (2016)
	2603	Copper ores and concentrates	
Zinc	**Chapter 79**	Zinc and articles thereof (**7901-7907**)	
	2608	Zinc ores and concentrates	
Nickel	**Chapter 75**	Nickel and articles thereof (**7501-7508)**	
	2604	Nickel ores and concentrates	
Silver	**2616100** **7106, 7107**	Silver ores and concentrates Silver unwrought or semi manufactured forms, or in powdered forms; base metals clad with silver, not further worked than semi-manufactured	
	7114	Articles of goldsmiths or silversmiths' wares or parts thereof, of silver, whether or not plated or clad with other precious metal	
Seafood (incl fish, crustaceans, mollusks, and other aquatic invertebrates in all forms)	**Chapter 3**	Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates (**0301-0308)**	Para. 9 of 2371 (2017)
	1603	Extracts and juices of meat, fish or crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates)	
	1604	Prepared or preserved fish; caviar and caviar substitutes prepared from fish eggs	
	1605	Crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates, prepared or preserved	
Lead	**Chapter 78**	Lead and articles thereof (**7801-7806**)	Para. 10 of 2371 (2017)
Lead ore	**2607**	Lead ores and concentrates	

Textiles (including but not limited to fabrics and partially or fully completed apparel products)	**Chapters 50-63**		Para. 16 of 2375 (2017)
	50	Silk, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	51	Wool, fine or coarse animal hair, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof; Horsehair yarn and woven fabric	
	52	Cotton, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	53	Vegetable textile tibers nesoi; Yarns and woven fabrics of vegetable textile fibers nesoi and paper	
	54	Manmade filaments, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	55	Manmade staple fibers, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	56	Wadding, felt and nonwovens; Special yarns; Twine, cordage, ropes and cables and articles thereof	
	57	Carpets and other textile floor covering	
	58	Fabrics; special woven fabrics, tufted textile fabrics, lace, tapestries, trimmings, embroidery	
	59	Textile fabrics; impregnated, coated, covered or laminated; Textile articles of a kind suitable for industrial use;	
	61	Apparel and clothing accessories; knitted or crocheted;	
	62	Apparel and clothing accessories; *not* knitted or crocheted;	
	63	Textiles, made up articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags	
Agricultural products	**07**	Vegetables and certain roots and tubers; edible	Para. 6 of resolution 2397 (2017)
	08	Fruit and nuts, edible; peel of citrus fruit or melons	
	12	Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit, industrial or medicinal plants; straw and fodder	
Machinery	**84**	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	Para. 6 of resolution 2397 (2017)
Electrical equipment	**85**	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; Sound recorders and reproducers; television image and sound recorders and reproducers, parts and accessories of such articles	
Earth and stone including magnesite and magnesia	**25**	Salt; sulphur; earths, stone; plastering materials, lime and cement	
Wood	**44**	Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal	
Vessels	**89**	Ships, boats and floating structures	

c. For paragraphs 4 and 5 of resolution 2397 (2017), the Panel uses the following HS codes. The Panel notes that annual caps are placed for the two items below.

- HS 2709 : crude oil [cap: 4 million barrels or 525,000 tons]
- HS 2710, HS 2712 and HS 2713 : refined petroleum products [cap: 500,000 barrels]

Source : the Panel

Annex 52: Correspondence with Thailand

No. 56101/206

The Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) and, with reference to the communication from Mr. Georgy Toloraya, member of the Panel of Experts, requesting additional information to supplement the former's note no. 56101/18 dated 15 January 2021 on the implementation of customs measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) for the period of 2018-2020, has the honour to transmit the said information herewith for the latter's kind perusal.

The Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) the assurances of its highest consideration.

Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Thailand
to the United Nations, New York
26 March B.E. 2564 (2021)

Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009),
New York.

1

Attachment

Additional information of 12 cases of goods withdrawn from delivery to the DPRK

No.	Export Entry	HS Code	Description of Goods	Export agent	Quantity	Date
1.	A002-1610208716	85411000	DIODE BZG03-C36-R-EIC	EIC SEMICONDUCTOR COMPANY LIMITED	1 Carton	2018/02/02
2.	A006-1610810538	32041900	MOMIJI FOUNDATION HD MAKE UP NO.1 (40ml.)	ORIENTAL ORCHID TRADING COMPANY LIMITED	10 Cartons	2028/08/06
	A006-1610810538	33049930	DERLISE BRIGHT SMOOTH SUN SCREEN CREAM 15g.	ORIENTAL ORCHID TRADING COMPANY LIMITED		
	A006-1610810538	33049930	DERLISE BRIGHT & CUTE WHITE CREAM 15g.	ORIENTAL ORCHID TRADING COMPANY LIMITED		
	A006-1610810538	33049930	ANTI-ACNE 5g. BRIGHTENING 5g. MELASMA 5g. SUNSCREEN 5g.	ORIENTAL ORCHID TRADING COMPANY LIMITED		
	A006-1610810538	33049930	DERLISE WHITE SERUM 30g.	ORIENTAL ORCHID TRADING COMPANY LIMITED		
	A006-1610810538	33049930	DERLISE AQUA TONER 100g.	ORIENTAL ORCHID TRADING COMPANY LIMITED		
	A006-1610810538	33049930	DERLISE MOUSSE 150g.	ORIENTAL ORCHID TRADING COMPANY LIMITED		
	A006-1610810538	33069000	DERRICH ORAL HERBAL TOOTHPASTE 25g.	ORIENTAL ORCHID TRADING COMPANY LIMITED		
3.	A017-1610701164	85119090	TRANSFORMER	KEIC THAI COMPANY LIMITED	6 Cartons	2018/07/17

2

No.	Export Entry	HS Code	Description of Goods	Export agent	Quantity	Date
4.	A022-1610114592	12079990	SACHA LN LNCHI NUT UNSALTED	ASIA STAR OMEGA (THAILAND) COMPANY LIMITED	1 Pallet	2018/01/22
5.	A025-1610908321	33049930	MOMIJI SIXTY-SIXANTI-ACNE 5g. BRIGHTENING 5g.	ORIENTAL ORCHID TRADING COMPANY LIMITED	6 Cartons	2018/09/25
	A025-1610908321	33049930	MOMIJI SIXTY- BRIGHTENING 5g.	ORIENTAL ORCHID TRADING COMPANY LIMITED		
	A025-1610908321	33049930	MOMIJI SIXTY-SIXMELASMA 5g.	ORIENTAL ORCHID TRADING COMPANY LIMITED		
	A025-1610908321	33049930	DERLISEWHITE SERUM 30g.	ORIENTAL ORCHID TRADING COMPANY LIMITED		
	A025-1610908321	33049930	MOMIJI SIXTY-SIXBRIGHTENING 5g. MELASMA 5g.	ORIENTAL ORCHID TRADING COMPANY LIMITED		
	A025-1610908321	33049930	LOTION (SAMPLE FREE OF CHARGE)	ORIENTAL ORCHID TRADING COMPANY LIMITED		
6.	A027-1611206861	21069019	NUTRITION DRINK	WINTHAI TRANS INTERNATIONAL COMPANY LIMITED	2 Cartons	2018/12/27
7.	A028-1611203712	30045099	NUTRITION DRINK	MR. KI SONG HAN	2 Cartons	2018/12/28
8.	A019-1621216780	84439100	AccuStar UltraFilm BNK19-12-70005 7114764	ROTOMETRICS (SE ASIA) COMPANY LIMITED	1 Carton	2019/12/19
	A019-1621216780	84439100	AccuPrime BNK19-12-69970 7114764	ROTOMETRICS (SE ASIA) COMPANY LIMITED		
	A019-1621216780	84439100	AccuStar UltraFilm BNK19-12-69971 7114730	ROTOMETRICS (SE ASIA) COMPANY LIMITED		

3

No.	Export Entry	HS Code	Description of Goods	Export agent	Quantity	Date
9.	A012-1630309810	85340090	FLEXIBLE PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD	FUJIKURA ELECTRONICS (THAILAND) COMPANY LIMITED	12 Cartons	2020/03/12
10.	A017-1630812078	40151900	LATEX GLOVES	PHOENIX RUBBER PRODUCTS COMPANY LIMITED	25 Cartons	2020/08/18
11.	A020-1630101270	20081999	BLACK SESAME PASTE	FLOWER FOOD COMPANY LIMITED	1 Pallet	2020/01/20
12.	A023-1630405508	85340090	FLEXIBLE PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD	FUJIKURA ELECTRONICS (THAILAND) COMPANY LIMITED	9 Cartons	2020/04/23

****

Source : the Panel

Annex 53: Correspondence with Bulgaria

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
B U L G A R I A
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

11 East 84th Street, New York, NY 10028, Tel: (212) 737 4790, Fax: (212) 472 9865, e-mail: bulgaria@un.int

№ 44

New York, 6 July 2021

Dear [redacted]

I am writing with regard to your letter ref. № S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.92 of 28 May 2021, and have the honor to communicate the following information, as provided by the competent Bulgarian authorities:

According to the National Customs Agency's database, in the period 1st January 2020 – 31 March 2021 10 (ten) exports of nutritional additives were made to the DPRK as declared country of destination. The goods were exported by „DSM NUTRITIONAL PRODUCTS EUROPE, address: Wurmisweg 576, 4303, Kaiseraugst, Switzerland, to "UNICEF DPR KOREA UNICEF REPRESENTAT", address: P.O. box 90, Pyongyang, the DPRK. The export declarations were lodged with the Sofia West Customs Office by the Bulgarian company "KENDY LTD", address: 101 Sofia Str., 1320 Bankya, Bulgaria. The goods were classified under the EU Combined Nomenclature and the Common Customs Tariff with tariff code 21069092 and left the customs territory of the European Union through the Port of Thessaloniki, Greece. Details about the customs declarations (CD) are as follows:

- CD 20BG005807AA913100 of 17 January 2020;
- CD 20BG005807AA913019 of 17 January 2020;
- CD 20BG005807AB055481 of 31 July 2020;
- CD 20BG005807AB055414 of 31 July 2020;
- CD 20BG005807AB055580 of 31 July 2020;
- CD 20BG005807AB055599 of 31 July 2020;
- CD 20BG005807AB056949 of 3 August 2020;
- CD 20BG005807AB056957 of 3 August 2020;
- CD 20BG005807AB057108 of 3 August 2020;
- CD 20BG005807AB057116 of 3 August 2020.

During the above-mentioned period there have been no cases of rejection of customs clearance or seizure of goods with the DPRK as a country of destination/ consignment, transit, origin or manufacture.

I take this opportunity to assure the Panel of Experts that the competent Bulgarian authorities take all necessary measures to ensure the strict implementation of all sanctions imposed on the DPRK as per relevant UNSC resolutions.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

Lachezara Stoeva
Ambassador, Permanent Representative

M[redacted]
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)
United Nations
New York

Source : the Panel

Annex 54: Correspondence with Singapore

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE
UNITED NATIONS I NEW YORK

24 June 2021

[redacted]
Coordinator
United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)

Dear [redacted]

I refer to your letter (S /AC.49/2021/PE/OC.134) dated 28 May 2021 requesting information on any cases of rejection of customs clearance or seizure of goods with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a country of destination, consignment, transit, origin, or manufacture, as well as integrated national data on trade with the DPRK, for the period of 2020 through the first quarter of 2021.

During the aforementioned period, Singapore forfeited a shipment of wine that was transhipped through Singapore and allegedly bound for the DPRK on 25 August 2020. This forfeiture fulfilled the obligation for Member States under Paragraph 20 of UNSC Resolution 2397 (2017) to seize and dispose of items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by the relevant UNSC resolutions. The Panel was informed of this case in our letter to the Panel dated 15 September 2020, which we enclose again for the Panel's ease of reference.

Apart from the case mentioned in our letter dated 15 September 2020, there are no other cases of rejection of customs clearance or seizure of goods with the DPRK as a country of destination, consignment or transit, origin, or manufacture during the relevant period.

A general prohibition on all commercially traded goods that are imported, exported, transhipped, or brought in transit from or to the DPRK has also been in force since 8 November 2017.

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Singapore reiterates our commitment to upholding our obligations under the relevant UNSC resolutions, and will continue to be of assistance to the Panel where possible.

Yours sincerely,

JOPHIE TANG
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Enc.

PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE
UNITED NATIONS | NEW YORK

15 September 2020

Mr [redacted]
Coordinator
United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)

Dear [redacted]

I write to inform you of the Singapore Government's forfeiture of a shipment of wine allegedly bound for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

Singapore received information from a Member State in January 2020 concerning an allegedly DPRK-bound shipment of alcohol that transhipped in Singapore from 7 to 10 January 2020. The shipment was held for checks while in Singapore, and was seized by Singapore authorities on 31 January 2020.

According to the invoice and packing list submitted by the shipping agent, the shipment of wine was supplied to Sangmyong General Trading Corporation ("Sangmyong"). The hygiene certificate submitted by the shipping agent identified Sangmyong as the importer. The Panel would recall that Sangmyong had previously been identified as an entity that had actively violated Japan's ban on luxury goods trade with the DPRK in the Panel's reports S/2012/422 (2012) and S/2013/337 (2013). Sangmyong is also listed by the Dow Jones Risk Center as an "entity fully owned by the OFAC comprehensively sanctioned government of North Korea via the Korean Worker's party".

Under Regulation 5(a) of Singapore's United Nations (Sanctions – Democratic People's Republic of Korea) Regulations 2010, "no person in Singapore and no citizen of Singapore outside Singapore shall supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, any designated export item or designated luxury item to any person in the DPRK, whether or not the item originated in Singapore".

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ANNEX

APPLICATION PURSUANT TO REGULATION 17(1) OF THE UNITED NATIONS (SANCTIONS – DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA) REGULATIONS 2010

Third Report of Deputy Chief Superintendent of Customs [redacted], made in support of the application of the Attorney-General under Regulation 17(1) of the United Nations (Sanctions – Democratic People's Republic of Korea) Regulations 2010 (**"UN DPRK Regulations"**), before the undersigned District Judge, State Courts of the Republic of Singapore, on **25 August 2020**.

Items seized vide Report/Case No.: C2003520/IP/01

2. As stated in the First Report of DCSC [redacted] filed on 11 August 2020 (the **"First Report"**), Singapore Customs seized the following goods on 31 January 2020 in exercise of its powers under Regulation 14A of the UN DPRK Regulations read with Sections 34 and 35 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap. 68) (**"Seized Goods"**):

(a) 1158 cases x 4 boxes x 3 litres of Dry Red Wine;
(b) 50 cases x 12 packets x 1 litre of Orange Juice;
(c) 25 cases x 12 packets x 1 litre of Summer Pine Juice;
(d) 25 cases x 12 packets x 1 litre of Medly of Fruit Juice;
(e) 49 cases x 12 packets x 1 litre of Mango Juice; and
(f) 25 cases x 12 packets x 1 litre of Secrets of the Valley Juice.

Reports filed by Singapore Customs on 11 August 2020 and 21 August 2020

3. The background facts and outcome of Singapore Customs' investigations are set out in detail in the First Report. To summarise, shipping documents revealed that Sangmyong General Trading Corp (**"SGTC"**) was the client / receiver of the Seized Goods. Korea Sangmyong General Trading Corporation (also known to Singapore Customs as SGTC) was flagged by the United Nations Panel of Experts as a "DPRK end-user" in its 2013 Report[1] and its 2012 Report[2] for its involvement in the smuggling of luxury goods into the DPRK.

4. As stated in the Second Report of DCSC [redacted] filed on 21 August 2020 (the **"Second Report"**), Singapore Customs gave notice of the application to five parties that appeared to have an interest in the Seized Goods, pursuant to Regulation 17(3) of the UN DPRK Regulations. As at 20 August 2020, two parties had indicated that they would not be contesting the forfeiture of the Seized Goods. As at 25 August 2020, there

[1] Report of the Panel of Experts (S/2013/337).
[2] Report of the Panel of Experts (S/2012/422).

1

was no response received from the remaining three parties. Singapore Customs' correspondence with the five parties are set out in detail in the Second Report.

Mention on 25 August 2020, at 10:00 am, Court 7A of the State Courts, Republic of Singapore

5. State Counsel [redacted] and [redacted], on behalf of the Attorney-General of the Republic of Singapore, applied for the forfeiture of the Seized Goods under Regulation 17(1) of the UN DPRK Regulations. The Seized Goods were proved to be designated export items (i.e. items listed in paragraph 2(a) to 2(f) above)[3] and designated luxury items (i.e. items listed in paragraph 2(a) above)[4]. The Seized Goods were also proved to be the subject of a contravention of Regulation 5(a) of the UN DPRK Regulations which reads:

> "A person in Singapore and no citizen of Singapore outside Singapore shall – (a) supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, any designated export item or designated luxury item to any person in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, whether or not the item originated in Singapore".

6. Upon the application of the Attorney-General, and upon reading the First and Second Reports, the learned District Judge [redacted] was satisfied that forfeiture of the Seized Goods under Regulation 17(1) of the UN DPRK Regulation was made out.

7. In view of the above, may I seek a court order for the Seized Goods to be forfeited to Singapore Customs, and either destroyed or otherwise dealt with.

[redacted]

[redacted] (DCSC)
Assistant Head
Trade Investigation Branch
Singapore Customs

for Director-General of Singapore Customs

[3] Regulation of Imports and Exports Regulations, Seventh Schedule (Prohibited imports from and exports to (including transhipped goods and goods in transit originating from or bound for) country or territory, Third Column, DPRK, (18) Any goods that are for the purposes of trade with any person in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

[4] Regulation of Imports and Exports Regulations, Seventh Schedule (Prohibited imports from and exports to (including transhipped goods and goods in transit originating from or bound for) country or territory, Third Column, DPRK, (5)(t) wines and spirits.

2

To the Officer of Singapore Customs:

Order in Terms

The Seized Goods be dealt with as the Director-General of Singapore Customs thinks fit, and in such a case the Director-General may direct that the Seized Goods be destroyed or otherwise dealt with.

The Seized Goods are:

(a) 1158 cases x 4 boxes x 3 litres of Dry Red Wine;
(b) 50 cases x 12 packets x 1 litre of Orange Juice;
(c) 25 cases x 12 packets x 1 litre of Summer Pine Juice;
(d) 25 cases x 12 packets x 1 litre of Medly of Fruit Juice;
(e) 49 cases x 12 packets x 1 litre of Mango Juice; and
(f) 25 cases x 12 packets x 1 litre of Secrets of the Valley Juice.

SEAL

[redacted]

Magistrate / District Judge

3

Source: the Panel

Annex 55: Correspondence with Guatemala

GOBIERNO de GUATEMALA
DR. ALEJANDRO GIAMMATTEI

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
MISIÓN PERMANENTE DE GUATEMALA ANTE NACIONES UNIDAS, NEW YORK

PS/11.3.14/806

La Misión Permanente de Guatemala ante las Naciones Unidas saluda atentamente al Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009) del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas y se permite hacer referencia a su nota no. S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.110, en relación a los esfuerzos de dicho Grupo de Expertos por reunir, examinar y analizar información respecto a la implementación de las medidas impuestas a la República Popular Democrática de Corea (RPDC).

La Misión Permanente de Guatemala ante las Naciones Unidas se permite informar que la República de Guatemala como Estado fundador de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas reconoce la importancia del mantenimiento de la paz y la seguridad internacionales, y con tal fin está comprometido en cumplir todas y cada una de las medidas colectivas eficaces para prevenir y eliminar las amenazas a la paz, y para suprimir actos de agresión u otros quebrantamientos de la paz; y lograr por medios pacíficos, y de conformidad con los principios de la justicia y del derecho internacional, el ajuste o arreglo de controversias o situaciones internacionales susceptibles de conducir a quebrantamientos de la paz.

Es así que en virtud de la solicitud realizada por el Grupo de Expertos al Gobierno de la República de Guatemala y en reconocimiento al sentido obligatorio de cumplir con el artículo 25, de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas respecto a aceptar y cumplir las decisiones del Consejo de Seguridad, se permite informar lo siguiente:

- *El Estado de Guatemala en apego a su marco jurídico interno ha dispuesto la investigación pertinente del caso reportado por el Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009) del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas;*

Honorable señor
[redacted]
Coordinador del Grupo de Expertos
establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009)
del Consejo de Seguridad

c.c.: S[redacted]*Miembro del Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009)*

57 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016 - Teléfonos: 001212-6794760 - Ext. 210, 220
Correo electrónico: onunewyork@minex.gob.gt / www.guatemalaun.com Twitter: @GuatemalaONU
Síguenos en:

GOBIERNO *de* GUATEMALA
DR. ALEJANDRO GIAMMATTEI

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
MISIÓN PERMANENTE DE GUATEMALA ANTE NACIONES UNIDAS, NEW YORK

- *El Estado de Guatemala, se permite informar al Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009) del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas que la entidad estatal encargada de administrar el sistema aduanero, establecer mecanismos de verificación de origen de meercancias, de organizar y administrar el sistema de fiscalización y de mantener y controlar los registros een el territorio de la República de Guatemala es la Superintendencia de Administración Tributaria (SAT).*

- *Dicha institución, mediante su Nota con registro No. OFI-SAT-IAD-0471-2021[1], informó que se han realizado una serie de acciones para contrarrestar los errores suscitados anteriormente con la base de datos de los agentes aduaneros. Para información del Grupo de Expertos, se adjunta la copia de dicha Nota y sus respectivos anexos.*

- *Sin prejuicio de lo anterior, se reitera el compromiso del Estado de Guatemala hacia la completa implementación de las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas sobre las sanciones impuestas a la República Popular Democrática de Corea, siendo las siguientes: 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) y 2397 (2017).*

La Misión Permanente de Guatemala ante las Naciones Unidas aprovecha esta oportunidad para expresarle al Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009) del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas, las seguridades de su más alta consideración.

MISIÓN PERMANENTE DE GUATEMALA NACIONES UNIDAS N.Y.

Nueva York, 9 de julio de 2021.

[1] Ver Anexo I.

57 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016 - Teléfonos: 001212-6794760 - Ext. 210, 220
Correo electrónico: onunewyork@minex.gob.gt / www.guatemalaun.com Twitter: @GuatemalaONU
Síguenos en:

Source: the Panel

2109720E 1

Translated from Spanish

Permanent Mission of Guatemala to the United Nations

PS/11.3.14/806

The Permanent Mission of Guatemala to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) and has the honour to refer to its note No. S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.110 relating to its efforts to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the sanctions imposed against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The Permanent Mission of Guatemala to the United Nations wishes to report that the Republic of Guatemala, as a founding Member of the United Nations, recognizes the importance of maintaining international peace and security, and to that end is committed to taking all effective collective measures to prevent and remove threats to the peace, and to suppress acts of aggression and other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

Thus, pursuant to the request made by the Panel of Experts to the Government of the Republic of Guatemala, and in recognition of the obligation to comply with Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations, namely, to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council, the Permanent Mission wishes to provide the following information:

- The Government of Guatemala, in accordance with its domestic laws, has ordered an investigation into the cases reported by the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009).

[redacted]

Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)

cc: [redacted], member of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)

- The Government of Guatemala has the honour to inform the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) that the State entity responsible for administering the customs system, establishing mechanisms for verifying the origin of goods, organizing and administering the control system and maintaining and monitoring records in Guatemala is the Tax Administration Superintendency.
- That entity, in its note No. OFI-SAT-IAD-0471-2021,[1] has indicated that it has taken a series of steps to address the errors that previously arose in the database maintained by customs agents. For the information of the Panel of Experts, a copy of that note and the annexes thereto are attached.
- Notwithstanding the above, the Government of Guatemala reiterates its commitment to the full implementation of the following Security Council resolutions on sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017).

The Permanent Mission of Guatemala to the United Nations takes this opportunity to convey to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) the assurances of its highest consideration.

New York, 9 July 2021

[1] See annex I.

OFI-SAT-IAD-0471-2021

Guatemala City, 17 June 2021

Madam,

I am writing in response to note No. SUBONU-487-2021-2020 of 3 June 2021, transmitting letter No. S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.110 of 28 May 2021, signed by [redacted] Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009), referring to the implementation of sanctions measures in the area of trade, including the export to and import from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in accordance with Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017).

On the basis of the aforementioned resolutions and in order to promote best practices in their implementation in all Member States, the Panel has requested that information be provided in response to seven points relating to the first quarter of 2020 and 2021, as set out in letter No. S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.110. The relevant information is provided below.

With regard to points 1 and 2:

In letters Nos. OFI-SAT-IAD-1276-2020 of 12 November 2020 and OFI-SAT-IAD-1411-2020 of 18 December 2020, the Customs Administration stated that, from January to March 2020 (first quarter), it fulfilled the requirement relating to external trade operations carried out under the code KP (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), indicating that, after reviewing the relevant documentation, it determined that the importer in Guatemala purchased from El Salvador goods originating from the Republic of Korea (South Korea), and that it incorrectly declared them under the code KP instead

[redacted]

Ambassador

Director-General for Multilateral and Economic International Relations

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Guatemala

of the correct code, KR, corresponding to the Republic of Korea (South Korea).

The Customs Administration also clarified declarations relating to goods arriving in Guatemala are transmitted by customs agents who, according to regional laws, are auxiliaries to the public customs service and may transmit electronically customs declarations and supplementary information relating to acts, operations or customs regimes in which they participate, pursuant to Chapter II, "Auxiliaries to the public customs service", articles 19 and 21 (d), of the Central American Uniform Customs Code and its implementing regulation.

After consulting the computer system of the Tax Administration Superintendency, the Customs Administration has determined that no imports under the code KP were recorded from January to March 2021.

With regard to points 3 and 4 contained in letter No. S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.110, the Customs Administration has consulted the various customs offices in Guatemala and wishes to report the following information:

- No cases of rejection of customs clearance or seizure of goods with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a country of destination/consignment or transit have been recorded by any customs office.

- No cases of rejection of customs clearance or seizure of goods with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a country of origin or manufacture have been recorded by any customs office. Since no cases related to points 3 and 4 have been recorded by any customs office, it is not possible to provide the information solicited in the subsequent points set out in your request.

In letter No. OFI-SAT-IAD-1390-2020 of 11 December 2020, the Customs Administration indicated that its Regulatory Department made improvements to the Central American Single Customs Declaration (DUCA) platform by prohibiting the validation of DUCA-D and low-value import declarations containing the code KP (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea). The Customs Administration has also taken the following steps to address the errors that occurred:

- Disseminating information internally and externally, through news digests and *Aduana Moderna* (Modern Customs) bulletins, indicating that the code KP should not be used in declarations of goods, in order to ensure compliance with United Nations resolutions.

2109720E 5

- Prohibiting the use of the code KP in the Single Customs Declaration system.

Accept, Madam, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

(s[redacted]

Superintendent of Customs

Tax Administration Superintendency

Source: the Panel

Annex 56 : Correspondence with Guyana

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE CO-OPERATIVE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
801 Second Avenue, 5th Floor, New York, NY 10017
Telephone: 212-573-5828/29 Fax: 212-573-6225
E-mail: guyana@un.int

19 July 2021

H.E. [redacted]
Coordinator of the United Nations Security Council
Panel of Experts established pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Excellency,

I have the honour to refer to your letter, dated 28 May 2021, informing of the efforts of the Panel of Experts to gather, examine and analyze information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) , 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016) , 2356 (2017) , 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), in particular incidents of non-compliance and requesting relevant information from the appropriate authorities of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana on trade with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

In this regard, I have the further honour to advise that:

i. No trade took place between Guyana and the DPRK for the period 2020 and 2021 (1st quarter).

ii. Trade between the DPRK and Guyana was erroneously recorded during the period in question but this was due to logging errors. Certified true copies of the supporting shipping documents will be provided, in short order, to substantiate this.

iii. To reduce the possibility of trade being erroneously recorded between Guyana and countries under United Nations Security Council (UNSC) trade sanctions, the competent Guyanese authority (the Guyana Revenue Authority) is introducing a Risk Profile System in the ASYCUDA World System to flag trade transactions involving countries under a UNSC sanctions regime, including the DPRK.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(*Signed*) C R Birkett

Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana
to the United Nations

Source : the Panel

Annex 57 : Correspondence with Bulgaria

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
BULGARIA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

11 East 84th Street, New York, NY 10028, Tel: (212) 737 4790, Fax: (212) 472 9865, e-mail: bulgaria@un.int

№ 44

New York, 22 February 2021

[redacted]

I am writing with regard to your letter Ref. № S/AC.49/2020/PE/OC.19 of 16 March 2020, and have the honor to communicate the following information, as provided by the competent Bulgarian authorities:

The property relations between the Republic of Bulgaria and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) are regulated by an Agreement of 30 June 1982 between the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the reciprocal assignment of the right to build and the right to use plots of land for the construction of embassy buildings, and the Protocol of 30 December 1986 amending the 1982 Agreement.

Pursuant to the above-described international agreements, the buildings that have been built on these plots are property of the DPRK, according to Art. 6, para 1 of the Agreement of 30 June 1982. The plots on which the properties are built belong to the Republic of Bulgaria.

According to Art. 6 of the 1982 Agreement, the plots and the buildings built on them may not be sold or transferred to a third party without the consent of the other contracting party. In regard of the fact that the above-mentioned Agreement has been concluded between the governments of the two countries, the granting of consent in the context of Art. 6 of the Agreement is within the competence of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria.

In light of the above, the building located on 56 Andrei Sakharov Blvd., Sofia – "Terra" Residence, is owned by the DPRK.

In February 2017, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria informed the DPRK Embassy about the restrictions imposed with UNSC resolution 2321 (2016) - prohibition of use of real estate property owned by the DPRK Embassy for any purpose other than diplomatic and consular activities. The Embassy was urged to cease any such activities immediately.

At that time two Bulgarian companies were registered at two of the properties belonging to the DPRK Embassy, namely "Terra Group" and "Technologica". The companies were strongly advised to terminate their rental agreements and to comply with the sanctions regime. According to the relevant Bulgarian authorities, no rental payments have been made by the companies to the DPRK Embassy ever since.

I take this opportunity to assure the Panel of Experts that the competent Bulgarian authorities take all necessary measures to ensure the strict implementation of all sanctions imposed on the DPRK as per relevant UNSC resolutions.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,


Lachezara Stoeva
Ambassador, Permanent Representative

[redacted]
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)
United Nations
New York

Source : the Panel

Annex 58: Images of a grand piano in DPRK in June 2021





Source: NK news, KCTV

Annex 59 : An excerpt from a cybersecurity firm (Kaspersky) report on the cyberattacks against the Russian defence industry


(Available on-line at: https://ics-cert.kaspersky.com/media/Kaspersky-ICS-CERT-Lazarus-targets-defense-industry-with-Threatneedle-En.pdf)

Kaspersky ICS CERT   kaspersky

Initial infection

In this attack, spear phishing was used as the initial infection vector. Before launching the attack, the group studied publicly available information about the targeted organization and identified email addresses belonging to various departments of the company.

Email addresses in those departments received phishing emails that either had a malicious Word document attached or a link to one hosted on a remote server. The phishing emails claimed to have urgent updates on today's hottest topic – COVID-19 infections. The phishing emails were carefully crafted and written on behalf of a medical center that is part of the organization under attack.


[redacted] <med[redacted]@mail.ru>
[Срочность] Коронавирусной Инфекции
[redacted]

Уважаемые работники Общества,

У двух человек из числа руководства [redacted] выявили новую коронавирусную инфекцию COVID-19.

Поэтому мы анонсировали новые обновленные инструкции по профилактике и диагностике коронавирусной инфекции.

Мы просим вас внимательно прочитать и тщательно следовать инструкциям.

Памятка о коронавирусной инфекции
Профилактика гриппа и коронавирусной инфекции

Берегите свое здоровье!

--
С уважением,

[redacted]
Заместитель главного врача по лечебной работе
ОАО [redacted]
Tel. +7[redacted]


Phishing email with links to malicious documents

The attackers registered accounts with a public email service, making sure the sender's email addresses looked similar to the medical center's real email address. The signature shown in the phishing emails included the actual personal data of the deputy head doctor of the attacked organization's medical center. The attackers were able to find this information on the medical center's public website.

A macro in the Microsoft Word document contained the malicious code designed to download and execute additional malicious software on the infected system.

The document contains information on the population health assessment program and is not directly related to the subject of the phishing email (COVID-19), suggesting the attackers may not completely understand the meaning of the contents they used.


LAZARUS TARGETS DEFENSE INDUSTRY
WITH THREATNEEDLE   3
© 2021 AO KASPERSKY LAB



Contents of malicious document


The content of the lure document was copied from an online post by a health clinic.

Our investigation showed that the initial spear-phishing attempt was unsuccessful due to macros being disabled in the Microsoft Office installation of the targeted systems. In order to persuade the target to allow the malicious macro, the attacker sent another email showing how to enable macros in Microsoft Office.



Email with instructions on enabling macros #1

After sending the above email with explanations, the attackers realized that the target was using a different version of Microsoft Office and therefore required a different procedure for enabling macros. The attackers subsequently sent another email showing the correct procedure in a screenshot with a Russian language pack.



Email with instructions on enabling macros #2

The content in the spear-phishing emails sent by the attackers from May 21 to May 26, 2020, did not contain any grammatical mistakes. However, in subsequent emails the attackers made numerous errors, suggesting they may not be native Russian speakers and were using translation tools.

Kaspersky ICS CERT kaspersky

Мы обслуживаем слишком много людей в день.

Мы стараемся любезно служить всем, но иногда эти проблемы возникают.

Я отправлю вложение напрямую, пожалуйста, найдите мое вложение.

--
С уважением,

[redacted]
Заместитель главного врача по лечебной работе
ОАО [redacted]
Tel. +7 [redacted]

Email containing several grammatical mistakes

On June 3, 2020, one of the malicious attachments was opened by employees and at 9:30 am local time the attackers gained remote control of the infected system.

This group also utilized different types of spear-phishing attack. One of the compromised hosts received several spear-phishing documents on May 19, 2020. The malicious file that was delivered, named Boeing_AERO_GS.docx, fetches a template from a remote server.

However, no payload created by this malicious document could be discovered. We speculate that the infection from this malicious document failed for a reason unknown to us. A few days later, the same host opened a different malicious document. The threat actor wiped these files from disk after the initial infection meaning they could not be obtained.

Nonetheless a related malicious document with this malware was retrieved based on our telemetry. It creates a payload and shortcut file and then continues executing the payload by using the following command line parameters.

- Payload path: `%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\lconcaches.db`
- Shortcut path: `%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\OneDrives.lnk`
- Command Line; please note that the string at the end is hard-coded, but different for each sample:
  - `rundll32.exe [dllpath],Dispatch n2UmQ9McxUds2b29`

The content of the decoy document depicts the job description of a generator/power industry engineer.

LAZARUS TARGETS DEFENSE INDUSTRY WITH THREATNEEDLE 6

© 2021 AO KASPERSKY LAB

Source : the Panel

Annex 60: Reply from Ecuador

República del Ecuador

Misión Permanente del Ecuador ante las
Naciones Unidas en Nueva York

New York, 8 July 2021

Mr. Coordinator,

I have the honour to refer to your letter dated 11 November 2020, with regard the ongoing efforts to examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People´s Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017).

I further wish to inform that in response to the request made to the Government of Ecuador, and in compliance with the obligations arising from the relevant resolutions of the Security Council on this matter, the Government of Ecuador undertook the applicable measures for the termination of the contractual relationship between the Decentralized Autonomous Government of the Province of Pichincha and the nationals from de DPRK, and for the repatriation to their country of origin.

I remain at your disposal should the Panel need additional information.

Please accept Mr. Coordinator the assurances of my highest consideration.


Ambassador Cristian Espinosa,
Permanent Representative of Ecuador to the United Nations

[redacted]
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts
Established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009)
United Nations Security Council,

Cc. dppa-poe1874@un.org

Source : Member State

Annex 61: Purported Contract Signing with KCC Representative



密 码

登 陆

关于圣滨

圣滨介绍

永翔介绍

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组织机构

合作单位

永翔国贸与朝鲜KCC会社签署POS机采购合同

发布日期：2021-1-4

近期，由永翔国际贸易有限公司与朝鲜知名公司KCC会社就POS机采购一事签署重要的商业合同。

KCC会社是朝鲜国家财税省下属企业，从事为国家银行金融机构进行软硬件的开发采购事宜，为永翔国际的长期友好合作伙伴。

为了本次POS机的采购订单，我司业务经理多次南下深圳，与国内知名的设备生产商进行业务洽谈，深入制造车间探究产品生产和质量，力求向朝方提供国内最为优质的设备产品。同时，在与朝方多次意见交流后，将客户个性化意见反馈至厂家，为客户满意的订制了其要求的软硬件产品。由于现今朝鲜还没有POS机使用的先例，所以仅此一项弥补了朝方金融领域一大空缺，真正迈进了多功能交易终端和非现金结算的时代！

本次与KCC会社的驻华代表通过友好的洽谈，达成了战略合作意向，签署了大批量的采购合同，首批POS机已完成生产运抵大连，即将发往朝鲜，后期多批次机器也正在按合同要求有计划的生产制造中。永翔国际本着质量第一、客户至上的原则，严格把控产品质量，追踪产品使用情况，力求为客户提供最为优质的服务。KCC代表对此次采购非常满意，并表示将与永翔在多领域继续开展友好合作！

上一篇： 刘军董事长会晤朝鲜海运省代表团　　下一篇： 刘军董事长考察延边自治州

Source: The Panel, *website (address on file) accessed 17 March 2021.*

Unofficial Translation:

“Recently, the Yongxiang International Trading Company Limited [hereinafter referred to as Yongxiang International] signed an important commercial contract with the KCC Corporation, a well-known North Korean company, on the purchase of POS [Point of Sale] machines.

The KCC Corporation is an enterprise under the North Korean Ministry of Finance and Taxation and is engaged in the development and procurement of software and hardware for national banks and financial institutions. It is also a long term friendly cooperative partner of the Yongxiang International.

For this purchase order of POS machines, Yongxiang International's business manager went south to Shenzhen [in Guangdong Province] for many times to discuss business with China's well-known equipment manufacturers and delved into the production and quality of products at manufacturing workshops to strive to provide the North Korean side with the most high-quality equipment products in China. At the same time, after several exchanges of opinions with the North Korean side, the customer's personalized opinions were fed back to the manufacturers, and the required software and hardware products were customized to the satisfaction of the customer. Since there is no precedent for the use of POS machines in North Korea at present, this alone has helped North Korea to fill a major gap in the financial field and truly enter the era of multi-functional transaction terminals and non-cash settlements.

Through friendly negotiations with KCC representatives in China, a strategic cooperation intention was reached, and a large number of procurement contracts were signed. Also, the first batch of POS machines had completed production, arrived in Dalian, and would be shipped to North Korea soon. In the later stage, many batches of machines would be manufactured in a planned way according to the contract requirements. Based on the principle of quality first and customer first, the Yongxiang International strictly controls the quality of products, tracks the use of products, and strives to provide the best service for customers. KCC representatives were very satisfied with the purchase and said that they would continue to carry out friendly cooperation with Yongxiang in many fields."

公司介绍

1. 永翔国际贸易实业有限公司，注册地为香港。公司主要业务范围：综合国际贸易，进出口业务，公司成立至今，与欧美亚多地都有合作和贸易往来，享有良好的国际声誉。

公司于2017年，在平壤与朝鲜中央银行合作成立金融银行，2018年在朝鲜江原道设立金融银行分行，业务范围：外国投资企业和外国企业，外国人的外汇汇款，外汇贷款及投资业务，活期户头超额支付，外汇票据折扣，对外汇债务及合同义务履行的保证，外汇汇款，进出口货物哆款结算，信用调查及洽谈，信托，对客户的信用卡发行，在非居民之间的交易工作。

公司长年以来致力于经营管理国内外大型船舶，研制和开发先进的船舶技术，以及国际航线和集装箱运输的运营管理，业务卓有成效，名声享誉海内外。在元山葛麻旅游休闲开发区，独资开发建设四星级国际酒店、外国人国际公寓，独家经营开发区的游艇及码头等相关设施。今年来公司勇于业务范围，覆盖软件开发、银行系统设备研制、一线电子产品、服装产业、家装建材、文化影视业、劳务人员培训输出、大宗商品进出口贸易、国际一流品牌产品销售代理和新型合作模式的创新。

公司秉承“客户至上，海纳百川，求实创新，互惠互利”的经营宗旨，加强与各界的联系与合作，通过联手国内外知名品牌厂家，开拓国际贸易市场，为客户与品牌企业构建合作平台，实现资源互补，互利双赢。

公司贯彻“以人为本”的管理理念，积极建设“团结进取，争创效益”的企业文化。注重提高管理效率，重视人才储备战略。努力培养各级人才的思想品质、政治素质、集体观念以及奉献精神。从而保证企业动力充足，沿着健康的方向不断发展，创造美好的未来。

Source: The Panel, *website (address on file) accessed 17 March 2021*

Unofficial Translation:

“Yongxiang International Trade Industrial Co., Ltd. is registered in Hong Kong. The company's main business scope: comprehensive international trade, import and export business. Since its establishment, the company has cooperated and traded with many places in Europe, America and Asia, and enjoys a good international reputation.

In 2017, the company established a financial bank in Pyongyang in cooperation with the Central Bank of North Korea. In 2018, it set up a financial bank branch in Gangwon-do, North Korea. Its business scope: foreign investment companies and foreign companies, foreign exchange remittances, foreign exchange loans and investment business, current demand Account overpayment, discounts on foreign exchange bills, guarantees for foreign exchange debts and contract obligations, foreign exchange remittances, settlement of import and export goods, credit investigations and negotiations, trusts, credit card issuances to customers, and transactions between non-residents.”

Annex 62: Letter to China and Reply

Figure Annex 62-1: Letter to China

United Nations Nations Unies
HEADQUARTERS • SIEGE NEW YORK, NY 10017
TEL.: +1 212 963 1055 • FAX: +1 212 963 2013

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL PANEL OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1874 (2009)

REFERENCE: S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.68

10 May 2021

Excellency,

I have the honour to write to you with regard to ongoing efforts of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), in particular incidents of non-compliance.

Based on publicly available information, the Panel is investigating an alleged sale of payment processing systems, known as point-of-sale (PoS) machines, to the "Korea Computer Center" (KCC), which is part of the DPRK's Ministry of Finance and Taxation. The Panel is investigating this matter as a possible violation of, inter alia, paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017) which prohibited joint ventures or cooperative entities with DPRK individuals and entities and paragraph 11 of resolution 2094 (2013) which prohibit the provision of financial services or transfer of financial or other assets or resources that could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes. According to a 4 January 2021 post on the "Dalian Shengbin Crew Service Company Limited" website (annex), the Yongxiang International Trading Company Limited[1] signed a commercial contract with KCC to supply PoS machines. In its efforts to gather reliable and verifiable information, the Panel would be grateful for your assistance in supplying the following information:

- A copy of the previously referenced contract;
- A full description of the PoS machines;
- Copies of all purchase-orders, invoices, pro-forma invoices related to the sale of PoS machines to KCC;
- Any shipping records, to include customs declarations and inspection reports; and
- Records of any financial transactions between KCC and Dalian Shengbin Crew Service Company Limited, including account numbers, bank names, and all relevant transaction details.

Paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 2569 (2021) urges all Member States and other interested parties to cooperate fully with the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal. The Panel would welcome any other information that you might consider relevant to its work as mandated by the Security Council in this regard. In addition, the Panel would

[1] According to information provided on the website, Yongxinag International Trading Company Limited is a subsidiary or affiliate of Dalian Shengbin Crew Service Company Limited.

His Excellency
Mr. Zhang Jun
Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations
New York

like to assure you that any information you may consider confidential can be handled accordingly and used solely for the Security Council and the 1718 Committee.

Given the importance the Panel attaches to this investigation, we would be most grateful for any information to be supplied within six weeks of the date of this letter. Please reply by email to the Panel at [redacted]. Should you wish to discuss this request, or any follow-up matters, please c[redacted]

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

[redacted]

Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Annex: Photographs of purported contract signing with KCC representative

Source : the Panel

Figure Annex 62-2: China's Reply

6. POS machine (OC.68)

China's relevant authorities have not yet completed the verification and investigation accordingly. China has always been faithfully fulfilling the relevant provisions of the Security Council resolutions on imports from and exports to the DPRK. To ensure the validity of Security Council resolutions, any items that are prohibited to export to the DPRK will not be released by the Chinese customs even relevant contracts are signed.

We hope that the Panel will not expand the interpretation of the Security Council resolutions, which have clear provisions on providing financial services to the DPRK.

Source : Member State

Annex 63: Records from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce[55]

商务部业务系统统一平台

全国外商投资企业年度投资经营信息联合报告信息公示

[redacted]

企　业　报告日期:	2017-05-04	出　具回执部门:	大连市中山区外经贸局	出具回执日期:	2017-05-09
统一社会信用代码:	91210200716964630X	进出口企业代码:	2102716964630	法　定代表人:	马东赫

一 企业基本情况 | 二 投资情况 | 三 经营情况 | 四 境内外投资及分支机构情况

投资情况

投资总额（万美元）	12
注册资本（万美元）	10.0
其中：中方认缴（万美元）	4.0
外方认缴（万美元）	6.0
实收资本（万美元）	10
其中：中方实缴（万美元）	4
外方实缴（万美元）	6

境内投资者

姓名/名称	中文	大连友惠国际贸易有限公司
	英文	0
股权比例（%）		40
认缴注册资本（万美元）		4
认缴出资方式	其中：现金（万美元）	4
	实物（万美元）	0
	无形资产（万美元）	0
	土地使用权（万美元）	0
	股权（万美元）	0
	其他（万美元）	0
累计实际出资金额（万美元）		4

境外投资者

姓名/名称	中文	朝鲜新兴信息技术贸易会社 (1)
	英文	0
国籍（或地区）/注册地		朝鲜 (2)
资金来源地		朝鲜
股权比例（%）		60 (3)
认缴注册资本（万美元）		6
认缴出资方式	其中：现金（万美元）	6
	实物（万美元）	0
	无形资产（万美元）	0
	土地使用权（万美元）	0
	股权（万美元）	0
	其他（万美元）	0
累计实际出资金额（万美元）		6

1. Choseon Xinxing Information Technology Trade Association
2. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
3. Ownership Stake in China-based company

Source: The Panel, website (address on file) accessed on April 2021

[55] One expert objects to this annex because the content needs further corroboration.

Annex 64: Corporate Registry Records and Analysis of Social Media Profiles[56]

CERTIFICATE OF INCUMBENCY

Name of Company: **SUPER GOLD HOLDINGS INC.**


We, BEP (Anguilla) Limited of Babrow Building, The Valley, Anguilla, British West Indies, being the duly appointed Registered Agent of SUPER COLD HOLDINCS INC. (the "Company"), an International Business Company incorporated in Anguilla on the 3rd Day of October 2016 with registration number 2414897 hereby certify the followings:-

1. The Company is in Good Legal Standing in Anguilla;
2. That as far as can be determined from the documents retained at the Registered Office of the Company at Babrow Building, The Valley, Anguilla, British West Indies:
   a. The authorized capital of the Company is US$1,000,000.00 divided into 1,000,000 shares of US$1.00 par value.
   b. The sole director is:

Name		Date of Appointment
CHIEN, CHIH-WEI No. 150, Cheng'ai Rd., Fengshan Dist., Kaohsiung City 830, Taiwan	1	25th September 2018

   c. This company does not have a secretary because this is not mandatory under the International Business Companies Act 2000 of the laws of Anguilla under which the company was incorporated.
   d. The current shareholder (i.e. companies/individuals with 10% or more of the shares/voting rights of the Company, of which non are held in the form of bearer shares) is:

Name	No. of Shares Held	% of Shares / Voting Rights
CHIEN, CHIH-WEI No. 150, Cheng'al Rd., Fengshan Dist., Kaohsiung City 830, Taiwan	1,000,000	100%



TO ENABLE ASSIGNMENT OF A COMPANY IDENTIFICATION NUMBER, PLEASE PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING DETAILS:

CURRENT COMPANY NAME* SPRING GAIN INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
FORMER NAME(S) (if known)

Please indicate if:
- ☐ This is correcting the details for an existing company on the LR-F database
- ☒ This is a newly established company
- ☐ This is a change of company name (please give former names above)
- ☐ This is a company merger (please give former names of all companies above)

DATE OF REGISTRATION	8 MAY 2008	1
[redacted] OF REGISTRATION	TAIWAN, [redacted]	
CONTACT ADDRESS*	NO.150, CHENG-AI RD., FENGSHAN CITY	
TOWN*	KAOHSIUNG COUNTY	
POSTAL/ZIP CODE*	830	
[redacted]	TAIWAN, [redacted]	

TELEPHONE	07-336-4888	FAX	07-535-4222	2
E-MAIL	[redacted]@MANSON.COM.TW	WEBSITE		

IF KNOWN PARENT COMPANY

IMO ship identification number(s) * 7903366

If not available other ship details (please supply at least one IMO ship identification number in the current fleet. This helps in the identification of company records)

MANSON SHIPPING (SINGAPORE) PTE LTD.
JIU LI SHUN TRADING CO., LTD.
Manager
[redacted]

[redacted]

新加坡商萬順船務代理有限公司台灣分公司
聚利順貿易股份有限公司
[redacted]
[redacted]@MANSON.COM.TW
07-336-4888
07-535-4222
2

Winson Oil Bunkering Pte. Ltd.
80 RAFFLES PLACE, #41-01 UOB PLAZA 1, SINGAPORE 048624
TEL : +65-6222-9888 FAX : +65-6220-0988

Jiu Li Shuen Trading Co., Ltd 2
26/F-1 NO.29, HAI-PIEN ROAD, LINGYA DISTRICT, KAOHSIUNG 802 , TAIWAN [redacted]
TEL : +886-7336-4888 FAX : +886-7535-4222

WINSON OIL DMCC
UNIT NO.: 3807, DMCC BUSINESS CENTRE, LEVEL NO 1, JEWELLERY & GEMPLEX 3, DUBAI, U.A.E
E-MAIL : bunker@winsonoil.ae

Source: the Panel

[56] The Panel has redacted this third party primary documentation in order to issue a consensus report. Six Panel members object to this redaction.

Annex 65-1: Survey of NGOs on the effects of COVID-19 on humanitarian operations

In order to assess the impact of COVID-19 on humanitarian organizations operating within the DPRK, the Panel sent a survey of questions to 38 organizations. Responding organizations included both UN organizations as well as non-governmental organizations that applied for exemptions either directly to the 1718 Committee, or through a Member State or the UN Resident Coordinator in the DPRK. At the outset, the Panel clarified that responding to its inquiry was optional and that it had no bearing on the exemption approval processes within the 1718 Committee. The following questions were sent to the organizations.

QUESTION 1: What is your assessment of the impact of the limitations related to the COVID-19 pandemic and sanctions on the DPRK, and in what way has it influenced the overall humanitarian situation? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.

QUESTION 2: Please provide detailed information and data on whether your organization experienced reductions in operational capacity due to issues related to quarantine measures in the DPRK and / or implementation of UN sanctions.

QUESTION 3: If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What, if anything, could be improved in the exemption process, or in the implementation of UN sanctions, to better meet your operational needs and objectives?

Table Annex 65-1. Humanitarian organizations' responses to the Panel's Survey

The Panel does not take a position on the responses and has not verified the veracity of any claims made therein. The Panel has redacted Member States' identities and other phrases which might jeopardize the safety of the relevant organizations.

Org. No.	Responses
1	"It is a serious problem that the process of obtaining approval for the exemption for humanitarian assistance to DPRK takes a long time at this critical juncture of the COVID-19 pandemic and natural disasters. Since the UN Security Council Committee approved the updates to the Implementation Assistance Notice No.7 the Committee has announced that it would expedite the exemption procedure for emergency assistance to DPRK for natural disasters and COVID-19. However, it turned out that submitters of the humanitarian exemption requests must provide detailed information of necessary goods they plan to deliver to DPRK, including specifications. To meet the condition, non-governmental organizations, or NGOs on the ground in [redacted] need to confirm a purchase deal with the providers of goods or purchase the items before submitting the exemption requests to add the required information of the supplies in their documents. Yet it is not easy for the NGOs to purchase goods in advance, not knowing if they could obtain approvals for their exemption requests. Some providers tend not to easily share detailed information about their products unless the NGOs purchase them first or make a contract for future purchases. But timing is the most critical element for humanitarian assistance for emergencies because the aid needs to be delivered before things deteriorate or more severe damages occur. However, it is highly likely to miss the golden time in this situation while preparing for the exemption approval. Such a result would negatively impact humanitarian assistance for all cases, including natural disasters and the pandemic." "In 2018 after sanctions against DPRK were strengthened, the country's food production was 4.95M tons, down by 9% compared to 2017, which caused the nation to require humanitarian assistance. Also, malnutrition is closely related to various humanitarian situations other than food shortage. As mentioned above, submitting an exemption request itself already takes a long time before the actual humanitarian assistance is delivered to DPRK; thus, we need to consider and review calling for the adoption of the "Whitelist." " "The "secondary boycott" measures have prevented bank transactions for payments for humanitarian supplies and vessels to enter DPRK ports, and the routes for delivering humanitarian items to DPRK have been blocked. As a result, DPRK counterparts have given up on humanitarian projects for their country. Due to the prolonged suspension of assistance for DPRK and inter-Korean cooperation and exchange, it has become evident that the donors and sponsors of NGOs increasingly tend not to show interest in DPRK projects. Therefore, the UN needs to ease approval conditions for exemption requests on humanitarian supplies so that the NGOs can resume their assistance activities actively." "[Foreign] banks are more and more reluctant to supply sufficient amounts of cash, particularly if the cash supply is intended for projects in DPRK. Despite the exemptions that are granted to the funds dedicated to humanitarian operations, it is common that banks delay or block the supply of cash, leading to additional administrative work on [the organization's] side to unblock the situation."
2	"The drastic measures imposed by the country in regard to the complete cessation of movements of goods and people had repercussions on the preparation of the planting activities on the one hand, and on importations of agricultural inputs on the other hand. Both of these resulted in a large shortage of domestic production, which is estimated to have caused huge impacts on the population. In addition to the COVID-19 limitations'

	impact on the humanitarian situation, the management of the numerous natural disasters of 2020 further exacerbated the dire food insecurity.” “...with no direct access to the country, it proves difficult for [the organization] to monitor, assess and analyze the impact of the suspension of its food security projects on their beneficiaries, let alone the general impact of COVID-19 limitations and the cessation of importations on the humanitarian situation in DPRK.” “Since the DPRK imposed strict quarantine measures and closed its borders in January 2020, [the organization’s] operational capacity in DPRK has been highly compromised. In March 2020, two out of the three expatriates present in Pyongyang were able to leave the country…[P]artnership with local actors has been made more fragile. This is already having strong consequences on future programming capacity, such as the impossibility to be able to seek new funding for the next coming years. Partners have indeed cited the lack of post-COVID-19 visibility as reasons not to seek further grants and develop new projects.” “As of October 2020, all of [the organization’s] projects are officially suspended. This will have immediate consequences when the country reopens, as suspended projects will require further extension from funding partners to cover reopening assessment phases. The mid-term operational capacity of the organization in DPRK has also been impacted due to the increased remote communication and management issues that arose from the absence of expatriates in Pyongyang.” The organization further noted that overhead costs, which continue despite the lack of operations, are “not fully eligible for support by funding partners.” “In 2018, [the organization] observed an increase in the prices of the project goods, of 5 to 25% depending on the item (25% for cement). Korean providers offer prices that are two to five times higher than Chinese providers. Chinese[57] providers also tend to increase their offers due to the complexity and uncertainty of the customs processes. Besides, the need to separate batches according to delays in obtaining exemptions and clearances implies regular additional transportation costs which are significant for [the organization’s] project budgets.” “the daily implementation of the humanitarian exemption implies to manage simultaneously: the logistic processes for the purchases put on hold, contract modifications with providers to adapt to new constraints and delays, writing follow-up modifications of previously granted exemptions, dealing with complicated [redacted] domestic regulations reluctant to implement humanitarian exemptions...These recurrent tasks do require some extra time from Project Managers and Country Director, which eventually takes away time for the qualitative achievement of the projects’ results. All in all, these unintended impacts of the implementation of sanctions result in a general delay in all project implementation. It proves to be all the more important that authorization processes be more simplified and flexible in order not to infringe on the organizations’ operational capacity.” “The general opinion is that the request process is not quite optimal but that it remains acceptable. In order to better meet the organization’s operational needs and objectives, more guidance from the Committee could be valuable for [the organization].”
3	“Since our last correspondence...we have observed almost no changes regarding the situation with our project activities in North Korea.”

[57] One expert objects to the usage of “Chinese” and “customs processes” in this sentence.

4	"The strict measures and limitations that [the organization] has been itself facing in regards to the COVID 19 have significantly reduced the organization's capacity to monitor the impacts of the restrictions at a local and national level." "The last [the organization's] expatriate staff left the country in August 2020 considering the total suspension of the activities and the complete lack of visibility regarding a potential restart of [the organization's] operations in the country, as well as the possibility to send personnel, funds and equipment needed to properly run the projects." "The access and communication barriers imposed by the COVID 19 situation as well as the lack of secondary data from other sources make it impossible for [the organization] to propose an analysis of the humanitarian situation evolution in regards with the current pandemic." "...restrictions made impossible for [the organization] to keep implementing its projects within acceptable quality and integrity standards, forcing the organization to suspend all its activities." "...indeed, certain support running costs must be maintained, but they are not fully eligible for our financial partners and [the organization] will not be able to pay these costs with its own funds if the situation continues over time. Moreover, considering the impossibility to send cash to DPRK [redacted], [the organization] has therefore been accumulating debts since the suspension of its operations." "In terms of future operational capacity, the restart of [the organization's] activities in the country will imply a mission revitalization period ...; relaunch discussion for designation of national staff; clean up liabilities; sending back international staffs to the country; assessing the situation of each suspended projects and restart the contact with farms and partners; importing the material and equipment blocked at the border; etc.). Additional extension of projects will probably be needed, inducing costs that were not initially planned; [the organisation] is coordinating with its financial partners and will propose adjustments to its projects once the situation will have been reassessed." "Even though the COVID 19 related restrictions on importations decided by DPRK are responsible for this situation, it has to be mentioned that [the organization] currently has materials and equipment... blocked at the border since January 2020. [the organization] has no choice since then to request extension of the exemption granted for this purchase to ensure it is still valid when the border reopens." "An issue to report is that the exemptions granted to [the organization] are sometimes not recognized by [redacted] customs, which implies additional negotiations and explanation delays with [redacted] authorities to eventually lift this barrier."

Source : the Panel

Annex 65-2: Statements from NGOs regarding UN sanctions

The following quotes have been compiled from the responses to the Panel's survey to NGOs.

The Panel does not take a position on the responses and has not verified the veracity of any claims made therein.

The Panel has redacted Member States' identities and other phrases which might jeopardize the safety of the relevant organizations.

- "...The cash flow limitations remain the main challenge for organisations to operate in DPRK. Specifically, the closing of all banking channels to DPRK implies [redacted] in the country, thus representing an additional administrative and HR constraint. Banks appear to be reluctant to risk engaging with the DPRK, which is impacting all programmes. In general, the unavailability of cash in the country makes it complicated for organisations to implement activities. Action plans must be adapted to the availability of cash, to the detriment of needs."
- "the administrative work related to sanction compliance slightly increases the workload of project managers and the Country Director. The legal expertise required to understand the information involved in the sanction mechanisms and the absence of a direct channel for resident INGOs to communicate with the UNSC Sanctions Committee has, on some occasions, proven detrimental to other tasks and responsibilities. All in all, the administrative work related to sanctions implementation takes away fluidness, which impacts the working rhythm but does not infringe on the optimal dynamism of programme implementation."
- "following the set of sanctions implemented in 2018 (following UNSC resolution 2397 of December 2017), the [redacted] Customs have put a special emphasis on humanitarian imports, creating additional delays instead of easing the exempted imports."
- "the importation process through [redacted] has proven to be increasingly complicated as issues specific to [redacted] customs arise. These delays resulted in major impacts on project's implementation (and on the population's well-being), such as the suspension of the transportation of food to children institutions and the lack of vegetable intake by children due to the insufficiency of winter production because of the absence of the procured pipes to be used for the construction of greenhouses. All in all, these delays are estimated to have affected up to 30,000 to 45,000 beneficiaries, mostly children"
- "several major suppliers stopped submitting offers, mentioning specifically the [redacted] sanctions in place since January 2018, which do not specify any exemption for humanitarian activities. Suppliers are worried, increasingly reluctant to send their offers to call for tenders and discouraged by the [redacted] sanctions, in terms of customs clearance as well as in terms of banking."

- "each slight modification of technical specification must be notified to the UNSC SC, which appears to increase the planned duration of the action. As so, some activities have been delayed and no-cost extensions have been requested to donors for some projects due to the duration extension of the purchase procedures."
- "...Despite the exemptions that are granted to the funds dedicated to humanitarian operations, it is common that banks delay or block the supply of cash, leading to additional administrative work on [the organization's] side to unblock the situation."
- "Since the sanctions have come to force, a drop in the number of suppliers applying for the tenders [the organization] open in the frame of the procurement of goods and equipment. This decrease in the potential supplier diversity has a direct impact on prices competitively, goods and equipment quality."
- "...the exemption process is now well understood and managed but can still provoke delays in case of unexpected administrative issue (e.g.: [redacted] customs that sometimes refuse to recognize the exemptions granted to [the organization] –calling for additional negotiations)."

Source : the Panel

Annex 65-3: Summary of suggestions from NGOs

The following list of suggestions has been compiled from the responses to the Panel's survey to NGOs. The Panel does not take a position on the suggestions and has not verified the veracity of any claims made therein. The Panel has redacted Member States' identities and other phrases which might jeopardize the safety of the relevant organizations.

- "The end of the COVID-19 pandemic is an unforeseeable future. Thus, the Committee needs to reconsider its sanctions against DPRK on humanitarian assistance to help resolve the unprecedented case in the country. Also, the Committee should streamline the exemption procedure by writing a Whitelist on the already approved supplies or similar projects."
- "It sometimes takes a long time for an exemption request for a humanitarian project for DPRK to be approved because of the awareness that all people in Pyongyang belong to the privileged class. Such an awareness needs to change that delivery of humanitarian assistance should be made without prejudice for those who live in Pyongyang but are underprivileged."
- "The first suggestion is the extension of the exemption validity period. It was [the organization's] opinion that 6 months was a too short period to be able to: put in place the calls for tenders; examine, assess and preselect offers based on technical and financial criteria; request and obtain the validation of the service provider by [the state official]; finalize the contract with the service provider; and proceed to the importation and customs. It has previously been the case that, by the time the entire process is completed, the validity of the exemption reaches its term. It then leaves little time for the activities to be put in place."
- "The market realities are not often aligned with the technical specificities provided in the exemption request submitted to the UNSC Sanctions Committee. This implies that the slightest modification requires the submission of a new request to the Committee in order to confirm the exemption and enable [redacted] clearances… The most convenient adjustment to the exemption process for [the organisation] would be to be able to get a global validation from the Sanctions Committee for each project, thus covering the entirety of the project's duration. Such a measure would most definitely ease the project implementation."
- "[The organization] would also like to suggest the Sanctions Committee to assist in supporting customs authorities in transit countries by sending comprehensive instructions to facilitate the timely clearing of humanitarian items, as well as to consider issuing a communication to Member States, encouraging them to assist in exploring banking channels and highlighting that banking operations which support humanitarian operations are exempt from sanctions.

- “As of October 2018, the Sanctions Committee now publishes authorizations online, this can be very useful in asserting permissions. A good practice that could be implemented to facilitate the process would be to translate these documents into Chinese as well.”
- “the extension of the 6-month validity period granted for each exemption. Indeed, considering the weight of the exemption request process as well as the procurement delay necessary to import the goods and equipment in DPRK, the 6-month exemption granted so far complicates the implementation of the projects since it has to be quickly renewed to prevent delays in the delivery of the following items to be imported. In addition, despite the fact that the exemption process is now well understood and managed by all the stakeholders, any issue in the exemption granting process or more likely in the importation process could delay the importation to more than 6 months and therefore make null and void the exemption valid for 6 months. The current restriction on imports linked to the COVID 19 situation is a good example of this constraint: as mentioned previously, [the organization] had to request extension of the exemption due to the fact that the goods and equipment covered by the granted exemption are still blocked at the border. Considering the complete lack of visibility about the timeframe to expect regarding the resumption of the imports, it is likely that [the organisation] will have to ask for a new extension of the exemption.”
- “Strengthen the link with the [redacted] authorities to facilitate the customs clearance process”
- “Make fast tracks when it comes to 1) amendment justified in terms of quantity 2) renewal in the event of expiration.”

Source : the Panel

Annex 66: Consolidated list of recommendations

Maritime

On vessel identity laundering and swap

1. Member States and ship registries should issue up-to-date circulars on identified laundered AIS digital profiles used as cover identities, so as to caution against trading with such ships.

2. Where there is suspicion about the validity of the identifiers of a vessel, port and other relevant maritime authorities should conduct the necessary checks of the history of such vessels entering its port jurisdiction waters, pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 2397 (2017).

3. Flag registries should require all applicants seeking to join their registry to include up-to-date photographs of the exterior (bow, stern deck) and interior of their vessels where vessel identifiers are displayed.

4. Member States hosting shipyards that service foreign-flagged vessels should raise awareness of the risk of vessels seeking physical alterations or other modifications to obfuscate their identity in order to engage in sanctionable activities.

On information sharing

5. Flag registries should regularly publish a list of deregistered vessels on their website and in maritime circulars for the broader shipping community.

6. The misuse of MMSIs is a trend affecting various flag registries. To assist and ensure that the MMSIs of flag registries are not fraudulently used, the Panel encourages registries and Member States in whose waters vessels transmit fraudulent identifiers to investigate such vessels and to share the results of their investigations, including with the Panel, in particular where it relates to suspected sanctions evasion activities.

On AIS manipulation

7. Member States should monitor and investigate vessels that broadcast suspect identifiers particularly in waters where DPRK and DPRK-linked vessels are known to operate.

8. Flag registries should ensure dedicated personnel for monitoring the AIS status of their registries' fleet as part of their due diligence efforts, including contacting ships that broadcast AIS information that is different from that in their registered profile.

9. Classification societies should certify the existence of a single, functional, type A AIS system on each vessel as part of a periodic safety inspection. Inspections should look for evidence of multiple AIS systems.

On beneficial ownership information

10. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States require their relevant competent authorities to disclose beneficial ownership information related to all legal entities seeking to register vessels under their ship registry. Member States with open registries should endeavour to collect identifying and contact information for each individual who owns or exerts control over the foreign entity to which each vessel belongs, whether as a controlling shareholder, a financier of the enterprise, or a senior manager or decision-maker. Such information should be made available to relevant entities such as law enforcement, as well as to the Panel, to facilitate sanctions implementation efforts.

Trade and Customs

11. The Panel recommends that the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) look into possible measures to prevent erroneous usage of country codes for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea (KP and KR respectively).

12. The Panel recommends that Member States streamline their export and import control lists, using as supportive material the Panel's informal list of prohibited commodities.

13. The Panel notes that Member States could study the possibility of using the ASYCUDA system, developed by UNCTAD (a computerized customs management system, now used in more than 80 countries; see https://asycuda.org/en/) to monitor transactions with sanctioned jurisdictions.

14. The Panel recommends that the customs authorities of Member States use the above-mentioned resources for the information of and usage by the trading agents of their jurisdictions for due diligence purposes, particularly when dealing with prohibited commodities in relation to trade with sanctioned jurisdictions.

Luxury Goods

15. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States streamline their export control lists to reflect the list of prohibited luxury goods in a manner consistent with the objectives of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016), avoiding unnecessary broadening of their scope in order not to restrict the supply of unprohibited goods to the civilian population nor have a negative humanitarian impact once trade restarts.

16. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States encourage their business entities and nationals exporting luxury goods to include a contractual provision to prevent resale to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

17. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States and relevant organizations encourage shipping and transportation companies to provide thorough systems for checking consignees, bearing in mind the risk of trans-shipment.

Finance

18. The Panel notes the October 2020 revision by the Financial Action Task Force of Recommendation 1 and its Interpretive Note (R.1 and INR.1) to require countries and private sector entities to "identify, assess, understand and mitigate their proliferation financing risks (PF risk)" related to "the potential breach, non-implementation or evasion of the targeted financial sanctions". Pursuant to this requirement, the Panel recommends that all Member States and private sector entities review the recently published FATF Guidance on Proliferation Financing Risk Assessment and Mitigation.

Unintended Impact of Sanctions

19. The Panel notes the usefulness of biannual briefings by the relevant United Nations agencies on the unintended impact of sanctions and recommends that the Committee continue this practice.

20. The Panel reiterates the need for urgent measures to re-establish the banking channel.

21. The Panel recommends that the Security Council continue to address issues and processes that mitigate the potential unintended adverse impacts of sanctions on the civilian population of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and on humanitarian aid operations to benefit the country's vulnerable population and overcome the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.